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A B S T R A C T
The peer-to-peer paradigm offers the potential to address many of the challenges related
to large-scale content distribution over the Internet (e.g., scalability, costs, etc.). However,
currently, many approaches fail to offer the quality of service supported by over-
provisioned client-server distribution systems such as RapidShare and YouTube. The
reason for this is that peer-to-peer systems must operate under the constraints placed
on them by contributing users. Consequently, selfish, strategic, or malicious users often
lower the overall system utility. To address this, incentive mechanisms are employed to
motivate such users to cooperate with the system (e.g., those that contribute more,
receive more in return). Many users, however, observe that popular systems such
as BitTorrent (employing tit-for-tat as incentive mechanism), are often ineffective
at fulfilling a set of key content distribution requirements, namely performance and
availability. The overarching goal of this thesis is therefore to extend existing incentive
mechanisms to better fulfil these core requirements.
At first, this thesis validates and quantifies these casual observations regarding
peer-to-peer performance and content availability. To achieve this we carry out two
major measurement studies in the BitTorrent system, the current de-facto standard
for peer-to-peer content distribution. To this end we identify widespread performance
and availability problems that, through detailed analysis, are attributed to ineffective
incentive design. In particular, we find that the current popular approach of ’tit-for-tat’
fails to incite sufficient cooperation amongst users to ensure high performance and
content availability. Further analysis shows that this is caused by a lack of incentives
for seeding (i.e., the process of remaining as a data source after one has downloaded
the entire file).
Based on these findings, we subsequently study a set of intuitive solutions to
overcome what we call the seeder promotion problem. The purpose of this analysis is to
narrow the solution space and to shape a more sophisticated incentive design. In order
to achieve this, three abstract cross-torrent incentive approaches are detailed, as well as
single-torrent incentive mechanisms. Each of these approaches are then quantitatively
analysed through extensive trace-based simulations. These analysis further confirm our
finding that bilateral incentive strategies (e.g., tit-for-tat) are insufficient at providing
robust incentives for seeders. This is because most users (i) do not meet each other
repeatedly and (ii) do not simultaneously require each other’s content. Instead, it is
shown that the only way to overcome performance and availability issues is to use
multilateral incentive strategies (i.e., to allow users to contribute to one user yet receive
reciprocation from another).
Finally, we design and evaluate a novel multilateral incentive mechanism, named
FairSwarm.KOM. Unlike digital currency systems (in which contribution informa-
tion is globally visible) or tit for-tat (where no propagation of credit points occurs),
FairSwarm.KOM uses one-hop information of the overlay network to evaluate the
cooperativeness of the peers. Through the use of extensive trace-based simulations, it
is shown that FairSwarm.KOM improves the download performance of the popular
BitTorrent system by more than 86%, while guaranteeing high levels of file availability
(>99%). Most importantly, these two properties are achieved without harming the
fairness of individual users and with an extremely low overhead.
K U R Z FA S S U N G
Das Peer-to-Peer (P2P)-Kommunikations-Paradigma bietet neue Möglichkeiten für die
Verteilung von digitalen Inhalten über das Internet. Peer-to-Peer bündelt die Ressourcen
der Teilnehmer im System und setzt diese effizient ein, um eine Datei an eine große
Anzahl von interessierten Nutzern zu verteilen. Damit sind P2P-Systeme inhärent
selbst-skalierend: Je mehr Teilnehmer dem System beitreten, desto höher die Anzahl
der verfügbaren Ressourcen und desto besser die Verteilungsgeschwindigkeit. Jedoch
profitieren nicht nur die Nutzer von P2P-Technologie; die Anbieter digitaler Medien
(Content-Provider) können gerade durch die Nutzung dieser Ressourcen ebenfalls
Upload-Kosten durch den Quellserver einsparen.
Trotz dieser beachtlichen Vorteile gegenüber traditionellen Client/Server-Ansätzen
können bestehende P2P-Inhaltsverteilsysteme, wie zum Beispiel das populäre BitTor-
rent-System, bezüglich der Downloadgeschwindigkeit und der Langzeitverfügbarkeit
von Inhalten oftmals nicht mit ressourcenstarken Client/Server-Farmen wie Rapid-
Share oder YouTube konkurrieren. Dies ist insbesondere darauf zurückzuführen, dass
die Leistungsfähigkeit eines Peer-to-Peer-Systems einzig und allein auf der Kooperati-
onsbereitschaft der teilnehmenden Nutzer beruht. Jedoch neigen gerade die Endnutzer
dazu, ihre Ressourcenbereitstellung bis auf ein Minimum zu reduzieren, solange kein
Anreiz zur Kooperation besteht. Angesichts dieses Dilemma und der häufig zu beo-
bachtenden Effizienzprobleme von P2P-Inhaltsverteilsystemen, ist daher zu vermuten,
dass existierende Anreizmechanismen zur Erhöhung von Kooperation, wie z. B. der
vorwiegend eingesetzte „Tit-for-Tat“-Mechanismus in BitTorrent, ihre Rolle gänzlich
verfehlen. Genau an diesem Punkt setzt die vorliegende Dissertation an; dem Entwurf
und der Konzeptionierung eines neuartigen Anreizmechanismus zur Förderung von
nachhaltiger Kooperation, der sowohl höhere Downloadgeschwindigkeiten erzielen soll,
als auch die Langzeitverfügbarkeit von Inhalten in P2P-Systemen verbessert.
Um die Korrektheit der oben genannten Schlussfolgerungen wissenschaftlich zu
untermauern, beschäftigt sich diese Arbeit zunächst mit der Validierung, Quantifi-
zierung und Ursachenanalyse bestehender Effizienzprobleme in P2P-Inhaltsverteil-
systemen. In diesem Kontext werden zwei Messstudien im populären BitTorrent-
System durchgeführt, das den gegenwärtigen de-facto-Standard für moderne P2P-
Inhaltsverteilung repräsentiert. Hierbei wird gezeigt, dass P2P-Systeme sowohl von
gravierenden Geschwindigkeits- als auch Verfügbarkeitsproblemen betroffen sind.
Durch die Messdatenanalyse kann des Weiteren belegt werden, dass diese Effizienzpro-
bleme auf falsch gesetzte Anreize zur Kooperation zurückzuführen sind. Genauer
betrachtet schafft es der Tit-for-Tat-Mechanismus nicht, Nutzern Anreize zur Koope-
ration zu geben, wenn diese ihren Dateidownload beendet haben. Jedoch sind genau
diese Datenquellen, die so genannten „Seeder“, ausschlaggebend für die Downloadge-
schwindigkeit und Verfügbarkeit von Inhalten in P2P-Systemen.
Basierend auf diesen Erkenntnissen wird anschließend eine eingehende Analyse von
möglichen Lösungsansätzen zur Schaffung von Anreizen für Seeder durchgeführt. In
Folge dessen wird der mögliche Lösungsraum weiter eingegrenzt und es können grund-
legende Lösungsanforderungen ermittelt werden. In diesem Zusammenhang werden
sowohl drei „Torrent“-übergreifende Lösungsansätze als auch „Single-Torrent“-basierte
Ansätze durch messdatengestützte Simulationen quantitativ untersucht. Hierbei be-
stätigt sich, dass bilaterale Anreizstrategien (wie z. B. Tit-for-Tat) gänzlich ungeeignet
sind, um nachhaltige Kooperationen in P2P-Systemen zu fördern. Dies ist dadurch
begründet, dass Nutzer sich oftmals nur einmal im P2P-System begegnen und keine
Tauschgrundlage bezüglich bereits heruntergeladener Inhalte besitzen. Stattdessen
kann aufgezeigt werden, dass ausschließlich multilaterale Anreizmechanismen das
Potenzial aufweisen, langanhaltende Anreize für Seeder zu schaffen, und somit der
Schlüssel zur Lösung der oben beschriebenen Effizienzprobleme sind. Mithilfe eines
multilateralen Anreizmechanismus kann ein Nutzer beispielsweise Daten zu einem
beliebigen Teilnehmer im System transferieren, um diese Kooperation dann von einem
beliebigen Dritten (zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt) zurückzufordern.
Anhand der ermittelten Anforderungen für eine konkrete Lösung beschäftigt sich der
letzte Teil dieser Arbeit mit dem Entwurf und der Konzeptionierung eines neuartigen
Anreizmechanismus namens „FairSwarm.KOM“. Im Gegensatz zu bestehenden Tit-for-
Tat-Mechanismen, in denen die Nutzer keine Informationen über geschehene Koopera-
tionen austauschen, und Anreizmechanismen, die jede Kooperation eines Teilnehmers
im System öffentlich sichtbar machen (Virtual Currency), verwendet FairSwarm.KOM
„Ein-Hop“-Nachbarschaften, um die Kooperationsbereitschaft einzelner Teilnehmer zu
ermitteln. Es wird durch messdatengestützte Simulationen gezeigt, dass dieser An-
satz eine nahezu 100-prozentige Dateiverfügbarkeit in BitTorrent-Systemen garantiert
und auch die Downloadgeschwindigkeit im Vergleich zu Tit-for-Tat-Mechanismen um
mehr als 86 % verbessern kann. Zudem werden diese Eigenschaften erreicht, ohne
dabei die Fairness-Grundlagen des Systems zu verletzen und ohne einen signifikanten
Kommunikationsoverhead im System zu erzeugen.
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1I N T R O D U C T I O N
Content distribution over the Internet is becoming increasingly popular amongst
both the industry and consumers alike. Recently, a market analysis has shown that
25% of all music purchased in the U.S. is downloaded from Apple iTunes and it is
expected that digital music sales will nearly equal CD sales by the end of 2011 [6]. This
trend is confirmed by the observation that a large number of key content producers
including MGM, Universal, Disney, and 20th Century Fox are now distributing films
and television shows via the Internet [86]. These online stores offer millions of users a
simple way to access a wide variety of pre-stored content while remaining as a high
profit-yielding business model.
During the last years, not only the number of Internet users has experienced an
explosive growth, but also the size of content being distributed. Videos are available in
higher resolutions so that a 90-minute movie in high-definition quality already exceeds
2 GByte. In addition to this, many users have access to resident broadband networks
such as Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL) and cable connections. More than 283 million
people already use these networks worldwide [36], and this number is expected to rise
to 477 million by 2011 [25]. As a consequence, content providers need to be prepared
to handle potentially hundreds of thousands of well-connected users simultaneously
accessing a single file object amounting to several gigabytes.
Not surprisingly, source servers are recently often crowded and suffer from link
congestion. For instance, the beta release of Microsoft Vista and Windows 7 were
restricted to only a few thousands downloads, but still the source servers could not
withstand these peak demands and suddenly crashed [119, 91]. These issues are often
addressed by hardware upgrades (i.e., adding additional servers) to increase the
bandwidth available and/or the amount of parallel connections that can be maintained.
This is, however, only a temporary solution as it does not tackle the problem while it
occurs; there can always appear more users necessitating additional upload resources.
Consequently, a solution also requires that the system can spontaneously adapt to the
unpredictable and continuously changing demand of users.
1.1 motivation
Peer-to-peer (P2P) networks have a great potential to address these long-standing
issues. While early P2P research has focused almost exclusively on content localisation
[18, 41, 104, 117], one of its most promising applications is content distribution [73, 4].
In P2P content distribution, users (synonymously called peers or nodes) are both
suppliers and consumers of bandwidth, in contrast to the traditional client-server
model where only servers supply and clients consume. When aggregated by a P2P
network, these nodes constitute an immense pool of under-utilised bandwidth that can
be leveraged by protocols such as BitTorrent to quickly distribute content files over the
Internet [21]. As shown in Figure 1, in BitTorrent, the file to be distributed is typically
split into many chunks that are directly exchanged between the interested peers. Since
peers not only download chunks from users in possession of the file (e.g., source
servers), but also serve them to other users, the serving capacity of the system increases
with the number of available nodes, making the system potentially self-scaling.
From the content provider’s perspective, P2P content distribution offers two potential
benefits. First, expensive bandwidth over-provisioning to withstand peak-demands
is negated to the point of irrelevance, because the system automatically adapts to its
needs. Second, the content provider can forbear from purchasing services of third-
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Figure 1: Modern peer-to-peer content distribution systems split large files into many chunks.
Source node 1 simultaneously uploads file chunks to receivers 2 and 3. Both receivers
then immediately start to mutually exchange already received chunks.
parties such as Akamai. This cost-effectiveness is further validated by the fact that
leading content producers such as MTV, Paramount Pictures and 20th Century Fox have
recently partnered BitTorrent Inc. [13]. Also, leading players in the gaming industry,
e.g., Blizzard Entertainment, already use the BitTorrent protocol to distribute important
patches and software updates for their famous online game ’World of Warcraft’ [14].
When considering the above, P2P content distribution seems to have many advan-
tageous characteristics compared to client-server based approaches for both content
providers and end-users. Although P2P technologies have been applied to commer-
cial environments, their predominant usage remains in the domain of open systems.
These are systems that do not maintain strict control over peer and protocol behaviour.
Instead, they are systems that allow open access to any user willing to cooperate.
Consequently, through the use of modified source code, it becomes possible for any
peer to deviate from the protocol specification at its own will. Such systems already
account for 50-70% of the total Internet share [49]. Recent work has shown that these
systems can be used in a commercial context [75, 76, 46]; however, issues related to the
continuous provision of content have so far not been sufficiently addressed.
In particular, measurement studies such as [98, 94, 5] demonstrate that in P2P content
distribution systems1, users often have to wait long periods of time before being able to
finish their downloads. Unfortunately, however, client download performance is a major
indicator of user satisfaction, and thus the success of the entire system. Users simply
expect that the system fully utilises the downstream bandwidth of their broadband
connections. While this problem is often mitigated when accessing popular content
early in its lifecycle, significant performance issues can be observed in P2P systems
distributing older, less popular items. Specifically, this content not only suffers from low
performance but also from long-term unavailability [42, 84]. This is, however, a highly
unsatisfactory situation; ideally, it should be guaranteed that users can download the
entire range of pre-stored content including popular as well as unpopular file objects.
Especially the latter are of particular importance, since unpopular file objects can
represent a significant fraction of demand and revenue [3].
This thesis primary focuses on these performance and availability issues in (open
platform) P2P content distribution systems.
1.2 incentive mechanisms
A number of potential causes can be identified when inspecting performance and
availability issues in P2P content distribution. Most notable is the poor resource
availability that can be observed at some peers. Traditionally, this has been used to
explain why not the same level of performance can be achieved compared to over-
provisioned client-server systems. Recent studies, however, have identified that resource
availability is not the core reason [94]. Instead, the willingness of peers to contribute
1 When we use the term P2P content distribution system in the remainder of this thesis, we implicitly refer to
open platform systems.
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their resources is, in fact, the true cause [48]. Thus, the resources are sufficient but the
users are simply not prepared to contribute them, meaning that the solution to these
performance and availability issues should be oriented towards incentivising users to
better cooperate with the system. This is most systemic in systems such as Gnutella
that do not provide any incentives at all.
From this it is clear that a logical approach to resolve the issues inspected in this thesis
is to improve the incentive mechanisms employed by P2P content distribution systems.
Subsequently, the purpose of this would be to ensure that strategic (selfish) users are
always encouraged to contribute their resources through the promise of rewards. Recent
years have seen a set of similar efforts taking place, with the predominant technique
focussing on ’tit-for-tat’-policies [7], i.e., node A will only upload to node B if node B
will upload to node A. This approach, however, has failed to address performance and
availability issues, as validated later in this thesis. Consequently, the next stage must
be to investigate the research challenges related to the design of superior incentive
schemes.
1.3 research challenges
Designing incentives to fully exploit the potential of P2P content distribution is complex
and highly challenging. In particular, due to the constraints of the environment that
P2P content distribution systems operate in (i.e., the Internet), a sophisticated design
has to consider many characteristics at the same time, viz.:
Challenge 1: Lack of Centralised Control.
Incentive design becomes trivial if we can assume a central authority in P2P systems
that immediately detects and punishes uncooperativeness while keeping account of
user contributions. P2P networks are, however, assumed to operate in a completely
decentralised fashion without a global ’police’ that governs interactions between the
nodes [116, 81]. As a result, users are free to attempt to strategically manipulate others,
facilitated by the impossibility of peer interactions being monitored by third-parties.
This makes incentive design extremely challenging because it must be devised such that
it motivates even selfish users to cooperate, without having to resort to a centralised
authority. Consequently, such a mechanism must be robust to attacks and misbehaving
users.
Challenge 2: Need for Continuity of Data Sources.
In a P2P system, inciting users that are downloading a file to cooperate is a basic requi-
site for achieving superior system performance. This alone, however, will not suffice in
a P2P context, because the highly asymmetric nature of residential broadband links
does not align well with the requirements of P2P content distribution. In particular,
the downstream bandwidth of users is often an order of magnitude higher than their
upstream capacity [25]. This suggests that a set of users that are all downloading from
each other can never saturate their downstream links by default, as important upstream
capacity is missing. Thus, a sophisticated incentive design needs to find a method to
compensate for this lack of capacity. This is only possible if other users provide their
uplink capacity while not downloading (i.e., they perform the role of an altruistic data
source). Therefore, data sources not only ensure the availability of content, but also
increase download performance, which highlights the necessity to incorporate these
users into incentive design.
Challenge 3: Ensuring Fairness in the Face of User Heterogeneity.
Most of the Internet access links are not only highly asymmetric, but also vary signifi-
cantly with regard to their performance capabilities [25]. The skew in user upstream
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capacities is extreme; a small fraction of higher provisioned nodes (10%) hold more than
79% of the total capacity [50]. This observation, however, induces a serious performance-
fairness dilemma. In particular, to achieve the best possible system throughput, it is
necessary to keep higher provisioned nodes engaged as long as possible in the distri-
bution process so as to sustain maximum aggregated system capacity. Indeed, it can be
shown that average download throughput increases significantly, if high capacity users
leave the system last [31].
From a user’s perspective, however, the above situation seems unfair as system
throughput is achieved by exploiting peers residing at the higher end of the capacity
spectrum. Moreover, precisely because of the selfishness of users, systematic unfair-
ness should be avoided by all means. This is because a peer’s upload contribution
is typically a tuneable parameter that can be freely configured by the participating
users (potentially resulting in high capacity nodes withholding their resources). Conse-
quently, systemic unfairness will likely result in performance collapse in the long-term.
Therefore, a sophisticated incentive design needs to find a method to cope with this
inherent performance-fairness dilemma.
1.4 research goals
Motivated by the above issues, the key objective of this thesis is to strengthen and
improve the download performance and file availability of P2P content distribution
systems. This objective can be further decomposed into three core research goals:
• To investigate the shortcomings of current P2P content distribution systems with
regard to providing continuous content distribution. Specifically, to understand
how existing incentive mechanisms fail to fulfil performance and availability
requirements.
• To design and build a new P2P incentive mechanism that addresses any discovered
performance and availability limitations of existing systems.
• To show the superiority of the new incentive mechanism; specifically to (i) validate
that improved performance and availability can be achieved compared to existing
tit-for-tat mechanisms, and to (ii) ensure that this can take place in a robust, fair,
and low overhead manner considering current operating environments.
1.5 thesis organisation
This thesis is structured into seven chapters.
After this introduction, Chapter 2 “Background and Related Work” details basic princi-
ples and important terminology in the domain of P2P content distribution. Following
this, an abstract overview of a set of prominent P2P protocols used for online con-
tent distribution is given. Subsequently, related work in the field of P2P incentive
mechanisms is discussed.
Chapter 3 “Measurements and Analysis of the BitTorrent System” deals with two major
measurement studies that we performed in the BitTorrent system. The purpose of
these studies is to validate our critique of P2P content distribution with respect to
providing continuous content distribution and to discover vital properties that cause
these limitations.
Chapter 4 “Analysis of Solution Space” studies a set of intuitive solution approaches
with regard to the issues found in Chapter 3, both to narrow the solution space and
to shape a more sophisticated incentive design. A further purpose of this chapter is
then to derive a set of key requirements that a solution must fulfil to overcome the
performance and availability issues discovered.
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Chapter 5 “A New P2P Incentive Mechanism – FairSwarm.KOM” focuses on the design
of a novel P2P incentive mechanism that is devised to meet the solution requirements
posed in Chapter 4. Within this chapter, a conceptual overview of the solution’s basic
concepts and major building blocks is given. Following this, each building block is
presented and discussed in detail, while important design decisions are justified.
Chapter 6 “Evaluation of FairSwarm.KOM” evaluates the devised P2P incentive so-
lution with a focus on performance, availability, fairness, robustness, and overhead.
To this end, extensive trace-based simulations are performed, taking our BitTorrent
measurement data as an input.
Chapter 7 “Conclusion” first summarises the content and main findings of this thesis.
Following this, the main contributions of the thesis are highlighted and the research
goals are revisited. Finally, the thesis is concluded by presenting areas of potential
future work opened up by this work.

2B A C K G R O U N D A N D R E L AT E D W O R K
This chapter introduces the basic principles and important terminology in the context of P2P
content distribution. After this, we give an abstract overview of a set of prominent P2P protocols
used for online content distribution. Finally, related work in the area of incentives for P2P
systems is discussed, particularly in P2P online content distribution.
2.1 introduction
The overarching goal of this chapter is to provide relevant background information
to assist in the understanding of the following chapters. In particular, in Section 2.2,
we describe the major components of a P2P content distribution system and explain
their key functionality. Thereby, important terminology is introduced. Following this,
in Section 2.3, we give an abstract overview of the most prevalent P2P systems used
for online content distribution, namely Gnutella, eMule, and BitTorrent. The informa-
tion presented form the basis required to understand the analysis performed in the
remainder of the thesis. Finally, since a core research goal of this thesis is to design
a new P2P incentive mechanism, Section 2.4 reviews related work in the field of P2P
incentives. To this end, incentive mechanisms are classified into three categories: direct
reciprocity (bilateral schemes), indirect reciprocity (multilateral schemes), and virtual
currency systems. The chapter then concludes with a brief summary containing the
main points to keep from this chapter.
2.2 basic principles of p2p content distribution
Any form of P2P content distribution can be reduced to certain basic components that
provide the required functionality to distribute content to a set of interested end-users.
This section briefly delineates those components, including a brief discussion of the
advantages and drawbacks of different approaches to realise either component.
2.2.1 Overview
Modern P2P content distribution systems usually split a file into smaller parts, which
are named chunks in the following. This allows downloading peers to act as servers
to other peers as soon as they have received a complete chunk, which is obviously
quicker than waiting for a complete file. From the downloader’s point of view, this
method also allows for downloading a file from multiple sources at the same time.
In literature, the above technique is often referred to as multi-source downloading. As
shown by [129, 11, 32], multi-source downloading has two major advantages compared
to classical client/server approaches. First, it exploits the upstream capacity of the
users and therefore increases the throughput of the system, which ultimately decreases
download times. Second, the approach is inherently self-scaling while avoiding the
limitations of client/server approaches, i.e., it continuously adapts system capacity
because of increasing user populations and access connections.
As highlighted by [32], to best capitalise the upstream capacity of the users in the
data distribution process, it is mandatory (i) to engage users as fast as possible, and
(ii) to keep users engaged as long as possible.
Evidently, users can only be integrated into the distribution process if they are useful
to others. Therefore, it is important to maintain a high degree of chunk diversity by
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keeping the number of copies of each chunk approximately the same. This prevents
peers from having to wait for extended periods for rare chunks that only a few other
peers possess.
The architecture of modern P2P content distribution systems basically consists of two
architectural elements: content discovery and content delivery [4, 73]. The functionality
of each of these elements can be briefly summarised as follows:
1. Content Discovery: The objective of the content discovery component is to find
source peers in the system, capable of serving the file. In multi-source download-
ing, a potential data source is a peer that possesses at least one file chunk. In this
regard, we distinguish between source peers that are already in possession of
the entire file, so-called seeders, and sources that possess only a subset of the file,
named leechers.
2. Content Delivery: The delivery component defines a ’rule set’ how chunks are
efficiently forwarded from discovered data sources to interested receivers. To
this end, important decisions are made within this component. First, a user must
decide how many peers to serve simultaneously. Indeed, each peer’s outdegree k
varies depending on the chosen peer organisation strategy that can range from a
linear chain to a tree or mesh [11]. Further, with respect to the chosen distribution
model, a peer must also select the users it wants to serve data to and subsequently
decide which chunk to download next. All three, the distribution model, the
peer selection strategy, and the chunk selection strategy have a major impact on
download performance [129, 11].
In essence, the delivery of content in a cooperative content distribution system
consists of two steps. In step one, potential data sources for a certain file are discovered.
In step two, the discovered data sources are interconnected with interested receivers
simultaneously demanding the file. Subsequently, the actual content delivery process
starts following a certain delivery technique.
We next provide a brief overview of techniques to realise source discovery, and
briefly discuss the advantages and drawbacks of different peer organisation strategies.
2.2.2 Discovery Mechanisms
In order to discover source peers in P2P content distribution systems, either a cen-
tralised or decentralised approach can be taken [27]. In addition to this, these two
approaches can also be combined together to form a hybrid source discovery model
[23, 24]. We now present an abstract overview of the two basic discovery models. For
more details, we refer the interested reader to [116].
Centralised Source Discovery
For system designers, centralised source discovery is often a popular choice, largely
because of the ease of implementation and increased control of the system. In such an
approach, a central entity acts as entry point to the system at which every participant
must register. This component periodically receives reports from all connected peers,
e.g., to build up a search index of all available files and data sources [27]. Through this
global view, system designers can easily implement different functionalities to fulfil
specific needs. For instance, as exemplified by the Napster1 system, the central server
could answer keyword-based queries, initiated by participating users. Alternatively,
the central server could be configured to always return data sources that are in direct
proximity of the requesting nodes, e.g., reside in the same Internet Service Provider or
1 http://www.napster.com
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country. This is highly useful to achieve traffic locality and to improve the download
performance of the users [35, 126, 1, 99].
The major disadvantage of centralised source discovery is robustness and scalability.
For one, the entire system relies on the proper functioning of the central entity. Conse-
quently, the sudden failure of it often induces a system breakdown. Furthermore, apart
from being a single point of failure, a central component to lookup sources can easily
be the subject of malicious nodes trying to disturb or even destroy the entire system.
Finally, even powerful centralised lookup entities (e.g., consisting of multiple servers)
are limited in their CPU power and bandwidth capabilities. For instance, according
to [12], even the high performance BitTorrent tracker BitComet only supports 80,000
torrents and 800,000 users. In practise, however, P2P content distribution systems can
easily exceed this threshold by an order of magnitude in terms of user population size
(see Chapter 3). A common remedy to improve robustness and scalability is clearly to
use multiple trackers at the same time.
Decentralised Source Discovery
Decentralised source discovery is usually implemented in a P2P overlay network, which
provides certain search capabilities, ranging from identifier lookups to location-based
and full-text searches [63, 64, 65, 116]. The overarching goal of decentralisation is
to foster scalability and provide increased robustness, e.g., the approach still works
regardless of whether some peers fail in the overlay network. Decentralised source
discovery can be implemented with the aid of unstructured or structured overlay
networks2:
• Unstructured Overlays. In unstructured overlays, each peer maintains a number
of overlay connections to other peers in the system, referred to as its local
neighbourhood. Those distinct connections form the only way to send or receive
overlay messages from other nodes. To lookup data sources, peers can either flood
request messages in their local neighbourhood (e.g., the Gnutella system [20]) or
use random walks by sending messages to a subset of their neighbours who in
turn repeat this process [18]. Intuitively, these two generic approaches can also
be combined, as exemplified by the BubbleStorm system [120]. It is worth noting
that unstructured overlay networks usually face the problem of non-deterministic
results; a peer initiating a search may or may not receive responses from other
nodes in the system. That is, there is no abortion criteria to find out whether the
search is complete, i.e., if all nodes possessing the desired content are reached.
• Structured Overlays. Structured overlays provide a unique mapping between data
objects and peers responsible of storing these. These addressing schemes are
typically implemented by so-called distributed hash tables (DHTs) [104, 117, 83, 106,
135]. As an enhancement of a normal hash table, a DHT provides a distributed
lookup/store functionality for (key, value) pairs. To achieve this, participants
and data items are assigned identifiers from a sufficiently large identifier space.
The identifier (ID) of a data item is usually its hash value. Peers either choose a
random identifier or derive it by calculating a hash value of their own IP address,
for instance. To obtain the distributed buckets, peers are only responsible for
storing data items with IDs that are close to their own ID. This notion of closeness
usually varies between the different DHTs [4, 56]. To find these nodes in the
network, peers perform a prefix matching between their overlay contacts and the
ID of the object to be looked up. Depending on the metric applied, the ’closest’
node is then chosen to receive the query, which repeats this process until the
target node is found.
2 In this context, the term structure refers to a peer being assigned for a specific task and/or position in the
network.
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A major advantage of DHTs is that ID lookups are deterministic; they always find the
data object belonging to a certain identifier, if existent. On the other hand, compared to
unstructured overlays, it must be noted that, in DHTs, the realisation of keyword-based
searches is much more complicated. For instance, due to the prefix-based routing, there
is no direct way to support wildcard searches for queries consisting of multiple words.
In fact, as exemplified by the eMule system, one technique to overcome this is to hash
keywords and compute an intersection on the obtained results [66, 114]. This involves,
however, several DHT lookups per query, and, consequently, there is a clear trade-off
between lookup performance and communication costs.
2.2.3 Delivery Mechanisms
To replicate chunks from source peer(s) to interested receivers, system designers can
chose from three different architectures: a linear chain, tree, and mesh [11]. In the
following, we briefly discuss the properties and applicability of these approaches in
the context of online content distribution.
Importantly, the coordination of the content delivery process must rely on the
collaboration of individual users, without having to resort to any centralised control.
Additionally, the sudden failure or departure of a node, referred to as churn (or
synonymously peer turnover), is likely to occur and must be taken into account. Finally,
recall that most of the access links are highly asymmetric such that users can often
download content faster than they can upload it [25].
Linear Delivery
The simplest and most straightforward approach is to organise peers in a linear chain
(cf. Figure 2). In this linear architecture, every peer serves the entire file to another peer
and then disconnects. This means a peer’s outdegree is one (k = 1). Nevertheless, a
peer can start serving as soon as it owes one chunk. Peer selection is rather static as
users have only one ingoing and one outgoing connection. Also, there is no chunk
selection mechanism, since file fragments are sequently forwarded from one node to
another.
Figure 2: Illustration of a linear delivery architecture.
A major advantage of a linear delivery architecture is that peers do not have to
maintain state about which chunk has already been downloaded by their neighbours.
Instead, every downloaded chunk is useful for the peers’ downstream neighbours.
Further, due to the simpleness of the approach, it is straightforward to move the higher
provisioned nodes towards the seeder. This optimises distribution speed as the peer
with the slowest upstream capacity is bottleneck, i.e., it determines the delivery rate of
the downstream nodes.
This simplicity and low overhead, however, comes at the expense of some attributes
that prove themselves to be disadvantageous for P2P content distribution. First, a
linear chain inherently lacks robustness against churn; a sudden crash or disconnect of
one node may disconnect all downstream peers in the delivery chain. Second, peers
at the end of the chain will experience a long idle period until the actual download
starts. Lastly, since the outdegree k is constantly one, the users’ downstream capacity
will only be poorly utilised because of the link asymmetry of current Internet access
connections.
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Tree-based Delivery
In a k-tree architecture, the seeder is root of a distribution tree and uploads to k peers
in parallel (cf. Figure 3). As soon as an ’inner’-node (non-leaf peer) has downloaded
one chunk, it starts to forward it to k child nodes in parallel. Leaf-nodes only obtain
data, but do not upload it to others. Similar to a linear chain, peer selection is rather
static as the tree structure remains unchanged until all peers have completed their
downloads. Also, chunks are sequently forwarded from parents to leaf nodes.
Figure 3: Illustration of a treek=2 architecture.
When compared to a linear chain, the k-tree architecture offers some important
improvements. First, the approach is much more robust against peer turnover. In par-
ticular, depending on the tree position, the crash of an inner-node affects significantly
less downstream users. Moreover, the sudden failure of a leaf-peer (half of the users)
does not impair the downloading process at all. Finally, the waiting-time for content
is significantly lower, as the initial seed can inject data chunks to k nodes in parallel,
which immediately repeat this process.
In the context of P2P content distribution, however, care must be taken when choosing
this approach as delivery architecture. In general, each serving node has one incoming
and k outgoing connections. This suggests that a k-tree performs best if peers can
upload k-times faster than they download. However, this is exactly the opposite to
what today’s Internet connections offer. Further, when finishing a download, each
non-leaf peer has uploaded the file k times, whereas the upstream capacity of the leaf
nodes remains unused.
A more sophisticated approach is to arrange nodes in a parallel k-Tree, as proposed
by SplitStream [17]. Compared to a standard k-Tree, this architecture strives to also
leverage the upload capacity of the leaf nodes. To do so, peers are organised into k
different trees such that each user is a non-leaf node in at most one tree, and a leaf
node in the remaining k− 1 trees (cf. Figure 4). Subsequently, each chunk is further
subdivided into k blocks and the k-th block is served into its k-th tree, respectively.
Compared to a standard k-Tree, a parallel k-tree is less sensitive to churn and
additionally leverages the upstream capacity of the leaf-nodes. Further, each peer
downloads k parts of the file from k peers in parallel, while it, at the same time,
serves data to k other peers. Therefore, each peer receives exactly what it uploads.
Ignoring the complexity of maintaining such a tree without a central coordinator, the
parallel k-tree assumes that access connections are symmetric, still making the approach
ill-suited for online content distribution over the Internet.
Mesh-based Delivery
Organising peers in a linear chain or in a tree-based architecture results in a static
topology that is complex to maintain without centralised coordination (e.g., in the
case of sudden failures). In contrast to this, mesh-based architectures are based on the
premise that every peer can interact with any other node in the system (cf. Figure 5).
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Figure 4: Illustration of a parallel treek=2 architecture.
Also, there is no fixed chunk selection strategy and peers are allowed to change their
peering partners at will at any time without notice, i.e., they are not limited to a fix
overlay structure with fix peer sets.
The topology of such mesh-based system is, thus, continuously changing over time
and is only determined by two factors: (i) the maximum amount of neighbours a peer
wants to simultaneously upload to (the outdegree k) and (ii) the chosen peer selection
strategy defining whom to upload next. The peer’s outdegree is typically a user-specific
setting and computed over the node’s available upload bandwidth. The peer selection
strategy, on the other hand, can be implemented in different manners. For instance,
peers may prefer nodes with high upload capabilities to accelerate the distribution of
rare chunks in the network. Alternatively, they may also favour particularly cooperative
nodes in the system.
Figure 5: Mesh architecture with varying peer outdegrees.
Furthermore, this flexibility with regard to peer selection allows mesh-based delivery
architectures to quickly adjust to sudden failures, making them highly robust to churn
[45, 44]. Moreover, it has been demonstrated that in mesh-based architectures, the
locally-rarest-random strategy in requesting missing chunks is highly efficient [62]. In
particular, it can be shown that such architectures replicate chunks in the system with
an exponential capacity of service, thereby clearly outperforming linear chains or tree-
based architectures in terms of download completion times [129]. On the other hand,
to enable mesh-based systems based on sophisticated chunk requesting strategies,
peers need to exchange control traffic which clearly induces additional communication
overhead and complexity.
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2.3 widely deployed p2p content distribution systems
Upon presenting the relevant details to gain a basic understanding about important
key principles of P2P content distribution, we next provide an abstract overview of a
set of prominent P2P protocols used for online content distribution. Our discussion
focuses, however, only on those systems that are currently most relevant, i.e., widely
used in terms of user population and proportion of the Internet share. According to
this metric, the different systems are presented in a chronological order.
2.3.1 Gnutella
The Gnutella protocol was developed in 2000 and is one of the first P2P content sharing
systems [20, 28]. Due to its early development state, however, the system now plays
only a secondary role in online content distribution [49]. It belongs to the so-called
pure P2P applications that do not rely on any centralised component [27]. Instead, all
participants are interconnected in an unstructured overlay network. To lookup content,
peers either flood queries to all overlay neighbours (version 0.4) or rely on super
peers to find potential data sources (version 0.6) [61]. As such, the Gnutella protocol
implements a decentralised source discovery mechanism.
The delivery mechanism of Gnutella is very simplistic. In particular, in Gnutella 0.4,
data transactions always relate to entire files, instead of small file chunks. Thus, peers
can only download from a single data source, and, consequently, there is no support
for multi-source downloading. Gnutella 0.6 attempts to improve this by supporting
HTTP range queries for different file fragments. However, to use multiple download
sources, it still leaves the design of the delivery process up to the clients involved.
As one of the first P2P content distribution systems, Gnutella does not implement
any contribution incentives and therefore solely relies on the altruism of the nodes
to contribute their resources. This assumption, however, has severe consequences for
system performance; due to the lack of incentives, the Gnutella network is largely
plagued by free-riding during recent years, i.e., users tried to download content from
others while not contributing themselves [2, 48]. As a result, 15% of the participating
users in Gnutella provided 98% of the content, clearly demonstrating the systematic
unfairness in the process [48]. Because of this important lesson, subsequent systems
therefore explicitly built contribution incentives into their design.
2.3.2 eDonkey/eMule
The eDonkey [53] protocol is an open file sharing protocol that was initially developed
in 2000 by MetaMachine Inc. In 2005, however, this company officially discontinued
their development by following a ’cease and desist’ letter from the Recording Industry
Association of America (RIAA). Nevertheless, the eDonkey network is still available
through the popular file sharing application eMule, which has taken over the further
development of this protocol [66]. According to the iPoque study [49], the eMule
network is currently the second most popular P2P file sharing application in many
regions of the world. As shown in Table 1, in 2008, it accounted for 24% of the total
P2P traffic in Germany, even though this number has been continuously decreasing
during the last years.
The eMule file sharing network consists of hundreds of eMule servers and hundreds
of thousands of eMule clients [66]. eMule servers are solely responsible for indexing
files, and for distributing IP addresses of other eMule servers and clients [66, 79].
As such, they do not store any files, but act as a communication hubs to connect
eMule clients together. Each eMule client, on the other hand, is pre-configured with
a list of eMule servers and a list of files it wants to share in the system. To enter
the network, a client may connect to multiple servers at the same time to retrieve
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Protocol 2007 2008 Change
BitTorrent 66.70% 70.77% +6.11 %
eDonkey 28.59% 24.22% -15.27%
Gnutella 3.72% 1.75% -53.06 %
Other 0.99% 3.77% +280.54%
Table 1: The proportion of the most popular content distribution systems out of the total P2P
traffic in Germany [49].
information about desired files and available data sources. Upon bootstrapping, each
eMule client maintains several hundred TCP connections to other clients for uploading
and downloading content. Since most of the eMule servers have been overloaded in
recent years, the eMule network has additionally resorted to a decentralised resource
discovery scheme, which utilises the resources of the individual peers. In particular, it
makes use of the Kademlia distributed hash table [83], which is also known as the Kad
network [115].
To enable data exchange between peers, eMule splits files into individual fragments,
which are called parts. Peers can share individual parts before they have downloaded
the entire file, thereby enabling a mesh-based multi-source downloading. Unfortu-
nately, the part size is hard-coded into the protocol with a rather large value of 9.28
megabytes [66]. Individual parts can be verified using the hashes from a hash list, and,
correspondingly, files are identified in the network using their unique hash identifiers.
To select which part to download next, eMule clients prefer parts that are rarest in
their local neighbourhood (the locally-rarest-random requesting strategy).
To tackle free-riding, eMule employs a credit-based tit-for-tat incentive strategy
that rewards the long-term cooperativeness of users. For this purpose, peers possess
permanent identifiers that can be used to identify nodes across time and multiple
download sessions. To keep track of user contributions, however, peers solely use local
histories and direct observations. That is, they do not exchange information about
third-party experiences. Peer selection is then performed by preferring nodes that
exhibit particularly high share ratios, defined by the amount of data provided and
consumed over time.
2.3.3 BitTorrent
The BitTorrent protocol was developed by Bram Cohen in 2001 [21], and is nowadays the
de-facto standard for scalable P2P content distribution. Alone in Germany, BitTorrent
accounts for more than 70% of the total P2P traffic (cf. Table 1), which is more than
twice the total HTTP traffic [49].
The BitTorrent ’ecosystem’ consists of peers, trackers, and torrent discovery sites (cf.
Figure 6) [133]. As opposed to all previous P2P content distribution systems such as
Gnutella or eDonkey/eMule that organise peers sharing multiple files together into an
overlay network, BitTorrent organises peers interested in the same file into a so-called
BitTorrent swarm (or synonymously called a torrent) [43].
Each single BitTorrent swarm is identified by a unique identifier, called the infohash,
which is typically stored in the .torrent meta information file. To join a particular
swarm, a peer must first learn about its existence from a torrent discovery site such as
Mininova, PirateBay and IsoHunt. There are dozens of discovery sites, each representing
a distinct BitTorrent community. Table 2 shows the most popular indexing sites,
obtained from the Web-traffic monitoring site Alexa3. Each torrent discovery site
3 http://www.alexa.com
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Figure 6: The BitTorrent ecosystem [133].
Discovery Site Alexa Rank Location
Mininova.org 88 Netherlands
Thepiratebay.org 109 Sweden
IsoHunt.com 219 Canada
Torrentz.com 225 Netherlands
Btjunkie.org 454 Germany
Table 2: Top-5 most popular torrent discovery sites.
maintains a database of .torrent files that contains the torrent name, the hashes of all
file chunks, the IP-address of the responsible tracker, and the infohash.
After discovering the file of interest on one of these sites, a peer downloads the
corresponding metafile (i.e., the .torrent file). Subsequently, it contacts the tracker
by sending the appropriate infohash, which returns a random subset of the peers
(typically 50 nodes) currently participating in the swarm. The new node then tries to
establish a TCP connection to these nodes in order to be incorporated into the current
download process. To support peer heterogeneity, the maximum number of peers each
node connects to is limited by the node’s uplink capacity. Therefore, the neighbour set
size of each node is variable in BitTorrent.
To balance the tracker load and provide increased robustness, peers can further
learn about other peers in the swarm using distributed hash tables (DHTs) and peer
gossiping. For instance, peers using the Azureus client interconnect to a Kademlia-
based DHT that takes the torrent’s infohash as a key [30]. Looking up a specific
infohash in this DHT returns a list of other Azureus peers currently participating in
the swarm. In addition to this, uTorrent and Azureus clients have defined their own
protocol specification, the so-called the Peer Exchange protocol (PEX) [103], allowing
peers to mutually exchange their neighbourhood lists. Note that both peer discovery
mechanism (i.e., DHT and PEX) return, however, only a subset of the information that
is available from the tracker. As such, BitTorrent implements a hybrid source discovery
mechanism.
A file is split into chunks that are typically between 256 KB and 4 MB in size,
which varies depending on the size of the file. While BitTorrent peers maintain TCP
connections to roughly 50-120 neighbours, they solely upload to, or unchoke, a small
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number of them. Each user may individually adjust this number of unchoke slots
(its outdegree k), which is by default 5 [21]. The peer selection strategy is termed the
choking algorithm in BitTorrent, responsible for deciding whom to upload data to. To this
end, BitTorrent implements a real-time tit-for-tat incentive policy to favour peers that
have recently provided the highest download rates. Similarly to eMule, for the decision
making (i.e., downloader selection), peers solely use local contribution histories and
direct experiences with other nodes.
To guide the peer selection process, users inform one another of the chunks they
have downloaded. That is, upon connection establishment, peers mutually exchange a
bit array of their chunks, called a bitfield. As soon as a peer successfully receives and
verifies a new chunk, the bitfield is updated by sending per-chunk have messages. The
common strategy to decide which chunk to download next is rarest-first. In this manner,
peers specifically favour chunks with the least number of copies, computed across all
neighbours’ bitfields. As such, the BitTorrent protocol is an archetype for mesh-based
content delivery.
2.4 related work
The focus of this work is to design a superior incentive mechanism that strengthens
and improves the download performance and file availability of (existing) P2P content
distribution systems (cf. Section 1.4). In order to establish a basis for comparison and
discussion, this section presents related work based on existing incentive strategies
in P2P content distribution. Since much work has gone into encouraging users to
contribute their resources in these systems, we first present our methodology to classify
those works. Subsequently, we give an overview of the most recent approaches of each
category and emphasise important findings that are relevant for the remainder of this
thesis.
2.4.1 Overview
So far it has been shown that P2P content distribution systems consist of a content
discovery and content delivery scheme. The former is necessary to discover potential
data sources, while the latter defines how these sources are interconnected to quickly
replicate content. In early system designs (e.g., Gnutella), it was implicitly assumed that
peers are behaving collaboratively and are always willing to contribute their upstream
resources for the benefit of the system. However, in practise, it can be observed that
many users tend to strategise, i.e., they do not contribute resources unless they receive
a benefit for it [2, 48]. Importantly, this selfishness of users can be observed in most of
the popular P2P content distribution systems, including eMule and BitTorrent [132].
Therefore, since a successful content delivery mechanism has to rely on peer parti-
cipation, system designers need to find methods to motivate users to cooperate with
the system. To achieve this, incentive mechanisms strive to provide a profitable bonus
to users for serving content to other participants in the system. Within the context of
content delivery, such a bonus may be that cooperative peers achieve higher download
rates for content they desire, either immediately or in future downloads.
The download rate of a user is usually limited by the sum of upstream capacity that
other peers are willing to provide. To promote competition among users and thus to
incite cooperation, it is therefore necessary for peers to keep record of the contributions
of other users. Additionally, to increase the efficiency of this, peers may also exchange
messages with third-parties to inform other users about the cooperativeness of their
interaction partners. There are different approaches to spread this information in
the system. They all differ in information quality, propagation speed, traceability,
communication overhead, and other criteria. In this work, we order those approaches
by the knowledge base a peer obtains in the network. This ranges from approaches
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Figure 7: Overview of categories of incentive mechanisms and examples.
considering only local experiences to approaches where all peers share and have access
to the same information base, a so-called shared history (see Figure 7).
A term that is useful when talking about incentive mechanisms is reciprocity. In
general, reciprocity means rewarding a peer for its contribution. To this end, we distin-
guish between direct reciprocity (bilateral incentives), i.e., servicing a peer with content
because it has serviced us before, and indirect reciprocity (multilateral incentives), i.e.,
servicing a peer with content because it has serviced some other peer(s) before. In
addition to this, some works propose a virtual currency in which users can only obtain
services from the system that do not exceed their account balance. We next present
related work based on these three categories.
2.4.2 Direct Reciprocity
Incentives based on direct reciprocity only reward those nodes with which a user has
had a good experience in the past. In particular, each user maintains a local history
of the contributions of other nodes, which is then used to rank requesting peers later
on. There are two different criteria that can be used to rate peers, i.e., based on their
provided download rates, or, alternatively, based on their ratio of data provided and
consumed.
To the best of the author’s knowledge the only (deployed) system that implements
a rate-based incentive mechanism is the BitTorrent protocol [21]. More precisely, it
employs a so-called rate-based tit-for-tat strategy that periodically (every 10 seconds)
ranks users according to their provided download rates, measured during the last 20
seconds. Using this ranking, the top k peers in this list (default n = 4) are unchoked
and their requests accepted. The effectiveness of BitTorrent’s incentive mechanism has
been studied in detail, e.g., [51, 100, 10, 71, 31]. By using a five months long tracker
trace log of a large torrent, Izal et al. [51] reported that BitTorrent is highly effective at
sustaining flash crowds, and, due to the instantness of BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat servicing
policy, clients observed extremely high download rates. Qiu et al. [100] propose a
simple fluid model to capture BitTorrent’s performance. Amongst other things, they
find that the system scales fairly well and that the delivery process is very effective,
mainly because of BitTorrent’s incentives. Bharambe et al. [10] confirm this and show
through large-scale simulations that BitTorrent is remarkably robust at ensuring high
uplink bandwidth utilisation. Legout et al. [71] use testbed analysis to demonstrate
that BitTorrent’s incentive mechanism forms download clusters that are proportional
to the peers’ upload contribution. Finally, Bin et al. [31] demonstrate that there is an
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fundamental trade-off between download performance and fairness in BitTorrent, and
that BitTorrent’s current implementation is only one point in the design space.
In contrast to all these results, there are also a few studies that have challenged the ro-
bustness, fairness, and performance properties of BitTorrent’s incentive mechanism. For
instance, [77, 78, 112, 93] expose situations in which BitTorrent peers (i.e., particularly
seeders) can be systematically exploited by free-riders, and, therefore, proposed several
refinements. Further, in contrast to the work of Legout et al. [71], Piatek et al. [93]
find that rate-based incentives are inherently unfair in terms of upload contribution
and download reward. This observation is also confirmed by Levin et al. [72]. In
addition to this, the measurement analysis of [96, 94] reveal that, in BitTorrent, user
download performance is sometimes quite low and even a 100-fold increase in upload
contribution only yields a very slight performance improvement.
It is commonly known that BitTorrent’s rate-based incentive mechanism only applies
in the context of a single swarm, and thus does not incite users that have completed
their downloads (seeders) to remain in the system [72, 94, 10]. Recent works such as
[43, 42, 10, 84, 113, 122] demonstrate, however, that seeders have an important impact
on download performance and availability in BitTorrent. Specifically, Guo et al. [42]
propose a fluid model of the lifespan of torrents in BitTorrent to find that most torrents
are short-lived. To tackle this, Yang et al. [130] propose a variation of BitTorrent’s
rate-based incentive mechanism that allows to recognise contributions from users
in other torrents, enabling what we call cross-torrent bartering (cf. Section 4.2). This
approach, thus, inherently provides incentives for seeding.
In contrary to rate-based incentives, pairwise volume-based approaches, on the other
hand, keep track of the users’ amount of data provided and consumed. For instance,
the eMule/eDonkey system uses this approach to establish a credit system that rewards
the long-term cooperativeness of the clients with reduced download times [66]. This
incentive approach operates across time and file downloads, allowing for what we call
cross-torrent tit-for-tat (cf. Section 4.2). To the best of the author’s knowledge the only
existing performance analysis of this incentive mechanism is that of Pucha et al. [98].
To this end, the authors find that the majority of peers in eMule (90%) download with
rates below 10 KBps, which is extremely poor when considering the users’ downstream
capacities [25]. Apart from the eMule network, in the Swift system [118], peers define
a total credit for all users that they interact with. Download requests are only satisfied
if the credit value is greater or equal to the requested data. In Sherman et al. [109],
each user maintains a deficit counter for each interaction partner that is computed
by the difference between data send and received. In contrast to the eMule system,
however, the deficit counter is valid for only one file download allowing to quantify
the instant cooperativeness of each user. Interaction partners with the lowest deficit
are then chosen for uploading. Finally, in [54], Jun et al. propose a byte-level tit-for-tat
incentive mechanism to tackle free-riding in the BitTorrent system, which is similar to
pairwise volume-based incentives.
It is worth noting that all currently deployed P2P content distribution systems
solely implement incentive strategies that are based on direct reciprocity. For instance,
BitTorrent employs an instant tit-for-tat incentive, while eMule opts for a volume-based
long-term tit-for-tat incentive strategy. This design choice is intentional because the
major advantage of any bilateral incentive strategy is that decision making is solely
based on direct observations and local histories. This makes those approaches highly
robust to strategic/malicious attacks such as peer collusion [33, 74] or Sybil attacks [26].
The drawback of direct reciprocity is, however, that symmetric interests as well as repeat
interactions between peers are required. While these conditions can be easily fulfilled
for the download of a single file object (e.g., when applying multi-source downloading),
it is unclear how these approaches perform across multiple file downloads. In particular,
modern P2P content distribution systems consist of millions of online users, and thus
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Figure 8: Comparison between direct and indirect reciprocation.
repeat meetings between two peers might be infrequent. We will thoroughly investigate
this issue in Chapter 4.
2.4.3 Indirect Reciprocity
In contrast to direct reciprocation, indirect reciprocity relies on direct observations, and
additionally on information from third-parties that are distributed among the nodes
in the system. This means, instead of only considering peer B ′s direct contribution to
peer A, peer A may exchange information with an overlay neighbour C, allowing it to
also see B ′s contributions to C (see Figure 8). This knowledge base can be arbitrarily
extended when peer A also shares information with its neighbours’ neighbours and
so on. Pushing this direction to its extreme arrives at a shared history in which all
peers share their local observations among each other, and the contribution of a node
becomes globally visible.
While direct reciprocity assumes a symmetry of interest between the peers, indi-
rect reciprocation is also able to cope with asymmetric demand and, thus, does not
necessarily require peers to repeatedly meet each other. This greatly improves the
coverage of known peers in the network; a peer may judge another peer even if it has
not interacted with it before, simply by using another peer’s experience. However, this
advantage comes at the expense of other properties. For instance, the scale of infor-
mation produces network traffic that may exponentially increase with each additional
level of indirection [131]. In addition to this, trusting other peers makes an algorithm
vulnerable to issues such as Sybil attacks, collusion, or whitewashing [34, 90, 74].
Therefore, when designing multilateral incentive strategies, all of these issues must be
carefully considered and addressed, introducing a far greater complexity for incentive
design.
During the last years, there has been a rich body of work on indirect reciprocation
schemes, e.g., [22, 55, 16, 127, 69, 43, 94, 15, 87, 80]. Most of them have focused on
several issues and also differ in the level of neighbours (or synonymously level of
indirection) they use to compute reputation or trust values.
Lee et al. [69] propose a platform that can be used to implement cooperative applica-
tions on top of the Internet. In this system, peers assess the trustworthiness of other
users by initiating a cookie search in the system. Cookies are assigned values on the
[0,1] interval and evaluate a single transaction. Once the search is terminated, peers use
transitive trust chains to estimate a global reputation value among the received cookies
from other nodes. Guo et al. [43] sketch a very abstract mechanism to enable indirect
reciprocation for the BitTorrent system. In this approach, the trackers in BitTorrent are
responsible for detecting contribution cycles among the nodes across overlay swarms.
If any exists, it is in the responsibility of the tracker to mediate data transfers along this
cycle. The tracker is also responsible for punishing fraudulent peer behaviour (e.g., if a
peer sends invalid data). Martinovic et al. [80] use mutually signed transaction receipts,
so-called tokens, in order to protect P2P systems against file poisoning and free-riding.
In contrast to the coupon-based approach devised in Section 5.3, tokens are created for
every single transaction (i.e., the transfer of a file) and are thus unilateral. Furthermore,
the authors use a flooding-based approach in order to make information accessible to
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as many users as possible. Kamvar et al. [55] also focus on the problem of detecting
peers providing inauthentic files in P2P systems. To achieve this, every participant is
assigned a set of score managers, responsible for maintaining and computing a global
trust value. To obtain this value, the managers recursively request the private histories
of all the participants in the system. These local histories are used to compute a global
trust matrix, similar to the PageRank [92] algorithm used by Google. Yu et al. [131]
extend this work to show that the opinion of only a small minority is enough to have a
good estimation of a peer’s global reputation.
The works of [15, 94] go even further and promote the assumption that incorporating
the information of one-hop neighbours is often sufficient to enable indirect reciproca-
tion. In particular, Piatek et al. [94] show that the BitTorrent system is characterised
by a small minority of peers that are extensively connected to other nodes in the
network. This observation is exploited to enable indirect reciprocation between two
less popular peers, sharing one of these highly popular nodes as common interaction
partner. Similar to this, Bocek et al. [15] search for one-hop transitive paths between
two peers, once the credit limit of a requesting peer is exceeded. Both works share
the assumption that the common interaction partners are always online and are thus
able to provide attestation receipts for prior interactions. However, as discussed in
Chapter 5, across time and file downloads, this assumption holds for only 29% of the
users. Therefore, in contrast to these works and to provide long-term incentives for
seeding, the solution presented in Chapter 5 is designed to operate without the need
for requesting intermediaries to attest contributions.
2.4.4 Virtual Currency
In addition to locally decided mechanisms or those based on indirect reciprocation,
there is also a class of approaches that relies on a virtual currency, inspired by real life
monetary payment. Peers in such schemes possess a predefined amount of virtual
currency (or tokens) that they can use to request services, i.e., to download content.
Upon receiving the requested content, the currency for this service provisioning is
transferred to the servicing peer, who itself can then spend this money to receive
content from another peer. Compared to reciprocity-based approaches, the account
balance of a user is globally visible and contributions are not governed by the peers’
subjective opinions. Also, peers have to continuously provide services to others, in
order to not run out of money, preventing them from downloading new content. In
addition to this, each peer — irrespective if it is a newcomer or long-time known — is
worth interacting with if it has enough money to pay. Thus, there is no differentiation
between the trustworthiness of users.
In literature, virtual currency systems can be classified into centralised and de-
centralised approaches. Centralised systems such as [113, 128] typically use a global
instance, which is comparable to a bank, that records all transactions between peers.
Each peer has a permanent identity in the system, which is connected to an account in
the bank. This, of course, requires the bank to be trustworthy because all peers base the
granting of transactions on the information provided by this bank. Consequently, every
transaction that a peer performs becomes globally visible in the entire system. The
major drawback of this approach is that each transaction has to be reported to a central
instance, which results in high overhead traffic and limits scalability. For instance, the
work of [113] requires at least one dedicated server to manage the downloads of only
200 clients.
Decentralised approaches typically distribute the functionality of a bank over a set of
randomly chosen nodes in the system. MojoNation [88] is an example of a file sharing
system that relies on a decentralised managed virtual currency, called "Mojo". In this
system, each peer locally maintains a relative credit balance for each interaction partner.
If the balance drifts too far in either direction, the debitor has to pay a "Mojo token" to
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its partner, which can be used to request additional content from other nodes. Landa et
al. [68] implements a distributed exchange economy based on social capital that allows
peers to contribute resources to one set of nodes and use this contribution to obtain
services from a different set of nodes. To achieve this, the authors propose a distributed
accounting system that keeps track of the peers’ contribution. BitStore [102] extends
the BitTorrent protocol through a storage network that allows peers to offer their disk
space for storing replicas of file chunks. This approach tries to raise the availability
of torrents that have too few or no seeders. As reward for storing and serving those
chunks, peers receive credits that they can use when the situation is reversed. The
’price’ for uploading or downloading blocks is not constant, but found out by a market
mechanism.
Other works [123, 39, 134, 76] provide decentralised micropayment schemes by
relying on distributed hash tables. DHTs are, however, a particularly difficult venue for
virtual currency as peers are transient and unreliable, and have no incentive to reliably
maintain accounts for other users. To address this, these systems often assume (i) an
already existing reputation infrastructure to rate the trustworthiness of the participants
[76]; (ii) additionally replicate the functionality of a bank to multiple DHT nodes
simultaneously (i.e., to provide increased reliability) [123]; (iii) and/or use threshold
cryptography as countermeasure against strategic manipulation [134, 76].
2.5 conclusions
This chapter has provided important information to assist in the understanding of the
remainder of this thesis.
Section 2.2 discussed basic principles and important terminology in the field of P2P
content distribution. Through this, it was shown that the architecture of such systems
basically consists of two principle elements: a content discovery and a content delivery
component. The former component is responsible to discover potential data sources for
a certain file. The latter component, on the other hand, interconnects these sources with
interested receivers simultaneously demanding the file. In this regard it was revealed
that in current operating environments, mesh-based delivery architectures are best
suited to replicate data chunks from source peer(s) to interested receivers. As opposed
to a linear chain and tree-based approaches, these topologies can quickly adjust to user
heterogeneity and peer turnover, and are only defined by the (i) peers’ outdegree k and
their (ii) neighbourhood size. More importantly, their flexibility in peer selection can be
utilised to enable discriminative uploading — the basis for any incentive mechanism.
Section 2.3 provided an abstract overview of a set of prominent P2P protocols
used for online content distribution. To this end, it was stressed that P2P incentive
mechanisms are vital for overall system performance. More precisely, as highlighted by
Gnutella, solely relying on the altruism of the nodes to contribute their resources will
inevitably fail in P2P content distribution systems. Therefore, currently popular P2P
systems have explicitly built contribution incentives into their design. Apart from this,
it was found that BitTorrent is the most prevalent P2P content distribution protocol
currently used, accounting for more than 70% of the total P2P traffic in Germany
(which is more than twice the total HTTP traffic). As such, it represents the current
de-facto standard for scalable P2P content distribution.
Finally, Section 2.4 classified P2P incentive mechanisms into three major categories:
direct reciprocity (bilateral schemes), indirect reciprocity (multilateral schemes), and
virtual currency systems. Subsequently, for each category, an overview of the most
recent approaches was given. It turned out that the predominant technique to foster
cooperation in P2P content distribution systems is the tit-for-tat incentive policy, i.e.,
node A will only upload to node B if node B will upload to node A. This bilateral
policy has the big advantage that downloader selection is solely based on direct
observations and local histories. This makes it easy to implement and highly robust
22 background and related work
to strategic and malicious attacks, as it refrains from using third-party experiences
for decision making. However, it must be also noted that a few recent works have
challenged the effectiveness of tit-for-tat at promoting long-term cooperation among
users. Specifically, they attributed the prevalence of P2P performance and availability
problems to it. Analysing and quantifying this important issue will be subject of the
following chapters.
3M E A S U R E M E N T S A N D A N A LY S I S O F T H E B I T T O R R E N T
S Y S T E M
The previous chapters have criticised P2P content distribution in terms of performance and
availability. It has been argued that ineffective incentive design is the core reason for these
shortcomings. Before continuing, it is important to validate both these aspects, alongside
discovering vital properties that cause these limitations. In this chapter, we perform such an
analysis using the BitTorrent system as case study.
3.1 introduction
So far it has been discussed that P2P system performance solely depends on the
willingness of users to cooperate with the system. Nevertheless, in practise, it can be
observed that users often tend to deny cooperation. To tackle this dilemma, current
popular P2P content distribution systems predominantly employ tit-for-tat incentive
strategies, only rewarding users who have directly contributed previously. Recent work
has argued, however, that these strategies can be highly ineffective at promoting long-
term cooperation between users, thereby causing serious performance and availability
issues.
Therefore, before devising a more sophisticated incentive mechanism, it is first
important to validate that existing P2P content distribution systems indeed suffer from
shortcomings, and that these shortcomings are caused by ineffective incentive design.
Further, in order to design improved incentives, it is also important to discover how
existing incentive mechanisms fail to fulfil performance and availability requirements.
The research conducted in this chapter primary focuses on these aspects by using the
BitTorrent system as a case study. This choice is motivated by the fact that BitTorrent is
the most prevalent P2P distribution system currently used. Also, it represents a basic
archetype for systems relying on bilateral incentive strategies (i.e., tit-for-tat), thus
perfectly satisfying our needs.
We believe the only accurate and valid way to perform such a comprehensive
analysis is to run exhaustive measurements in currently deployed BitTorrent swarms.
This allows us to infer important low-level details (e.g., overlay swarm characteristics
and user behaviour statistics) that cannot be obtained when applying analytical or
simulation-based studies using artificial workloads. For that reason, we have conducted
two large-scale measurement studies of BitTorrent; the first investigates BitTorrent on a
macroscopic level by periodically probing over 46,000 torrents to ascertain their high-
level characteristics, such as swarm size and the proportion of leechers and seeders.
While, the second study, on the other hand, investigates BitTorrent on a microscopic
level by contacting over 700,000 individual peers in 832 torrents to discover relevant
properties such as their download rates and chunk availability. To the best of the
author’s knowledge, this is the largest dataset in terms of size and collected information
used to investigate file availability and download performance in BitTorrent.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 details our measurement
methodology. After this, in Section 3.3, we utilise our measurement data to study
performance and availability issues from a user perspective. Subsequently, Section 3.4
investigates these issues on a system-level to reveal the causes for the shortcomings
observed. Finally, Section 3.5 inspects the large-scale effects of these issues, while we
conclude in Section 3.6.
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3.2 measurement methodology
In this section, we first give an overview of different techniques to measure BitTorrent-
like systems. To this end, we justify the choice of our measurement methodology.
Subsequently, we present relevant details about the devised measurement platforms
including the scope of our measurements.
3.2.1 Overview
The efficiency of BitTorrent is largely dictated by the behaviour and characteristics of
the peers operating in the system [100]. Depending on the workload offered, conclusive
statements can therefore vary significantly. For that reason, to truly understand avail-
ability and performance issues in BitTorrent, it is necessary to collect and analyse trace
data from a large number real swarms, along with the data on why these problems
arise in practise. Without this information, any analytical or simulation-based study
using artificial workload data as input can only give a rough estimation on what is
truly happening in reality.
Unfortunately, as described in Section 2.3.3, the BitTorrent ecosystem consists of
dozens of BitTorrent communities, each containing several thousands of torrents. Thus,
when performing such a large-scale measurement study, one has to restrict oneself
to a single community, since the monitoring of all of them at the same time is near
impossible. The measurements conducted and utilised within this thesis therefore
solely focus on the Mininova1 community. This choice is motivated by the fact that
Mininova was the largest BitTorrent community at the time of the measurements
according to the Alexa ranking. Further, Zhang et al. [133] have recently shown that the
redundancy of torrent indexing sites is high, and focussing on the biggest BitTorrent
community thus provides a representative picture on BitTorrent’s efficiency.
The most intuitive way to collect this data is to directly access tracker logs. In
particular, the BitTorrent protocol specifies that a peer that joins/leaves an overlay
swarm is supposed to contact the tracker [21]. Furthermore, it requires that each
peer periodically reports statistics such as the amount of data sent and received, and
its downloading state. A tracker log therefore contains detailed information about
the number of available leechers and seeders, the peers’ cooperativeness in terms of
uploaded data, and user behaviour characteristics such as seeding times and peer
arrival patterns. Unfortunately, however, these traces are often problematic to obtain
because they require the agreement from content providers. At best, data of only a few
torrents is available [51, 43, 42, 8].
To remedy this, one can inject passive monitoring nodes into each overlay swarm
under consideration. These nodes behave similarly to normal BitTorrent users, but
do not take part in the downloading process. Instead, they exploit the BitTorrent
protocol to continuously request relevant information from the tracker as well as the
participating peers. To this end, crawling techniques can be divided into two categories.
In its simplest form, a crawler2 periodically requests IP-addresses from the tracker to
learn about other peers participating in the torrent [133, 84]. This makes it possible
to study the demographics and population dynamics of the torrents under analysis,
what we name macroscopic crawling. More sophisticated crawlers also contact the clients
and retrieve detailed information such as the client ID and their chunk bitmap (i.e.,
downloading state). We name this microscopic crawling. Although the microscopic
crawling gives more detailed information, it is noticeably less scalable and only allows
a few hundreds torrents to be studied in parallel [97, 110].
1 http://www.mininova.org
2 In our terminology, a crawler describes a component that can be composed of several physical nodes, each
collecting data according to a specific task.
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Figure 9: Overview of microscopic measurement platform.
Each crawling technique is effective for addressing particular needs. However, to
analyse performance and availability issues of BitTorrent in a holistic way, it is important
to combine both techniques. For that reason, we have designed and implemented two
types of measurement platforms capable of performing microscopic and macroscopic
measurements, respectively. In the following, we describe each of both platforms in
more detail, along with our measurement methodology.
3.2.2 Microscopic Crawling
In this section, we first present relevant details of our measurement platform that can
investigate BitTorrent swarms on a microscopic level, using 20 nodes in the Emulab3
testbed. Subsequently, we give an overview of the scope of our measurements in the
Mininova community.
Measurement Infrastructure
The architecture of the microscopic measurement platform consists of two crawlers
and a network file system (NFS), as shown in Figure 9. The discovery site crawler
periodically downloads the RSS web feed document of the Mininova website. By doing
so, we are able to learn about all new torrents that have recently been published on
Mininova.org. To this end, we developed an XML parser, capable of extracting torrent
meta information from the downloaded RSS feed such as the torrent upload time,
torrent category, and the download URL of the .torrent file. By using this URL, the
discovery site crawler then downloads the .torrent file, and passes this information
to a .torrent parser. This parser extracts information such as the torrent creation time,
info hash, the IP-address of the tracker(s), data file size, and the number of chunks
the file is composed of. All this gathered information is directly stored in the NFS file
system for both post-processing purposes and to inform the microscopic crawler about
the existence of a new BitTorrent swarm.
The microscopic crawler is then responsible for acquiring low-level characteristics from
the peers participating in the different BitTorrent swarms. This information includes
the peers’ chunk bitmaps, their downloading speeds, and the seeding behaviour.
To accomplish this, however, a number of challenges must be addressed. First, the
crawler must continuously learn about all peers operating in a given BitTorrent swarm.
Unfortunately, there is no direct way to retrieve a complete list of these nodes. For
instance, querying the tracker that serves a torrent only returns a random pool of IP
addresses (usually 50) that participate in the content download. Moreover, the tracker
3 https://www.emulab.net
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dictates a fixed time interval (usually around 30-120 minutes) that must pass by until
a new request is allowed4. Since the population size of real BitTorrent swarms can
easily exceed 1,000 online nodes and also varies continuously, using only one physical
machine therefore has little prospect of success. Instead, it is mandatory to utilise
multiple machines (with different IP addresses) to query the tracker at a much higher
time resolution, thereby avoiding the repercussion of being banned.
For that reason, our microscopic crawler consists of one crawling manager and
multiple crawling bots. The manager maintains a list of (infohash, tracker)-pairs for all
swarms under consideration, as obtained by the discovery site crawler. The crawling
bots, each possessing its own IP-address, access this list and simultaneously request
information from multiple trackers (cf. Figure 9). This distributed approach allows
the system to quickly obtain the IP-addresses for each (infohash, tracker)-pair in a
granularity of only a few minutes. To further accelerate the peer discovery process, the
crawling bots additionally run the PEX protocol (cf. Section 2.3.3) to learn from already
discovered online nodes about the IP-addresses of their neighbours.
After obtaining the IP-addresses of the peers in a given swarm, it is necessary to
monitor them, which is even more complicated. In more detail, the only way to infer
detailed information about a peer is to establish and maintain a TCP connection to
this node. For instance, during the handshaking process, each peer transmits low-level
information such as its client ID and chunk bitmap. As soon as the peer successfully
downloads a new chunk, it informs its neighbours about this occurrence using HAVE
messages [21]. Collecting this data can thus provide a wealth of information, including
download speeds and chunk availability in the swarm.
Unfortunately, continuously maintaining TCP connections to users is hardly possible
in large-scale crawlings, mainly because of two important issues. First, our goal is to
collect data from hundreds of torrents each containing hundreds of peers. Thus, we
quickly exceed the maximum number of possible connections per machine (which is
typically 1,000). Second, even if we can handle this large number of connections, current
BitTorrent implementations quickly drop connections to peers that do not upload data.
To remedy this, for each single node, the crawling manager polls every 10 minutes one
of the crawling bots in a round-robin fashion. The chosen crawling bot then establishes
a TCP connection to this node, requests its chunk bitmap, and immediately disconnects.
Through this approach, we are able to monitor several 100,000 peers at the same time,
while avoiding being banned as the IP-address of the requesting node permanently
changes.
Finally, to identify and determine the uptime of the users, we use <ip,port>-pairs
and assume that a user comes online the first time it is reported/discovered by the
tracker/PEX protocol, and stays online until three consecutive connection attempts fail.
Measurement Scope
Our microscopic crawler operated from July 18, 2009 to July 29, 2009 (micros-1) and
then again from August 19, 2009 to September 5, 2009 (micros-2). For the micros-1
study, the crawler followed 255 torrents appearing on Mininova after the first measure-
ment hour; in these torrents, we observed 246,750 users. The micros-2 dataset contains
information from 577 torrents and 531,089 users. As mentioned above, each dataset
consists of the peers’ downloading states, seeding and leeching times, and routing
table entries sampled with a resolution of every 10 minutes.
Figure 10 shows the geographical origin of the peers encountered in both measure-
ments. Each point in this figure represents a single node. It is noticeable that most
of the peers are located in North America and Europe, which is intuitive since most
of the content provided on Mininova is in Spanish or English language. Users from
China rather access content from Chinese torrent-discovery sites [133]. Nevertheless, as
4 Under-running this time directly results in being banned by the tracker.
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Figure 10: Overview of peer distribution in BitTorrent (microscopic crawling).
demonstrated by the demographics of our macroscopic dataset later on (cf. Figure 12),
the geographical distribution of the users monitored in the microscopic crawling is
highly representative for the Mininova community, making the dataset very rich for
the detailed analysis of user and swarm characteristics in BitTorrent.
3.2.3 Macroscopic Crawling
The microscopic measurements provide detailed insights into the distribution of chunks
and download rates within a given swarm. However, due to scalability issues, it is
difficult to perform such detailed measurements on a very large-scale (e.g., several
thousand torrents). To complement these results, we therefore also implemented a
higher level measurement platform that followed every torrent published on the Mini-
nova website after December 9, 2008 for a period of 38 days. This study allowed us
to gain an extremely large number of measurements regarding details such as peer
arrival patterns, seeder/leecher ratios, and torrent sizes. This information can subse-
quently be correlated with our smaller-scale microscopic measurements to determine
the large-scale prevalence of potential performance and availability issues.
Measurement Infrastructure
Our measurement platform consists of four macroscopic crawlers that autonomously
operate from different sites in Europe (see Figure 11). Each macroscopic crawler is
composed of two sub-crawlers, a discovery site and multi-tracker crawler. The discovery
site crawler provides similar functionality as the one of the microscopic measurement
platform; it periodically downloads the RSS web feed documents of the Mininova
website to (i) learn about new torrents and to (ii) access important torrent meta
information. However, the information obtained is stored locally on a hard-disk,
instead of using a network file system.
After forwarding the list of newly discovered torrents, the multi-tracker crawler
repeatedly requests the peer-lists for each (infohash, tracker)-pair. To avoid being
banned, the frequency of two consecutive queries is set to the minimum time announced
by the tracker (which usually around 15 minutes). However, since all multi-tracker
crawlers perform this task at roughly the same time, each tracker under consideration
can be requested in intervals of less than 3 minutes on average. This distributed
approach enables us to monitor tens of thousands of overlay swarms at the same time,
while discovering 98% of the online peers reported by the tracker. Finally, we identify
different users by their <ip,port>-pairs. Unfortunately, due to scalability issues, we
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Figure 12: Geographical distribution of all the peers in both types of measurements (top-15
countries).
cannot actively probe these users to determine their session duration. To still have an
accurate estimation about their session time, we have devised an analytical model as
presented in Appendix A.1.
Measurement Scope
Our macroscopic measurement platform operated from December 09, 2008 to Jan-
uary 16, 2009. Our final dataset consists of reports from 46,227 torrents and 29,066,139
users, giving us large-scale insights into torrent popularities, seeder-to-leecher ratios,
user arrival patterns, user session times, and the download interests of the individual
user. Figure 12 shows the geographic distribution of the monitored peers. Among the
top-15 countries, twelve countries are from North America and Europe, which must be
clearly attributed to the language of the content. More importantly, however, it can be
noted that the peer distribution of the microscopic and macroscopic crawling is almost
identical, indicating that the by an order of magnitude smaller-sized microscopic data
set is indeed a representative sample.
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3.3 measuring user-level issues in the bittorrent system
One of the primary research objectives in this thesis is to explore the shortcomings of
current P2P content distribution systems, when attempting to achieve high download
performance and long-term availability of content. Specifically, we strive to find out
what causes these systems to fail to fulfil these properties (cf. Section 1.4). At first, we
need, however, to validate that current P2P content distribution systems (i.e., BitTorrent)
indeed suffer from these problems. This section focuses on this issue.
It is important to understand that performance and availability can be measured
from two different perspectives, namely from the users’ perspective and at a system-
level. This means, although content can be available in a given BitTorrent swarm
(i.e., there are accessible seeders that can serve the file), once performance becomes
unacceptably low, users may become frustrated and chose to abort their downloads.
Thus, on a system-level, the file is technically ’available’, but from the users’ point of
view, it appears to be ’unavailable’. Intuitively, the most important way to measure both
requirements is from the perspective of the users, since their satisfaction determines
the success and acceptance of a content distribution system. For the purpose of our
analysis, we consider two indicative user-level metrics.
The first metric, the download throughput, measures performance in BitTorrent. To this
end, we are interested in measuring the perceived quality of service over time, rather
than focussing on instant download speeds. This is because users typically access the
Internet using broadband connections and, thus, expect that their downstream capacity
is continuously fully utilised. Therefore, we define this performance metric by the total
download amount divided by the download time.
The second user-level metric, the download abortion rate, quantifies BitTorrent’s ability
to successfully distribute content to its users, i.e., such that they eventually finish their
downloads. Importantly, as discussed above, when users chose to abort downloads,
it does not necessarily mean that content is unavailable on a system-level. However,
currently, this is sufficient for our needs and, therefore, we delay the exploration of the
lower-level details to the next section. The rest of this section now investigates these
two user-level metrics.
3.3.1 Download Throughput
Over the course of our microscopic crawling, we were able to collect data from 777,839
users, participating in 832 overlay swarms. To determine the performance of these users,
we measured the rate over time at which new file chunks appeared in the users’ bitfields.
Figure 13 summarises the cumulative distributions of download throughputs (the total
download amount divided by the download time) for the different BitTorrent users. For
comparison purposes, we contrast these throughputs with the cumulative distributions
of user downstream link bandwidths as obtained from end-host measurements of 11
major cable and DSL providers in North America and Europe in 2007 [25]. There are
two points to notice from this figure:
• First, it can be observed that 8% of the users achieve a download throughput
of  1 KBps during their entire uptime. This indicates that every 12th user is
unable to download content; clearly, this is non-trivial for a content distribution
system.
• A second point to notice is that, in general, performance picture is extremely
unsatisfying and highly divergent. Specifically, 50% of the users download at a
rate of less than 30 KBps. However, most of the users have a downstream link
capacity that is significantly higher, ranging from 125 KBps to 1,000 KBps (note
that the x-axis is in log-scale). This suggests that overall download performance
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Figure 13: Performance of 777,839 BitTorrent users, participating in 832 overlay swarms. The
other two curves show the downstream link bandwidths for the different DSL and
cable ISPs, two years before our measurements [25].
as provided by BitTorrent is far from saturating even the modest broadband
connections of 2007.
3.3.2 Abortion Rates
After inspecting the performance of BitTorrent, we next turn to BitTorrent’s ability
to distribute a given file to all users in a torrent. Specifically, since we have collected
the bitfields’ of every node as they have evolved over time, we are able to ascertain
whether a user eventually completes its download. Accordingly, we categorise users
into two groups: completed and non-completed users. Table 3 provides statistics for both
type of users.
User type Number Download Session Download Number
of throughput time progress of
users (in KBps) (in minutes) (in %) sessions
Completed 423,495 85.91 79.45 100.00 1.23
Non-completed 354,344 33.38 112.05 26.28 1.63
All 777,839 62.54 92.04 65.28 1.40
Table 3: Statistics of users that finished their downloads (completed) and those that did not
(non-completed). All information provided are average values calculated over each user
group. Session time only considers time in leecher state.
Overall, we see that more than 45% of the users aborted their downloads. Without
having further information than the nodes’ bitfields, it is difficult to assess the reason
behind this large fraction of download abortions. It might be because users (i) suddenly
lose their interest in the file, (ii) download the file in multiple sessions (e.g., shutdown
their desktop PC at night), or, most likely, (iii) abort their download because of poor
performance.
To ascertain this issue, we first consider the session times of users. As can be seen
from Table 3, the download sessions of the non-completed users are considerably
longer than that of the completed user group. Still, users from the non-completed
group retrieve only 26.28% of the file, while the others are able to finish their downloads.
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This observation clearly points to the fact that the non-completed users patiently waited
for their download completion, rather than losing their interest.
On the other hand, it can also be noted that the reason for high download abortions
is not subject to multi-session downloading that could not be captured by our measure-
ment study, i.e., the measurement period was not long enough. This is evident from the
fact that the number of download sessions of the non-completed users is even higher
than that of the completed users. Instead, there is rather clear evidence that shows slow
download rates are the primary reason for this large fraction of download abortions.
In fact, as shown in the table, the non-completed users achieve an average download
throughput that is 2.5 times lower than that of users completing their downloads.
From these findings, we derive that users are highly sensitive to their perceived
instant quality of service. BitTorrent, however, fails to provide sufficient performance
levels, thereby inducing an overall abortion rate of more than 45%. Through these
findings, we can confidently say that, from the users’ perspective, the current BitTorrent
system suffers from serious performance and availability issues. Furthermore, the
extremely low download rates of some of the users ( 1 KBps) give also a clear
indication of file availability issues on a system level. Analysing this aspect and
identifying the reasons for theses issues will be the subject of the next section.
3.4 causes of limitations : performance and availability
So far, it has been validated that the current BitTorrent system suffers from shortcom-
ings when distributing content to a set of interested users. To demonstrate this, we
have intentionally used higher-level metrics to quantify performance and availability
from the users’ perspective. This section now focuses on fine-granular system-level
aspects, both to characterise and to better understand the causes behind these serious
user-level issues.
Previous research (such as [10, 113, 43, 84]) has shown that seeders are vital for high
download performance and the long-term availability of content. Further, Guo et al. [43]
have promoted the assumption that BitTorrent swarms without seeders are unable
to reconstruct the file. In contrast to this, BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat incentive mechanism
solely applies to users that are actively downloading, i.e., it does not provide incentives
for seeding (cf. Section 2.4.2). Accordingly, when combining these two aspects, it is
intuitive to assume that the user-level issues previously discussed are caused by seeders,
particularly by the lack of them. Also, this hypothesis is corroborated by the fact every
12th user is unable to download content, indicating the lack of sufficient data sources.
To test and validate this hypothesis, we proceed as follows. By utilising our mea-
surement data, we first confirm the significance of seeders with regard to download
performance in BitTorrent (cf. Section 3.4.1). Subsequently, we validate the assump-
tion that a torrent without seeders indeed causes file unavailability (cf. Section 3.4.2).
Importantly, in previous research, this is so far an unverified assumption that must
be investigated (and quantified). Finally, as a last step in our chain of evidence, we
confirm the assumption that due to the lack of appropriate incentives any BitTorrent
swarm will inevitably lose seeders over time; a fact that reduces both performance and
availability (cf. Section 3.4.3).
To not mix up terminology, when using the term availability in the remainder of this
chapter, we always refer to content availability on a system-level. This means content is
accessible for the users, irrespective of the download rate achieved.
3.4.1 The Role of Seeders in Download Performance
In this subsection, we show that seeders are vital for achieving high download perfor-
mance. From this it can then be derived that a lack of them causes serious performance
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Figure 14: The ratio of downstream to upstream link bandwidths [25].
problems. This is due to the characteristics of users who participate in online content
distribution.
The resources of a BitTorrent swarm are solely defined by the peers contributing
their upstream capacity. Concretely, the swarm’s service capacity Ut is defined by the
aggregate of available upload capacity, which can be calculated at time instant t as
Ut =
∑
i
upSi +
∑
j
upLj . (3.1)
Note that upSi and up
L
j are the upload contributions of seeder i and leecher j,
respectively. On the other hand, the required service capacity Dt at time t is given by
the aggregated downstream capacity of all leechers
Dt =
∑
j
downLj . (3.2)
Assuming that the users’ upload utilisation is always close to optimum (see [10]),
and file chunks are only downloaded once, the download links of leechers are saturated
if Ut > Dt. Unfortunately, this requirement does not align well with the characteristics
of residential broadband networks. More specifically, most of the Internet access links
are highly asymmetric with downstream capacities that are often a multiple of the
upstream capacity. For instance, Figure 14 plots the ratio of downstream to upstream
link bandwidths as obtained from major cable and DSL providers in North America
and Europe [25]. For more than half of the DSL hosts, the downstream bandwidths
exceed upstream bandwidths by a factor of more than 4. For cable hosts, this factor is
even higher with ratios above 10 for more than half of the nodes. Further, it is expected
that residential networks will continue to be highly asymmetric, as exemplified by the
bandwidths advertised by ISPs on their websites (e.g., [101]).
Due to this high link asymmetry, we must therefore conclude that it is gene-
rally impossible for a swarm of solely leechers to achieve downlink saturation, as∑
j down
L
j 
∑
jup
L
j . Instead, downlink saturation can only be achieved in the presence
of seeders. This happens because seeders increase the available capacity of service
without consuming any.
To validate this observation, we make use of our microscopic measurement data.
Specifically, we correlate the downlink saturation of peers to the seeder-to-leecher ratio
observed in their swarms (the downlink capacity is estimated by gauging each peer’s
peak download rate). Figure 15 shows the average downlink saturation for all peers
based on the seeder-to-leecher ratio of the swarm when they first join (averaged into
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Figure 15: The measured correlation between seeder-to-leecher ratio and downlink saturation.
clusters of size 0.05). In fact, there is a strong trend indicating that the amount of
online seeders heavily influences the download performance of the users. For instance,
we see that the downlink saturation increases linearly for ratios below 2, indicating
a significant performance improvement. As the ratio increases beyond two, however,
this trend tails off as many of the lower capacity peers reach their saturation (99% of
measured peers had a downlink capacity of under 10 Mbps).
In essence, the above findings have highlighted that seeders are of paramount
importance with respect to download performance. Specifically, an overabundance of
them are necessary to achieve high download speeds, which is also confirmed by other
studies [10, 113].
3.4.2 The Role of Seeders in File Availability
So far it has been shown that seeders are vital for achieving high download perfor-
mance. This was the first step for confirming our hypothesis that the lack of seeders is
core reason for the user-level issues previously observed. As a next step, we investigate
the role of seeders with regard to file (un)availability. This is important as many users
in our microscopic measurement study achieved download rates of less than 1 KBps.
Thus, we seek to find out whether these performance issues coincide with the lack of
seeders.
Defining Availability
To study and understand the availability of files in BitTorrent, we first present a
simple model. Let us assume that we have a torrent T , formed by N nodes, managing
the download of a file composed by P chunks. Thus, we can define the vector Vi =
[Vi1,Vi2, ...,ViP] that contains the information about the chunks stored by peer i:
Vij = 1 if node i has the chunk j; Vij = 0 if node i does not have chunk j. Vi is typically
known as the bitfield of node i.
We define the percentage of available chunks of torrent T at a time instant t as
U(T) =
∑P
j=1OR(Vij)
P
. (3.3)
Where OR(Vij) represents the logical OR-operation over the chunk j across all the
nodes in the torrent T .
34 measurements and analysis of the bittorrent system
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1
 0  0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.6  0.7  0.8  0.9  1
Cu
mu
lat
ive
 fr
ac
tio
n o
f s
ee
dle
ss 
sta
tes
Chunk availability max(U(T))
Figure 16: Chunk availability in torrents affected by seedless states.
The Circumstances of Unavailability
It is important to understand in which circumstances a file becomes unavailable, based
on our definition. A file is considered unavailable if at least one of its chunks is not
accessible within a swarm. This situation arises if there are no peers in the swarm
that possess a given chunk, or alternatively, if the peer(s) that possess the chunk are
inaccessible (e.g., due to firewalls, NAT, or overlay graph disconnection). It is intuitive
to consider the former as a far more likely circumstance (e.g., most BitTorrent clients
implement techniques such as NAT traversal [85]. Moreover, they include neighbour
discovery techniques such as the Peer Exchange Protocol (PEX) and periodic tracker
polling to prevent graph disconnection). Therefore, given this assumption, a file can
be considered available if (i) there is at least one seeder or (ii) there is no seeder but
the bitfields of the leechers collectively fit the condition U(T) = 1. Without detailed
analysis, we can therefore currently state that:
• With an accessible seeder, a file is available,
• Without an accessible seeder, a file may be available.
We use these two observations as a starting point to investigate unavailability in
BitTorrent. In the following, we denote time periods in a torrent’s lifecycle in which no
seeder is online as a seedless state. To this end, the file is unavailable if torrent T is in a
seedless state and U(T) < 1.
It is intuitive to think that U(T) < 1 in a torrent without any seeder (that is, leechers
alone are unable to reconstruct the file). However, this is, so far, an unverified assump-
tion that must be investigated (and quantified). To ascertain this, the rest of this section
inspects the (i) nodes’ bitfields and (ii) nodes’ download rates in all the torrents of our
microscopic traces affected by seedless states.
Bitfield Analysis
For the purpose of the bitfield analysis, we have collected the nodes’ bitfields for all
the torrents in our microscopic measurements as they have evolved over time. For each
torrent, we have computed U(T) periodically every 10 minutes during any period a
torrent is without any seeders (i.e., it is in a seedless state). This allows us to ascertain
whether a full copy of the file exists in the torrent at any given time. Figure 16 shows
the cumulative distributions of max(U(T)) observed in the seedless state for each
torrent that we studied.
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Figure 17: Snapshot from a torrent in our microscopic trace.
As can be seen from the figure, in the majority of cases (86%) our hypothesis is
confirmed and the contacted leechers are unable to collectively reconstruct the file
once a seeder has left (i.e., max(U(T)) < 1). This suggests that the lack of seeders is
the primary cause for unavailability of files in BitTorrent. The remaining torrents (14%)
are only able to maintain availability due to particular swarm characteristics such as
high downloading rates and stable user populations (cf. Appendix A.2).
Download Rate Analysis
A limitation of the bitfield analysis is that not all nodes are accessible to the crawlers
due to NATs. To address this, we also inspect the aggregate torrent download rates.
Through this we can infer that a file is unavailable when the download rate of all the
peers participating in a specific torrent drops close to 0 KBps. From this we can derive
that the node cannot find any new chunks to download.
To highlight our findings, we first inspect a representative torrent from our micro-
scopic trace5, shown in Figure 17. The figure shows the median instant download rate
of the online leechers over time, sampled every 10 minutes. It also plots the number
of seeders and leechers, as well as the number of copies of the least replicated chunk.
Note that when the number of seeders becomes zero, the torrent enters a seedless state.
5 We have observed the same behaviour in most of the torrents affected by seedless states.
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Figure 18: Interval download rates for nodes affected by the lack of seeders.
The torrent can be observed to enter a seedless state before day 6, remaining in this
state for the next days. When the final seeder departs, the download rate of the leechers
drops to approximately 0-3 KBps after only a few minutes. This also coincides with
the number of least replicated chunks dropping to zero. It can therefore be confidently
inferred that the file is, indeed, unavailable during this period due to the departure of
the last seeder.
The above analysis has inspected a representative torrent. To validate its widespread
applicability we also look at the download rate degradation in all torrents. To achieve
this, we have taken all the users that have been affected by a seedless state and separated
their downloading time into two periods: (i) periods in which they have suffered from a
seedless state and (ii) periods in which they have not. Figure 18 presents the download
rate distribution for both periods. First, we can observe that the download rate in
a non-seedless state is much higher than in a seedless state. 80-85% of the nodes
experience an average download rate lower than 1 KBps when in a seedless torrent,
indicating that the peers cannot locate any required chunks and the file is indeed
unavailable. Second, however, we also observe that 15-20% of users, in fact, maintain a
reasonable level of performance even without any seeders. This can be attributed to
two reasons: (i) the aforementioned 14% of torrents are capable of reconstructing their
file without a seeder at an average rate of 21.3 KBps; and (ii) newly joined peers can
download the subset of available chunks at an effective rate. This can be observed in
the representative torrent (cf. Figure 17): between days 8 and 9 there is a peak in the
number of leechers which results in a short peak in the download rate as newcomers
download the available chunks.
In sum, we have demonstrated that in spite of the effectiveness of BitTorrent’s chunk
distribution strategy [70, 71, 10], in the absence of seeders, typically (i) leechers are not
able to reconstruct a complete file and (ii) leechers’ download rates rapidly drop to 0
KBps. Therefore, the extremely low download throughput of some users ( 1 KBps)
must be attributed to the lack of seeders.
3.4.3 The Emergence of Seedless States
It has previously been concluded that seedless states generally result in either unavail-
able content, or, alternatively, low download performance. It is therefore important to
gain an understanding of how such seedless states emerge in BitTorrent. We identify
two main factors that directly influence the loss of seeders in a BitTorrent swarm: (i)
the session time of seeders and (ii) the inter-arrival rate of the users. To illustrate the
influencing factors, we use a simple example shown in Figure 19. In this figure, each
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Figure 19: Illustration of a seedless state.
horizontal line represents the lifetime of a user; these users can either be in a leecher
state (thin lines) or a seeding state (thick lines).
It seems straightforward that the longer a seeder serves content, the more leechers
are able to finish their downloads. As mentioned previously, however, BitTorrent’s
rate-based incentive strategy only applies in downloading state and only in the context
of a single swarm. Therefore, (as demonstrated later on) the seeding times of users are
typically quite short, contributing significantly to the frequency of seedless states.
Let us now assume that user n is the last available seeder in our example torrent and
none of the previous seeders return to the torrent. In this case, a seedless state occurs
when the time required for leechers to download the file exceeds the online time of the
last seeder. For example, Figure 19 shows that after the last available seeder leaves the
swarm at time t3, none of the remaining leechers were able to finish the download. If
we focus on the n-th node and its subsequent successor in the torrent (n+ 1-th), the
inter-arrival time between both users is given by τn+1(= t2 − t1) whereas the seeding
time of node n is given by µn. Assume that both users n and n+1 download a file of
size Fs with rate Dn and Dn+1 respectively. Thus, the swarm enters a seedless state
when Equation 3.4 is fulfilled.
Fs
Dn
+ µn < τn+1 +
Fs
Dn+1
(3.4)
To simplify the analysis, we assume that Dn = Dn+16. In this case, the seedless state
is reached if the inter-arrival time is larger than the seeding time.
To summarise, seeding times as well as inter-arrival times play an important role
in the loss of seeders and subsequently in the long-term availability of content. Since
both parameters are not directly correlated, we individually analyse both of them in
the following.
Arrival Behaviour of Users
The first behavioural characteristic that is paramount to seedless state generation is the
inter-arrival times of users. To this end, intuitive questions are: (i) what inter-arrival
times do we expect in reality and (ii) how do inter-arrival times evolve over time?
By analysing a few hundred torrents in a small community, previous work [42] has
shown that user inter-arrival times exponentially increase over time. Our goal is to
6 Our microscopic measurements show that the download rate of users that finish downloads (Dn in the
example) is higher than the download rate of those that do not (Dn+1) validating our assumption.
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Figure 21: Maximum inter-arrival times of torrents with highly unavailable seeders.
generalize this finding for ’open’ communities such as Mininova.org that are orders
of magnitude larger. For our analysis, we use similar techniques as applied in [42].
We consider all torrents in our macroscopic trace. We use linear regression to fit the
logarithm of the complementary7 of the number of node arrivals of each torrent along
time. Let Xt denote the complementary number of node arrivals at time epoch t and Yt
be the fitting result. We define the relative deviation of the actual node arrivals over an
ideally exponentially increasing function by logXi−logYilogXi . Thus, a relative deviation of
0% indicates that both curves overlap. Figure 20 shows the deviation for each torrent of
our macroscopic trace. The x-axis depicts the torrents ordered by ascending population
size while the y-axis shows the relative deviation. For most of the torrents, the relative
deviation is less than 10% whereas the deviation tends to decrease with increasing
torrent popularity. Altogether, the average relative deviation of all torrents is 4.8%.
Therefore, we conclude that the inter-arrival time of the nodes exponentially increases
with time.
Notably, we observed especially high inter-arrival times in torrents affected by
seedless states; this is in line with our analysis of Equation 3.4. For instance, Figure 21
plots the maximum inter-arrival time observed in these torrents with unavailable
seeders. More than 50% of the torrents exhibit inter-arrival times far beyond 7 hours.
7 We use the complementary number of node arrivals to avoid domains in which the logarithm is undefined,
e.g., epochs with no peer arrivals.
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Figure 22: Seeding time distribution.
Seeding Times of Users
The second behavioural characteristic that is paramount to the creation of seedless
states is the seeding time of the nodes, i.e., how long seeders stay online for. As already
shown in our example torrent (cf. Figure 19), to maintain file availability, it is necessary
for seeders to remain online long enough for new seeds to be generated. In addition to
this, to achieve high download performance, BitTorrent swarms must be dominated by
seeders.
Figure 22 shows the cumulative distribution of the seeding times of the nodes,
obtained from the two microscopic measurements. It can be seen that user seeding
times are generally short-lasting with 75% of the seeders staying online for less than 4
hours. When this data is compared to the characteristics and length of the inter-arrival
time of users, we can deduce two important observations:
• First, since user seeding times are constantly too short and inter-arrival times
are rapidly increasing over time, the torrent must inevitably lose seeders. This
occurrence can be demonstrated by a representative torrent from our microscopic
trace, shown in Figure 23. Upon the initial popularity wave at which many seeders
are generated is over, it can be seen that the torrent quickly loses important upload
capacity, which clearly reduces performance.
• Second, if we contrast the length of user seeding times (average is 3.44 hours)
against the inter-arrival times of users (i.e., 71% of them are 3.44 hours), it can
be noticed that these times are not sufficient to avoid seedless states. This fact not
only reduces performance, but also prevents torrents from achieving long-term
availability of content.
To conclude, through the results obtained in this section, we have confirmed our
hypothesis that the lack of seeders is root cause for BitTorrent’s performance and
availability issues. In particular, the presence of seeders is vital for achieving high
download performance and guaranteeing long-term availability of content. However,
BitTorrent apparently fails to promote them. This is evident by the observation that
current user seeding times in BitTorrent swarms are far too low to ensure the long-term
availability of content.
3.5 scale of limitations
So far we have validated the existence of shortcomings with regard to performance and
file availability using our microscopic measurement data. To extend this analysis and
to get a broader understanding of the scale of limitations, we now complement these
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Figure 23: Snapshot of the loss of seeders in a torrent (microscopic measurements).
results with the larger-scale macroscopic measurement data. Through this, it is shown
that poor download rates and high abortion levels are common place throughout the
entire BitTorrent system.
3.5.1 The Prevalence of Seedless States
The previous section has provided a basic understanding on the impact that different
seeder-to-leecher ratios have on download performance. In particular, it has been
shown that an overabundance of seeders is necessary to maintain high download
performance (i.e., to saturate the download links of users). The next step is to contrast
this knowledge against the data gathered from our macroscopic crawling. In particular,
we are interested in finding out which seeder-to-leecher ratios are common for the
current BitTorrent system. This allows us to gain a high-level overview of BitTorrent’s
performance picture and potential performance constraints.
Figure 24 depicts the cumulative distribution of seeder-to-leecher ratios in all torrents
under consideration, one week after the start of our large-scale measurements. From
this figure, we can extract two pieces of information; first, more than 17% of the
BitTorrent swarms show no active seeders. This suggests that performance in these
torrents is solely constrained by file unavailability. Also, this coincides with the findings
of Section 3.3.1 where several users achieve a download throughput of nearly 0KBps.
Second, it is clearly noticeable that the amount of seeders in existing overlay swarms
is far too low to satisfy the demands of the downloading users. In particular, the
majority of swarms (73%) exhibit seeder-to-leecher ratios below 2. However, as shown
before, the average downlink saturation in these ranges is only between 49-74%,
suggesting poor download rates and significant performance variations.
In general, due to the large variety of seeder-to-leecher ratios ranging from 0.01 to 55,
it is now unsurprising that the performance picture of BitTorrent is so divergent. For
instance, as shown in Figure 13, 50% of the users achieve download rates far below
30 KBps, whereas a small minority of users (18%) achieve superior performance with
rates ranging from 100 KBps to 1 MBps.
To summarise, our macroscopic dataset confirms the existence of large-scale effi-
ciency issues in BitTorrent. Specifically, in some torrents, download performance is
constrained by file unavailability. The remaining (available) torrents, on the other
hand, are predominantly dominated by leechers, lacking important upload capacity to
achieve high download performance.
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Figure 24: Ratios of seeders to downloading peers for the swarms in our macroscopic mea-
surement study (snapshot after one week). 17.3% of the swarms show no active
seeder.
3.5.2 The Extent of File Unavailability
The above analysis has revealed that, after only a few days, some BitTorrent swarms
show no active seeders. Since the large-scale snapshot of Figure 24 considers several
thousands of torrents at a particular stage of their lifecycle (at most one week old), we
next focus on the long-term availability of content by considering the entire lifecycle of
a torrent (amounting to several weeks). In particular, to quantify how prevalent file
unavailability is in BitTorrent, we ask the following question: how many torrents and
to what extent are torrents affected by seedless states? To answer this, we use again
the logs from our macroscopic trace that give us a large-scale view on the system
comprising of 46,227 torrents.
Our data analysis shows that more than 38% of torrents (17,568 out of 46,227) lose
their seeders within the first month, out of which 72% lack seeders after only 5 days.
Similarly, we find that more than 45% of the torrents suffer from a lack of seeders for
half of their monitoring time. To exemplify the scale of this, in 50% of the torrents
observed for periods longer than 30 days, no seeder was available for more than 16
days.
Finally, in our study, more than 9.68 million users participated in torrents with
intermittent unavailability. Out of these users, more than 1.59 million were directly
affected by the unavailability problem; i.e., they were trying to download content
during an unavailable period.
3.6 conclusions
In this chapter, we have investigated BitTorrent’s efficiency with regard to download
performance and file availability. For this purpose, we have conducted two large-
scale measurement studies, allowing us to collect data of more than 32 million users,
participating in 46,227 BitTorrent swarms. Through the combination of microscopic
and macroscopic measurement techniques, we make a number of findings, viz.:
• Extent of unavailability: File unavailability is a large-scale problem in BitTorrent.
The measurements show that more than 38% of the torrents (17,568 out of 46,227)
are affected by unavailability within their first month, out of which 72% are likely
to become unavailable after only 5 days. This already affects more than 1.59
million users in the first month of the torrents’ lifetime.
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• Poor download rates: The performance level of BitTorrent swarms is extremely
unsatisfying. Specifically, users in BitTorrent download with a rate of only 30 KBps
on median, far from saturating even the most modest home broadband connection.
Worse, every 12th user is unable to download content at all (i.e., the download
throughput is 1 KBps), which is non-trivial for a content distribution system.
• Poor user satisfaction: BitTorrent often fails to achieve its overarching goal – to
successfully replicate a single file object to all interested users. In particular, due
to the low perceived quality of service, user frustration is so high that nearly half
of the users (45%) abort downloads.
• Insufficient incentive design is root cause for the issues observed. Users that have
finished their downloads lack important incentives to persist as file replica in a
given overlay swarm. As a result, most of the BitTorrent swarms lose their seeders
after only a few days. This occurrence significantly impairs both performance
and availability.
Through the findings obtained by these two major measurement studies, the first
research goal of this thesis has been addressed (cf. Section 1.4). In particular, by using
the popular BitTorrent system as case study, we have demonstrated that current P2P
content distribution systems indeed suffer from serious shortcomings with regard to
providing continuous content distribution. Also, we have discovered major limitations
in existing incentive mechanisms when attempting to achieve these properties — they
fail to promote seeding. Seeders are, however, vital for superior download performance
and long-term availability of content. Consequently, any viable solution must therefore
incentivise these users to persist in the system.
4A N A LY S I S O F S O L U T I O N S PA C E
The previous chapter has outlined the performance and availability issues of current P2P content
distribution systems (i.e., BitTorrent) and highlighted the significant impact that seeders have
on this. We therefore deduce that a solution must find some way to encourage users to provide
content even after they have obtained it themselves. This chapter analysis a set of intuitive
solution approaches in an attempt to reduce the solution space and to inform our future design.
Through this, a set of key requirements are then outlined to shape the approach taken in the
following chapter.
4.1 introduction
The effectiveness of BitTorrent has been largely attributed to its rate-based tit-for-tat
incentive mechanism that encourages users to contribute resources to achieve higher
performance [70, 51, 71]. Despite this, however, we have shown that many torrents do
not seem to benefit from this strategy. Instead, a massive proportion of torrents (≈
40%) achieve extremely low performance with few users being able to download the
file successfully.
As shown in the previous chapter, the reason for this significant divergence in
performance is what we call the seeder promotion problem [60]. This occurs because users
are given no incentive to remain online to serve a file after their download has been
completed (i.e., to act as seeders). Seeders, however, play a vital role in BitTorrent’s
performance as they (i) provide resources without consuming any, and (ii) ensure that
a complete copy of the file remains in the swarm. We believe that it is the latter point
that is most vital for BitTorrent’s performance. Without a fully copy of the file, a swarm
is almost always unavailable, even if only one chunk is missing. As such, we consider
BitTorrent’s performance to be closely linked to its availability.
The solution space for addressing this problem is wide; to assist in its analysis, we cat-
egorise solution approaches into two groups: single-torrent solutions and cross-torrent
collaboration. The first approach involves users within a single swarm cooperating, e.g.,
to ensure the availability of rare chunks. As such, incentives (such as file encryption
or monetary rewards) can be used to encourage users to remain seeding for longer
periods of time. The second approach involves the peers of multiple swarms cooperating
to ensure the availability of rare chunks. As such, cross-torrent solutions aim to build
incentives that allow users to make contributions and to receive rewards agnostic to
the peers or swarms they interacted with.
Clearly, there is a wide spectrum of potential approaches to address the seeder
promotion problem. Therefore, to inform our design, it is important to study these
potential solutions from an abstract perspective. The purpose of this is to reduce the
solution space to gain an understanding of the best general approach. To achieve this
we utilise the trace logs from our measurement studies to analyse the potential of a
variety of abstract mechanisms. A further purpose of this chapter is to derive a set of
requirements that a solution must fulfil to overcome the performance and availability
issues previously discussed. These requirements are intended to be a necessary basis
for the solution devised in Chapter 5.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows; first, in Section 4.2, the key principles
of potential single-torrent and cross-torrent mechanisms are briefly outlined to show
how each approach might incite users to persist as seeders. Following this, in Section 4.3,
these different approaches are quantitatively analysed with regard to three primary
metrics: availability, performance and fairness. Based on these findings, in Section 4.4,
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we present the deduced solution requirements. Finally, in Section 4.5, the chapter is
concluded by summarising our main insights.
4.2 abstract solution space
This section briefly outlines the two generic approaches that can be taken for improving
seeding in BitTorrent. The first is using traditional single-torrent principles, while the
second exploits the concept of cross-torrent collaboration. Note that we do not offer
concrete implementational details; instead, we provide a brief outline of the key
principles behind each mechanism.
4.2.1 Single-Torrent Approaches
A single-torrent solution involves incentivising users to remain within a torrent to act
as seeder based on certain properties related to that individual torrent. As of yet, we do
not know of any successful mechanisms to achieve this. This is due to the difficulty
of enforcing incentives once a peer has already obtained the file which it desires. We
therefore consider a simple framework of encrypted chunks that may work. Such a
solution would involve encrypting the file before it is distributed within the swarm.
The tracker would be responsible for managing this encryption, and, as such, would
be the source of the keys. Subsequently, once a peer has downloaded the file, it would
be required to remain seeding for a length of time determined by the tracker, before
the encryption keys are released to it.
As shown in Figure 25, the intuition behind this approach is that, due to the
extended seeding time of peer A, a new replacement seeder can be generated (i.e.,
peer B), preventing a torrent from entering a seedless state. Obviously, to deploy such
a solution in practise, several security concerns must be addressed. For instance, it
must be prevented that users forward the encryption key to other users in the system
by using an alternative channel, e.g., another torrent. On the other hand, this could be
easily solved by using a per-peer key management, or, alternatively, the file could be
periodically re-encrypted using different encryption keys.
Peer A
Peer B
Waiting time for key 
(=seeding time)
...
Figure 25: File-encryption to extend the seeding times of the users in a single-torrent approach.
Upon peer A has finished its download, it has to wait some time until it can receives
the encryption key for the downloaded content. This contributes to the generation of
a new replacement seeder, namely peer B.
In contrast to the enforced increase of user seeding times, it is also worthwhile to
consider external rewards that are provided by content providers. In such a single-
torrent approach, seeders will receive monetary awards for the amount of data they
have provided to others nodes in the system. This gives users the freedom to chose how
long they want to stay online upon finishing their downloads and is less restrictive than
file encryption. In fact, this solution requires that content providers are prepared to
spend money for the dissemination of their content files. However, this could be easily
accomplished by investing a small fraction of the cost savings due to P2P technology
(e.g., bandwidth savings on source servers), resulting in a yet profitable business model.
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Figure 26: Exemplary lifetime of a peer. The long arrows represent torrents. The bold sections
represent intervals when the exemplary peer is active in the corresponding torrents as
a leecher. The dashed bold sections represent intervals when the peer could resume
seeding in the corresponding torrents in case there were any incentives for it to do so.
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Figure 27: Online users and available file replicas in the category ’Movies’ in our macroscopic
trace.
4.2.2 Cross-Torrent Approaches
An alternative to single-torrent approaches is to find ways of encouraging cooperation
between multiple torrents. A cross-torrent solution involves incentivising users to
cooperate with the system as opposed to individual torrents. This approach is motivated
by observations from our macroscopic trace showing that 51% of the users join multiple
torrents (4.98 on average). We have further found that seeders frequently re-join swarms
after they have left, therefore providing conclusive evidence that users re-join the
BitTorrent system multiple times while still possessing their previously downloaded
files.
To highlight the principles of a cross-torrent solution, imagine a user who joins
torrent X at some point in time and completes the download as shown in Figure 26.
This user may very well join another torrent Y at a later point in time. When this occurs,
the node could also theoretically persist as a replica for torrent X as shown by the
dashed bold sections in Figure 26. As such, the seeder promotion problem would be
addressed by utilising replicas as opposed to traditional seeders (although in practise
these are very similar). To inspect the feasibility of this, Figure 27 shows the number of
online nodes in the ’Movies’ category alongside the number of potential online nodes
that could act as replicas. Evidently, there is a large pool of untapped resources that
could be exploited; in fact, more than 40% of the online users are indeed file replicas
that could provide their previously downloaded content.
So far, it has been shown that there is real-world potential for utilising cross-torrent
solutions for addressing the seeder promotion problem. However, as of yet, there exists
no deployed solution for incentivising users to cooperate in such a process. In fact, the
need to divert upload resources from a node’s current torrent would disincentivise
cross-torrent collaboration because it would decrease the probability of a node being
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unchoked for its own content download. It is therefore important to build robust
incentives alongside any cross-torrent protocols. To this end, we next outline three
abstract cross-torrent incentive approaches that could encourage users to act as replicas.
Cross-Torrent Bartering
The most straightforward approach is to extend BitTorrent’s rate-based tit-for-tat
mechanism to operate across multiple torrents. This involves peers bartering with each
other for content regardless of what swarm they operate in. This could work as follows:
assume that user A has previously downloaded torrent X (fully or partially) and is a
leecher in torrent Y. User B, on the other hand, has obtained torrent Y earlier and is
now a leecher in torrent X. Both A and B could mutually exchange chunks while still
conforming to BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat strategy (cf. Figure 28).
B
Time
A
Torrent X
Torrent Y
A
B
Figure 28: Cross-torrent bartering.
This approach has the advantage that it is instant, based on personal experiences,
and does not induce any overhead to exchange information about cooperation across
torrents. However, it also has the limitation of needing to locate other peers with
shared interests, subsequently restricting the applicability of the approach in any
circumstances where such reciprocation cannot be found.
Cross-Torrent Tit-for-Tat
Traditional tit-for-tat and cross-torrent bartering are based on rate-based incentives
that are implemented in real-time (i.e., contributions and rewards are instant). An
alternative is to base incentives on long-term persistent observations based on total data
volume, as exemplified by eMule. In eMule, peers locally maintain a persistent history
of the contributions made by each user, agnostic to which file and to the time the
contribution is made. Subsequently, peers would show a preference to chunk requests
from users with higher contribution ratios. As such, peers are encouraged to act as
sources for as many files as possible so that they can build up a positive reputation.
For instance, as depicted in Figure 29, peer A contributes to B in torrent X because in a
future swarm Y, B will recognize A and reciprocate.
A
Time
B
B A
Torrent X
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Figure 29: Cross-torrent tit-for-tat (eMule-like).
This approach has the advantage that it might increase the probability of locating
shared interests (as with bartering) because incentives become long-term and persistent
rather than instant. Importantly, this can also be achieved without introducing any
communication overhead or the threat of using third-parties in the process. Unlike
bartering, the process is also detached from time, thereby allowing peers to claim
back contribution at a later date. However, persistent histories still require repeated
interactions between peers, possibly resulting in restricted applicability.
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Cross-Torrent Indirect Reciprocation
The previous two approaches rely on direct observations that are stored locally. An
alternative is to use persistent history information that is agnostic to individual peers.
As such, peer A would be able to make a contribution to peer X and receive the reward
from peer Y seamlessly (cf. Figure 30). This solution approach would require some form
of reputation infrastructure that can reliably store information about a given peer’s
’balance’. For instance, for the approach to work, peer Y must see the contributions
of peer A in the entire system. This could be realised by using a shared contribution
history in which peers exchange information about their local experiences with other
users in the system. As highlighted in Section 2.4, virtual currency systems or indirect
reciprocation schemes can fulfil this condition.
A
Time
X
Y A
Torrent X
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Figure 30: Cross-torrent indirect reciprocation.
Cross-torrent indirect reciprocation has the advantage of detaching incentives from
time, torrents, and individual peers, thereby offering the ’purest’ form of cross-torrent
collaboration. This subsequently addresses the need for synchronous interests (barter-
ing) or repeated interactions (tit-for-tat). However, such an approach also introduces far
greater complexity and overhead into the system, potentially negating these benefits in
certain environments.
4.2.3 Summary
For the sake of clarity, Table 4 gives an overview of the properties of the single-
torrent and cross-torrent solution approaches presented before. Most of the properties
are straightforward. Two, however, require some explanation: the identifiers and the
communication overhead. To enable long-term histories about the users’ share ratio,
permanent identifiers are required to identify users across different downloading
sessions. Contrary to this, temporary identifiers are newly generated whenever a
peer joins the system and can, thus, only be applied for incentive schemes where
reciprocation for contributions occurs in real-time. From the users’ perspective, the
latter is always preferable as temporary identifiers provide privacy, e.g., users cannot
be tracked in their long-term download behaviour. Communication overhead, on
the other hand, indicates whether users must exchange messages. Evidently, indirect
reciprocation is the only approach that requires network communication, because
peers evaluate each other based on local observations, and, additionally, on third-party
experiences.
As mentioned previously, single-torrent approaches strive to extend the seeding
times of users, immediately after they have finished their downloads. Consequently,
these approaches can never be agnostic to time, torrents, or individual users. Instead,
incentives to seeding are either enforced by file-encryption (no reward) or provided
with external monetary awards from content providers.
From the category of cross-torrent solutions, cross-torrent bartering is also neither
agnostic to time, torrents, or peers. Instead, for the approach to work, synchronous
interests between the nodes are required. However, it is most inline with BitTorrent
and could, thus, directly be deployed in the current BitTorrent system. Cross-torrent
tit-for-tat, on the other hand, detaches from time and torrents, but is still tied to
individual users. In particular, it requires that peers repeatedly meet each other in
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Solution Category Single-Torrent Cross-Torrent
File encryption,
monetary awards
Bartering Tit-for-tat Indirect
reciprocation
Incentive bilateral bilateral bilateral multilateral
Ranking of peers rate-based rate-based data volume data volume
Information horizon local local local shared
Reward no / monetary instant long-term long-term
Identifiers temporary temporary permanent permanent
Detaches time no no yes yes
Detaches torrents no no yes yes
Detaches peers no no no yes
Comm. overhead no no no yes
Table 4: Overview of abstract approaches for seeding in BitTorrent.
different torrents such that reciprocation for previous contributions can take place. Still,
no communication between the nodes is needed to realise the approach, but permanent
identifiers have to be added. Finally, cross-torrent indirect reciprocation is the least
restrictive; it even allows peers to claim back contributions at any time from any peer.
This comes, however, at the expense of others factors, including higher complexity,
management overhead, and network communication.
4.3 quantitative analysis of abstract solution space
In this section, we perform a quantitative analysis of the different abstract solution
approaches. Importantly, we do not aim to perform an implementational comparison
between the different approaches of the abstract solution space, e.g., regarding protocol
overhead, security concerns as well as technical aspects to realise either approach.
This is out of the scope of this thesis. Instead, we aim to reduce the solution space
by generally exploring the potential of either approach with regard to file availability,
download performance, and fairness. We consider fairness as also important because
performance must not be achieved at the expense of this property, as discussed in
Section 1.3.
To enable this comprehensive analysis in an accurate way, we perform extensive trace-
driven simulations using the data acquired by our crawlers. Specifically, to benchmark
the potential of the different abstract solution directions, we use as a baseline vanilla
BitTorrent as deployed in real BitTorrent swarms today.
In the following, we first present important details of our evaluation methodo-
logy to accomplish this analysis. With this information we then proceed to explore
the effectiveness of the different approaches based on the three metrics: availability,
performance and fairness.
4.3.1 Experimental Methodology
Exploring the effectiveness of strategies to promote long-term incentives for seeding –
a key requirement for improving file availability and performance in P2P content
distribution systems – requires a workload model that is itself long-term. In particular,
to truly quantify the impact of novel incentive strategies in the BitTorrent system,
it is important to reflect a BitTorrent community in lifelike manner, and, ideally,
over a prolonged period of time. To meet this requirement, we exploit the long-term
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measurement data acquired by our BitTorrent crawlers and use it as an input for
trace-driven simulations.
We next justify the choice of our simulation tool, capable of enabling such trace-
driven simulations. As the chosen simulator had to be adapted to our specific needs,
we also describe the changes that we have made and how we validated the correctness
of the results produced by this framework. Lastly, we detail how we have modelled the
different incentive mechanisms in the simulator and how the experiments have been
configured using our measurement data.
Simulation Tool
For our trace-driven analysis, we use the Octosim BitTorrent simulator of Bharambe
et al. [10], developed by the Carnegie Mellon University and Microsoft Research. Our
choice is motivated by the fact that this simulator is also used by other research groups
for BitTorrent research, allowing comparability between the experiments. The simulator
is discrete event-based and models many of BitTorrent’s mechanisms in detail. For
instance, it accurately models BitTorrent’s chunk selection strategy and unchoking
algorithm, including data flows on the transport layer. For further details about the
simulation framework, we refer the interested reader to [9].
To adapt the simulator to our needs and to further increase the realism of the
simulation model, we have modified the simulator as follows:
• We enable the simulator to support representative bandwidth distributions taken
from real-live measurements.
• We extend the peer arrival model to support file request patterns that follow our
trace data.
• We integrated functionality that a given user stays online as long as dictated by
our trace logs.
• We implement the optimistic disconnect functionality as used in current Azureus
implementations1.
• We update the choking algorithm in seeder state according to recent protocol
changes as reported by Legout et al. [70].
• We extend the simulator to enable cross-torrent collaboration and to support the
simulation of multiple torrents at the same time.
Simulator Verification
A simulator is useless if the results it produces do not coincide with the reality.
Modelling the complexity of BitTorrent’s mechanisms as well as transport layer functio-
nalities (e.g., TCP) requires a certain degree of abstraction to allow scalability. To
verify how accurate the forecasted simulation results are compared to live-experiments,
we have re-run various setups from a well-known BitTorrent measurement study of
Legout et al. [71]. In this work, the authors perform a wealth of experiments in the
PlanetLab testbed to explore the characteristics of important mechanisms associated to
BitTorrent. These experiments include a study of BitTorrent’s effectiveness to find peers
with similar bandwidth capacities, the interdependency between upload contribution
and download reward in BitTorrent, and the importance of the revised unchoking
mechanism in seeder state [71].
Clearly, if a simulation model is unable to accurately capture these important
characteristics, conclusive statements can be highly misleading. For this reason, by
using the same workload settings as presented in [71], we have repeated each of these
1 We find this important as Azureus is the most commonly used client in our measurement study.
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experiments with the modified OctoSim BitTorrent simulator. The detailed setup for
each experiment can be found in Appendix A.5, including the comparative results.
In general, we can confidently say that the outcomes produced by the simulator are
sufficiently comparable to those obtained by real-world experiments.
Incentive Model
Since the goal of our analysis is to capture the potential of the different solution
directions, we abstract away from technical constraints and assume global knowledge
for approaches requiring additional information from the system. This is sufficient for
our needs, even though the results produced represent an upper bound for a solution’s
performance capabilities.
The single-torrent solutions seek to extend the seeding times of users, once their
downloads have completed. To study the impact of this in the BitTorrent system, we
assume a single-torrent approach capable of extending the measured seeding times
of the users by a factor of 2, 5, and 10. This is representative for the proposed file
encryption framework or content providers providing monetary awards.
Cross-torrent bartering requires that users locate others in the system that own
content (or parts of it) that they desire, and vice versa. In our simulator, it is assumed
that these users always find each other (if simultaneously online) and can also always
establish TCP connections to each other to mutually exchange data.
Cross-torrent indirect reciprocation, on the other hand, requires that users can see the
contributions of their interaction partners to other nodes in the system. Ideally, they can
see all contributions of them, across time and torrents. Therefore, when encountering
a new user, the contribution history of this node is globally visible and thus directly
known.
Finally, in the volume-based cross-torrent approaches (i.e., cross-torrent tit-for-tat
and indirect reciprocation), we assume that users always prefer peers with the highest
share ratios for uploading.
Workload Model
We now describe the input parameters for the trace-driven simulations. This comprises
the torrents we selected from our trace data, the user behaviour model derived from
these torrents as well as how we estimated the speed of the Internet connections of
these users.
• Selecting the torrents. Our trace data encompasses tens of thousands of torrents
over a period of several weeks, far more than the simulator is able to handle.
Hence, we choose a random subset of a hundred torrents from the set of torrents
affected by seedless states. These torrents vary in file sizes between 3-1,500 MB
and exhibit a per-torrent monitoring period of at least four weeks. This procedure
has been repeated five times with different torrent subsets. The logs of each of
these subsets contain data of more than 45,000 downloads.
• User behaviour. To model the access pattern of torrents, we do not use any artificial
peer arrival function. Instead, we bring up peers according to the trace logs.
To model the number of swarms that a peer joins, we calculate the probability
distribution over our entire data set. Any user that cannot download the file
within 36 hours aborts the download2. The session time of a user consists of
a busy and idle period. In busy period, the user is actively downloading until
it reaches seeder state. Subsequently, the idle period begins in which the user
remains until it quits the client. During this idle time, in the single-torrent
2 We find through simulations that 36 hours is enough time to get a download success ratio over 99% in the
presence of seeders for all access links and file sizes used in our experiments.
4.3 quantitative analysis of abstract solution space 51
Netherlands
Norway
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
Turkey
Ukraine
UK USA
B a
n d
w i
d t h
 c a
p a
c i t
y  (
i n  
K b
p s
)   Downstream
 Upstream
  0
  2,000
  4,000
  6,000
  8,000
  10,000
  12,000
Belgium
Brazil
China
Czech_republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
India
Japan
Italy
Figure 31: Excerpt of statistics of median country speeds (Ookla database [121]).
approach, the user serves the downloaded content file to other nodes in the
overlay swarm. While, for the cross-torrent variants, the user additionally serves
downloaded content files in multiple overlay swarms, respectively. Finally, to
realistically model these idle periods for users, we use the measured seeding time
distribution of BitTorrent users, with an average of 3.37 hours (see Figure 22).
• Speed distributions. To realistically reflect the Internet access connection of the
different users contained in our trace logs, we first associate each IP address
with a country using a freely available geolocation database [82]. Based on the
country of origin, the Ookla database provides us with the median down/uplink
capacity of each user [121]. Figure 31 gives an overview of statistics of the speed
distributions on a per-country level, as obtained from this data set.
4.3.2 Formative Results
We now present the formative results of the different possible single-torrent and cross-
torrent approaches based on three metrics: availability, performance and fairness. For
conciseness and ease of representation, we focus on the results obtained from one out
of five torrent subsets. The results and conclusions drawn of the other subsets are,
however, similar.
Availability
A file is considered unavailable if at least one of its chunks is not accessible within a
swarm. This situation often coincides with a lack of seeders as seen in Section 3.4.2. It
means that any users attempting to download the file will fail; a prominent metric for
measuring this is the abortion rate as most users are only prepared to wait a limited
length of time during an unavailability period.
Figure 32 shows the fraction of users that abort their downloads when utilising the
different approaches. In addition, Table 5 gives an overview of the idle times of users
and their seeding times on average. Note that in the cross-torrent variants, the idle time
obviously differs from the seeding time. This is because cross-torrent collaboration
allows users to seed in two or more torrents while being in busy and/or idle state.
The simulations show that 19.67% of downloads were not successful in vanilla
BitTorrent. This confirms our observation that nodes do not remain as seeders for long
enough to overcome the exponentially increasing inter-arrival times of users. Worse,
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Figure 32: Fraction of download abortions of the different approaches.
Variant User stats Metric
Idle time Seeding time Down. throughput Abortion rate
(in hours) (in hours) (in KBps) (in %)
BT: Vanilla 3.37 3.37 145.57 19.67
ST: 2x seeding 6.88 6.88 186.28 13.65
ST: 5x seeding 17.20 17.20 249.95 4.39
ST: 10x seeding 34.40 34.40 274.59 0.66
CT: Bartering 3.37 4.84 127.93 16.86
CT: Tit-for-tat 3.37 10.36 76.45 0.11
CT: Ind. reciprocation 3.37 9.51 196.81 0.13
Table 5: Overview of results of quantitative solution space analysis. All presented figures are
average values, except the abortion rate.
due to extremely long inter-arrival times (often exceeding 10 hours), a single-torrent
approach even capable of increasing seeding times by a factor of 2 or 5 is limited in
its success. To maintain persistent file availability (i.e., success rate >99%), the users
must therefore stay on average 10 times longer after downloading. As such, to achieve
availability, vanilla BitTorrent would require average seeding times of more than 34
hours.
The first cross-torrent approach inspected is cross-torrent bartering. The results show
that this also fails to significantly improve availability. In fact, there is only a 2.78%
improvement over vanilla BitTorrent. This occurs because cross-torrent bartering as-
sumes that large numbers of peers operate in swarms with synchronous interests. The
trace-based simulations show that this is, in fact, not an accurate assumption. The mea-
surement study results also corroborate this finding; these show that the probability
of bartering working in the real-world is below 0.1%. Therefore, the circumstances in
which users can act as file replicas are very seldom.
In contrast to these results, the other two cross-torrent approaches (tit-for-tat and
indirect reciprocity) are able to effectively maintain persistent file availability. As op-
posed to cross-torrent bartering, these solutions do not require immediate reciprocation.
Instead, peers can claim back their rewards in the future and are thereby encouraged to
act as a file replica in the hope of later gaining an advantage. In the case of cross-torrent
tit-for-tat this involves repeat interactions, while in the case of indirect reciprocation
this involves interacting with any peer. This approach of detaching incentives from
time therefore perfectly addresses the availability issue.
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Figure 33: Cumulative distribution functions of the measured download rates. Top: Variants
with lengthened seeding times (Single-torrent approaches). Bottom: Cross-torrent
approaches.
Performance
While some solutions have been shown to enable persistent availability, we have also
found that users are highly sensitive to their perceived instant quality of service (cf.
Section 3.3.2). Therefore, any solution must also maintain an acceptable download
rate while improving availability. To study this, the average download rates in each
torrent have been recorded when utilising the single-torrent and various cross-torrent
solutions. Figure 33 shows the cumulative distribution of these download rates.
It can first be observed that roughly 20% of the downloads in vanilla BitTorrent are
below 1 KBps. As such, it can be considered that performance is unacceptably low. The
reason for this is the poor availability observed in the 20% of torrents as discussed in
the availability analysis. Clearly, both availability and performance in BitTorrent are
inexorably linked: torrents that are unavailable also have low performance. Of course,
as previously shown, this problem can be addressed in a single-torrent approach by
extending seeding times, thereby ensuring availability. The increase of seeding times
by a factor of 2, 5, and 10 also has the added benefit of increasing swarm resources. As
exemplified in Table 5, the single-torrent variant with 10x enlarged seeding (34.4 hours
on average) achieves by far the highest average download throughput of all abstract
solution approaches, confirming the findings of previous chapter that seeders are also
vital for download performance.
Considering the results of our availability analysis, it is unsurprising that cross-
torrent bartering also does not offer significant performance benefits. This is because
it is essentially the same as vanilla BitTorrent but with the ability to operate across
different torrents. It has previously been shown that this does not really improve
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availability, and, consequently, results in poor performance due to the dependency of
performance on availability.
The availability analysis has found that cross-torrent tit-for-tat does improve avail-
ability and, therefore, it is logical to assume that performance is also improved. In fact,
this approach does result in a significant increase in nodes that find content available
(>19%). However, the simulations show that this does not translate into performance
improvements. Instead, users can access the files with high availability but with poor
performance. This is consistent with most people’s daily experience of using the eMule
application (which actually employs volume-based cross-torrent tit-for-tat). The reason
for this is that eMule relies on repeated interactions by maintaining persistent records.
A peer that contributes resources to another peer can therefore only recoup them if
there is a later repeated interaction. This therefore creates incentives for sharing, but
prevents a peer from claiming back contributions from an arbitrary peer on many
occasions.
The last cross-torrent solution inspected is cross-torrent indirect reciprocation which
has already been shown to vastly improve availability. The results show that, unlike
cross-torrent tit-for-tat, this actually does translate into superior performance. In fact,
data inspection reveals that 54% of the users would gain a performance boost of a factor
of more than 4 when switching from the eMule-based approach to indirect reciprocation.
The reason is that indirect reciprocation allows users to make contributions and to claim
them back from any user and any torrent without the need for repeated interactions.
This means that a peer will receive superior performance from any peer if it, in return,
offers resources to the system as a whole.
Fairness
Whereas the previous two evaluative metrics have looked at aspects that are vital for
the continued success of BitTorrent, a further property that would also be desirable is
fairness. This is defined by the amount of reciprocated data generated by contributions.
For incentives such as applied in vanilla BitTorrent or cross-torrent bartering, reciproca-
tion is immediate and can therefore be directly measured. For persistent contribution
histories, however, peers may experience lengthy delays before receiving reciprocation.
Simply considering a snapshot of the users’ share ratio can therefore be a misleading
measure, because in the future, this measure may change. For this reason, we consider
the following fairness criteria, as defined by Legout et al. [70]: any peer x with an
upload rate Ux should get a higher download rate than any other peer y with an
upload rate Uy < Ux.
To quantify the relation between the upload rate of users (U) and their experienced
download rate (D), we compute the correlation coefficient ρU,D over all users that join
(i) just a single torrent and (ii) multiple torrents, as shown in Figure 34. In particular,
differentiating users in these two groups allows us to quantify whether users persisting
as file replicas benefit from their behaviour.
The single-torrent variants (vanilla and extended seeding times) show a positive
correlation between U and D. In fact, their correlations are very similar suggesting that
they all offer a similar level of fairness. Clearly, reciprocation in BitTorrent is based
on immediate rate-based observations, and, as such, it is not surprising that the peer
selection strategy does an effective job of matching users with similar capabilities [70].
Similarly, cross-torrent bartering offers a fairness level that is largely identical to vanilla
BitTorrent. This is intuitive as it operates using BitTorrent’s peer selection strategy with
the added capability of being able to interact with peers in different torrents.
In contrast to these results, cross-torrent tit-for-tat (the eMule-like approach) exhibits
at best a weak correlation for single torrent users and no correlation at all for multi-
torrent users. This suggests that users see poor returns when acting as file replicas.
The reason for this is twofold. First, the need for repeated interactions means that
sometimes a peer will make a contribution without ever receiving any benefit in the
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Figure 34: Correlation between upload contribution (U) and download reward (D) for single-
torrent and multi-torrent users.
future. This can occur due to permanent peer departures, or, alternatively, due to
bad luck on the part of the contributor. In fact, within the measurement study, only
19% of users ever meet each other repeatedly resulting in 81% of contributions being
unclaimed.
Last, cross-torrent indirect reciprocation offers the highest level of fairness, even
outperforming vanilla BitTorrent. However, when using indirect reciprocation, a peer
makes unchoking decisions based on the globally recorded share ratios of any requester
(as opposed to rate-based). This shows that using share ratios is at least equally effective
at achieving fairness as the traditional approach of using observed upload rates.
4.3.3 Summary
In general, our trace-based simulation study has confirmed what we have already
discovered in our large-scale measurements: availability and performance are very
closely linked with unavailable torrents also being low performance torrents. As such,
the simulations show that both vanilla BitTorrent and cross-torrent bartering fail to
offer high performance because they fail to improve availability.
Our experiments also show the fundamental limitations of single-torrent-based
seeding time extension, e.g., with the aid of file encryption or monetary awards. Here,
the seeding times must be extended by an extreme length (more than 34 hours) to
achieve high availability and performance. The reason for this is the exponentially
increasing inter-arrival times that can quickly exceed 10 hours after only a few days (cf.
Section 3.4.3). As such, we consider any solution that seeks to extend the seeding times
of users in a single-torrent approach as highly impracticable, as it is likely that users
will refuse to remain online for several days, every time they download a file of only a
few megabytes.
Similarly, cross-torrent bartering does not offer any real solution for the availability
problem due to the low probability of successfully finding peers with synchronous
interests. This results in low download performance and high abortion rates.
In contrast, both cross-torrent tit-for-tat (the eMule-like approach) and cross-torrent
indirect reciprocation incentives offer extremely effective mechanisms for addressing
unavailability, even outperforming the costly extension of seeding times. This is be-
cause peer contribution becomes detached from time, allowing peers to claim back
contributions at a later date.
Interestingly, cross-torrent tit-for-tat improves availability without also improving
performance. This is because a peer can only recoup its contributions through repeated
interactions. It is impossible, as such, for a peer to gain superior performance unless it
56 analysis of solution space
re-encounters a past peer. In contrast, indirect reciprocation offers the best performance
by a significant margin due to its ability to incentivise peers to make contributions to
any and all torrents, confident in the knowledge that this strategy can improve their
own position.
Finally, the single-torrent approaches as well as the different cross-torrent variants all
have positive fairness characteristics with the exclusion of cross-torrent tit-for-tat. This is
because cross-torrent tit-for-tat makes unassured investments that may not be recouped
in the future. This is an endemic problem of any local persistent history mechanism.
Therefore, in practise, long-term users of cross-torrent tit-for-tat (e.g., eMule/eDonkey
and its variants) are likely to reduce their sharing, thereby undermining its previously
identified benefits.
In summary, we conclude that cross-torrent indirect reciprocation outperforms other
approaches regarding the combination of all three metrics: availability, performance,
and fairness.
4.4 concrete solution requirements
Based on the findings of the solution space analysis, we next deduce a set of key
requirements that a concrete solution must fulfil to address the seeder promotion prob-
lem, as highlighted in BitTorrent. Importantly, these requirements take also implicitly
the research challenges presented in Section 1.3 into account.
4.4.1 Multilateral Incentive Design
The results of the previous section suggest that the use of cross-torrent bilateral
incentives is just as ineffective as single-torrent bilateral incentives at solving the seeder
promotion problem. This has been found to be true even when incentives are detached
from time. Instead, a solution requires a multilateral incentive strategy that is not only
detached from content and time, but also from individual users. As such, a user can
contribute data to a peer X at a given time and receive the reward from another peer Y
at another point in time without encountering this node before.
Interestingly, such an incentive strategy also enables that even lower provisioned
nodes can achieve high download performance; a fact that is only hardly possible in
the current BitTorrent system. In particular, BitTorrent’s rate-based tit-for-tat incentive
is instantaneous and seeks to match peers with similar upload capacities, thereby
forming bandwidth symmetrical clusters. Thus, due to this technical constraint, a user’s
download performance is always limited by the download rate of its corresponding
cluster, no matter how much data it has contributed to the system over time [93].
In contrast to this, multilateral incentive strategies detaching from time enable
that reward can be both instant and deferred. This property aligns well with the
highly asymmetric nature of residential broadband links. Specifically, users (i.e, lower
provisioned nodes) could contribute for a longer period of time (e.g., when not actively
using their desktop PC) and receive reward for those contributions at a later point in
time at a possibly much higher download rate [67].
From this discussion, we therefore derive our first important solution requirement.
Requirement 1 (Multilateral Incentive Design). The solution must be designed for
detaching incentives from time, content, and individual peers.
4.4.2 Decentralisation
At first glance, Requirement 1 can easily be achieved by assuming a central authority
infrastructure that mints identities, keeps account of user contributions, and pun-
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ishes uncooperativeness. However, there are a few practical issues that prevent from
deploying a large scale P2P content distribution on top of a central coordinator.
First, our long-term measurements in the BitTorrent system have shown that user
population sizes can quickly exceed several millions of online users. For this reason,
in practise, a central coordinator would have to withstand extremely high load re-
quirements as every single online user is going to interact with it. Consequently, it
is clearly a bottleneck and single-point of failure. Nevertheless, even if the reliability
and stability of the coordinating instance can be guaranteed, a central coordinator still
remains untrustworthy for many users, because it is usually under the control of a
single administrative domain.
Therefore, in favour of scalability, reliability, and openness of the approach, we
consider a solution that follows the principles of the P2P paradigm and thus avoids any
centralised authority infrastructure to which peers must register or even interact with.
Instead, the required functionality must be implemented in a decentralised manner by
efficiently leveraging the resources of the participating users.
Requirement 2 (Decentralisation). The solution must be designed to operate without the
involvement of any pre-trusted or centralised authority infrastructure.
4.4.3 Robustness
When implementing a multilateral incentive strategy in a decentralised manner, peers
need to exchange messages about third-party behaviour. This unavoidable fact, however,
greatly expands the range of possible attacks [90]. In particular, depending on the
extend of used third-party information, the incentive scheme may quickly become
vulnerable to Sybil attacks, whitewashing, and collusion [26, 34, 74]. For instance, if new
identities can be created at minimal costs and this process is not controlled by an
authorised infrastructure, any user can create multiple Sybil identities for the purpose
of boosting its reputation in the system [26]. Further, even if an attacker is detected in
the system, it can always ’whitewash’ its standing by creating a new identity, thereby
avoiding any punishment associated with its old account [34]. Finally, peers may
collude with others to report fake contributions, thereby obtaining services from the
community for free, without the need of contributing any [74].
In general, Cheng et al. have shown that multilateral incentive strategies that do not
feature a certified user registration (e.g., with the aid of a public-key infrastructure) can
never completely defend against these kind of attacks [19]. The best one can hope is
thus to reduce the effectiveness of these attacks, leading to the following requirements.
Requirement 3 (Robustness to Impersonation). The solution must be designed to hinder
a malicious peer to adopt the identity of other participants in the system, thereby preventing
misbehaviour in the name of the victim.
Requirement 4 (Robustness to Rational Attacks). The solution must be designed to
provide robust countermeasures against peer collusion, whitewashing and the Sybil attacks such
that the benefit from running one of these attacks is limited.
Apart from the fact that multilateral incentives can be subject to manipulation, peer
turnover or the lack of protocol incentives can also cause users to lose their reputa-
tion. For instance, since the solution is supposed to be decentralised, peers storing
reputation information about other users may suddenly crash or leave the system
forever. Further, since upload capacity is a rare resource in online content distribution,
selfish users may be tempted to discard protocol messages that are not beneficial to
them. From these two important facts, we identify to two further solution requirements.
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Requirement 5 (Robustness to Churn). The solution must be designed to allow peers to
reliably store and lookup experiences about third-party behaviour, regardless of whether some
nodes suddenly crash or leave forever.
Requirement 6 (Self-sustainability). The solution must be designed to incite users for
propagating protocol relevant messages.
4.4.4 Contribution Fairness
The performance analysis of the BitTorrent system has revealed that users are highly
sensitive to their perceived quality of service. Specifically, more than 45% of the users
aborted their download due to poor performance (cf. Section 3.3.2). From this observa-
tion, it can therefore be deduced that, when improving availability, any viable solution
must also maintain an acceptable level of performance. This is, however, challenging
because optimising for overall system utility often requires exploiting the resources
of high capacity nodes [31]. These users hold the majority of total upload capacity
in P2P content distribution systems and must therefore be kept engaged as long as
possible in the distribution process [50]. However, when treated unfairly, it is likely
that these nodes will withhold their resources, resulting in a performance collapse on
the long-term. This is evidenced by the fact that due to fairness issues users already
start to throttle their upload contributions in the BitTorrent system [94]. Therefore, we
derive the following important requirement.
Requirement 7 (Contribution Fairness). The solution must be designed to provide service
differentiation that is proportional to the upload contribution of the participants.
4.5 conclusions
This chapter has explored the potential of different abstract solution approaches to
overcome the performance and availability issues discovered in the BitTorrent system.
Three cross-torrent incentive approaches as well as single-torrent incentive alternatives
have been considered and quantitatively analysed through trace-based simulations.
Most notably, it was found that:
• Single-torrent approaches are infeasible. Any approach that attempts to lengthen the
online times of the users upon completing their downloads (e.g., with monetary
awards or file encryption) emerges as highly impracticable. The results show that,
on average, seeding times would have to be increased by a factor of 10 to gain
99% file availability. In other words, after finishing the download, a user would
have to stay online more than 34 hours on average.
• Bilateral cross-torrent approaches are insufficient. To achieve long-term availability
of content and high download performance in the BitTorrent system, any cross-
torrent solution based on bilateral incentive strategies is insufficient. The reason
for this is that peers lack important trading opportunities because (i) they do not
have synchronous file interests and (ii) most of them (81%) only meet once in the
system.
• A solution requires a multilateral cross-torrent approach. The trace-based simulations
have shown that cross-torrent incentives that are not only detached from time and
content, but also from individual peers have a great potential to overcome the per-
formance and availability issues in BitTorrent. In such an approach, peers would
be able to claim back contributions at any time from any peer, i.e., reciprocation
would be indirect.
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Through these findings, we were able to reduce the abstract solution space to the class
of multilateral incentives strategies that are agnostic to time, content, and individual
users. With this important information, we have deduced a set of key requirements
that a solution must fulfil to address the seeder promotion problem in the BitTorrent
system. These requirements also take into account the research challenges presented
in Section 1.3. Consequently, the next step is to design a concrete solution striving to
fulfil these requirements.
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The previous chapter has revealed a set of key requirements for addressing the seeder promotion
problem in the BitTorrent system. This chapter now focuses on the design and implementation of
FairSwarm.KOM1, a new P2P incentive mechanism that is devised to meet these requirements.
5.1 introduction
The quantitative analysis of the abstract solution space has provided a basic understand-
ing of the best general approach to address the seeder unavailability problem. Through
this we derived a set of key requirements that a solution must fulfil to overcome
the discovered performance and availability issues. This chapter details our concrete
solution approach, named FairSwarm.KOM, capable of meeting these requirements.
FairSwarm.KOM’s design is driven by properties such as no centralised trust, ro-
bustness (e.g., against churn and strategic manipulations), and self-sustainability. This
means, it has been taken into account that all protocol aspects are clearly motivated
and each peer takes its role in the system voluntarily, as everything happens in its own
interest. Otherwise, due to the assumed selfishness of the users, the protocol would be
difficult to implement in practise.
In general, FairSwarm.KOM is a generic incentive solution that can be adapted to a
variety of P2P content distribution systems, without affecting their key functionality.
In the following, however, we opt for presenting details on how this protocol can
be incorporated in BitTorrent, because it represents the current de-facto standard for
scalable content distribution. Specifically, BitTorrent is nowadays used by millions of
users world-wide that are transferring terabytes of data per day. Hence, a solution for
BitTorrent is seen as the most urgent.
At first, we give a conceptual overview of FairSwarm.KOM’s principle elements
and their key functionality. Subsequently, we focus on each of these elements in more
detail, while important design decisions are justified. After this, we delineate how the
approach can be implemented in the BitTorrent system. Finally, we revisit the solution
requirements introduced in Section 4.4 to show how they have been addressed by our
design.
5.2 conceptual overview
FairSwarm.KOM is a pairwise receipt-based indirect reciprocation mechanism that
allows peers to evaluate the long-term behaviour of other nodes by using information
that goes beyond direct observations and local histories. To achieve this, peers have
permanent identifiers and persistently document their bilateral interaction pattern
with other nodes using digital receipts, so-called coupons. These coupons are then
propagated in the network to enrich the knowledge base of other peers. Accordingly, a
peer’s local view of the contribution network is solely constructed from the coupons
gossiped by the other nodes.
1 In the originally submitted version of the thesis the name FairTorrent was used for the concept represented
by FairSwarm.KOM. It was subsequently discovered that the notion FairTorrent has been also used by
Sherman et al. [109] for an unrelated concept. In order to avoid confusion, we therefore have decided to use
the notion FairSwarm.KOM throughout. This does, however, neither change the original idea, underlying
concept or affect the context of the work. It is a simple name change.
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Figure 35: Overview of principle elements of FairSwarm.KOM.
The sole requirement to participate in FairSwarm.KOM is that each peer possesses a
cryptographic key pair, consisting of a 1024-bit long public and private key2. This is
necessary to enable long-term user identification and authentication. To this end, users
can freely create their own public/private key pairs. Thus, FairSwarm.KOM does not
require any complex public-key infrastructure to which users must register, nor do
users have to pay for participation.
To enable indirect reciprocation in a fully distributed manner, FairSwarm.KOM
consists of four principle elements: (i) coupons, (ii) a coupon propagation specification,
(iii) a data exchange specification, and (iv) a given service policy. Figure 35 gives an
overview of these elements as well as their interaction. The key functionality of these
elements can be briefly summarised as follows:
• Coupons. In FairSwarm.KOM, coupons are bidirectional transaction receipts, attest-
ing the long-term exchange of data between two peers. Each coupon is mutually
signed by both interaction partners and thus only contains information to which
both parties agree. Through these signatures, it is also prevented that third-parties
can modify coupons at a later date, i.e., to gain an advantage by undermining
the contributions of other users in the system.
• Coupon Propagation Specification. In order to claim back contributions, peers can
submit coupons to third-parties by following FairSwarm.KOM’s coupon pro-
pagation specification. Instead of simply flooding coupons in the network, Fair-
Swarm.KOM exploits the long-term interaction pattern of the users and thus
limits the propagation of coupons to at most one hop in the overlay network. This
restriction fosters scalability and provides increased robustness (i.e., to untruthful
peer behaviour and peer turnover). In addition to this, the specification also
provides mechanisms to meet the trade-off between communication costs and
information up-to-dateness. For instance, it is not always necessary to inform
overlay neighbours about every single transaction occurred.
• Data Exchange Specification. FairSwarm.KOM’s data exchange specification pro-
vides a particular safety concept, allowing two users to exchange digital items
in a fair way. That is, when running this specification, it is guaranteed that both
parties either obtain the item they desire, or neither party does. Providing such
functionality is crucial for a receipt-based indirect reciprocation scheme, because
once a service provider has properly delivered the requested data, it is convinced
that it will receive a corresponding coupon for its service provisioning. On the
other hand, once a service consumer has attested the receipt of the requested
data, it can be sure to actually receive this data.
2 To date, this key length can be considered as secure enough to perform standard cryptographic operations
such as digital signatures on messages.
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• Service Policy. The service policy is responsible for performing peer selection
among a set of interested candidate peers. Depending on the instantiation of such
a policy, different objectives can be pursued. For instance, a service policy can
be adjusted very conservatively to provide robustness against strategic attacks,
optimised for total system throughput or configured to foster fairness. Finally,
a mix of all of these aspects is possible, as exemplified by our default service
policy. Thus, FairSwarm.KOM decouples the mechanism prescribing how to
use reputation information (the Service Policy) from the mechanism providing
this information (the Coupon Propagation Specification). This design choice is
intentional, because it provides system designers with the flexibility to evolve
their own policy according to a large variety of criteria.
Next, we focus on each of these principle elements in more detail, both to delineate
its concrete design and to further explain the rationale behind our design decisions.
5.3 coupons
In contrast to prior approaches that issue digital receipts for every single transaction
(e.g., [69, 80]), FairSwarm.KOM follows a novel cumulative approach that stores the
long-term interaction pattern between two peers in a single digital receipt, called a
coupon. As such, each coupon is a data container providing information about the
total amount of data transferred between two peers (in both directions). Since this
information can change over time (e.g., when peers interact with each other), each
coupon has a version number that can be updated by both coupon producers.
The approach to stepwise document the bilateral interaction pattern between two
peers is advantageous because of the following reasons. First, by transmitting only
the coupon’s latest version, a third-party is immediately informed about the complete
transaction history of both peers. Moreover, it can directly infer how much data each
party has provided and consumed. In contrast to this, when using per-transaction
receipts, selfish peers are tempted to suppress the existence of receipts attesting their
service consumption in the network. Thus, it is in the responsibility of other users to
complete this picture (i.e., to transmit the missing receipts), which often complicates the
approach. Finally, especially in multi-source downloading, a data transaction relates to
the transfer of a single chunk. Therefore, transferring only one coupon that summarises
a large series of transactions is much more efficient (in terms of network traffic and
overhead) than transmitting a multitude of receipts for every single transaction that
has occurred.
As illustrated in Table 6, the concrete design of each coupon can be decomposed
into six data fields and two optional signatures. Next, we describe these data fields in
more detail and explain the intuition behind the signatures.
5.3.1 Coupon Data Fields
In each coupon, the first two data fields are reserved for the unique identifiers (IDs) of
the corresponding peers to which the coupon relates. To this end, we say that peer A
and B are producers or generators3 of coupon ζA,B. The IDs of both coupon producers
are computed by applying a collision-free hash function h(·) to the public key Kpub
of each producer: ID = h(Kpub). For this purpose, FairSwarm.KOM uses the SHA-1
hash function generating a 160 bit long identifier [125]. Furthermore, as depicted in
Table 6, the order of the producers’ identities can vary in the first two fields, depending
on who was the service provider and consumer in the most recent data transaction.
The third data field of the coupon is reserved for the ID of a so-called mediator. A
mediator is only involved in the data exchange process if one party tries to cheat the
3 We use both terms interchangeable in the remainder of this chapter.
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Data field Size Description
IDP 20 bytes Identity of the peer that was service provider in the most
recent transaction
IDC 20 bytes Identity of the peer that was service consumer in the
most recent transaction
IDM 20 bytes Identity of the peer that was mediator in the most recent
transaction
Data volume P −→ C 4 bytes Total amount of data transferred from P to C
Data volume C −→ P 4 bytes Total amount of data transferred from C to P
Version number 4 bytes The version number of the coupon
Signature of provider 46 bytes Cryptographic signature of the provider on the six data
fields
Signature of consumer 46 bytes Cryptographic signature of the consumer on the six data
fields + signature of provider
Table 6: Each coupon is composed of six data fields and two signatures of the corresponding
producers.
other. For instance, if peer B has obtained data from A, and yet denies having received
this data, the mediator will get contacted by peer A to resolve this conflict. This issue
is discussed in detail in Section 5.5.
To document the long-term transaction history of peer pair (A,B), the fourth and fifth
data fields store information about the total amount of data sent from peer A to B, and
vice versa. Upon the successful completion of a data transaction, these two data fields
are updated according to transactional parameters (i.e., who was the provider and the
consumer, and how much data has been transferred). In addition to this, the coupon’s
version number is incremented (sixth data field). Importantly, since the most recent
coupon version cumulates information over all previous interactions of a given peer
pair, it is sufficient to possess or distribute only this version in the network. Similarly,
once a peer receives a coupon whose version number is higher than the one it already
possesses, it simply discards the older coupon.
5.3.2 Coupon Signatures
The last two fields of each coupon are reserved for the signatures of both parties.
In general, any digital signature scheme can be used for this purpose, e.g., the RSA
algorithm or Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) [105, 89]. It is important to note that
both signatures are generated successively, beginning with the signature of the data
provider. We present details about this process, as well as the rationale behind it, in
FairSwarm.KOM’s data exchange specification (see Section 5.5).
We say that a coupon is valid if and only if it contains the signature of both the
producer and the consumer. If this condition is not fulfilled, a coupon is useless in the
system. That is, it is simply ignored by other users, as a fraud attempt seems likely. If
a coupon, however, contains these two signatures, third-parties can assume that the
coupon was generated in mutual agreement of both parties. In particular, since h(·) is
collision-free, it is hard to find a second public key K ′pub that hashes the same result
h(K ′pub) = h(Kpub). Thus, when a third-party can successfully verify both signatures,
it is guaranteed that the coupon truly originates from the producers to which the
coupon relates, providing authentication.
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Figure 36: Indirect reciprocation via multiple intermediary nodes.
5.4 coupon propagation specification
This section delineates FairSwarm.KOM’s coupon propagation specification that allows
peers to exchange information about third-party behaviour in the network. We be-
gin by discussing a major design decision taken; the propagation of coupons to at
most one-hop in the overlay neighbour network. Subsequently, we describe how the
resulting indirect reciprocation infrastructure is bootstrapped and maintained in Fair-
Swarm.KOM.
5.4.1 Selection of Indirection Level
Our solution space analysis has revealed that direct reciprocity is insufficient to over-
come certain performance and availability issues, because (i) most peers only interact
with a few others and (ii) users do not always simultaneously require each other’s
content. Instead, it has been shown that a solution requires a multilateral strategy that
is agnostic to time, content, and individual users (cf. Requirement 1 of Section 4.4).
Indirect reciprocity has the potential to fulfil this solution requirement. In particular,
it allows users to contribute to one peer yet receive reciprocation from another peer
at a later point in time. More importantly, these contributions do not have to take
place in the same overlay swarm. For instance, as illustrated in Figure 36, peer A could
initially send data to peer I1, peer I1 could in turn send data to I2 in another torrent,
and so on. Finally, when peer A and B encounter each other, peer B recognises A’s
cooperativeness along the contribution path and indirect reciprocation can take place.
This approach improves incentives because it increases the amount of users from which
peer A can receive reciprocation from (indirectly and in the future).
Importantly, however, as peers only have a local view of the system, peer B can only
recognise the contribution path from A → I1... → B, if it is informed about all the
interactions that have been occurred between the intermediary nodes (across time and
torrents). To achieve this, peer B must share information about third-party behaviour
with its direct interaction partner IN. This peer, in turn, must forward experiences
of its previous or current interaction partners (e.g., peer IN−1) to peer B, and so on.
Intuitively, with each additional level of indirection used, peer B’s knowledge base of the
contribution network grows exponentially, which clearly increases the probability of
detecting a contribution chain from A to B, enabling indirect reciprocation.
Ideally, it is desirable to have as much information as possible for decision making
(i.e., to select the highest level of indirection possible). However, care must be taken as
there is an inherent trade-off between different properties. For instance, when moving
to higher levels of indirection the communication overhead grows exponentially [131].
Accordingly, control traffic may quickly become a dominating factor and peers might
spend more time sending status messages than transferring user data. In addition to
this, the higher the level of indirection used, the more vulnerable is the approach to
untruthful peer behaviour. Specifically, as long as the peers’ knowledge base is limited
to one level of indirection, peers still can locally judge about the trustworthiness of
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information of intermediate nodes. This is because the peers only accept experiences
about third-party behaviour from overlay neighbours they have directly met. For any
higher level, however, peers must believe in the recommendations of the neighbours’
neighbours, and so on. Thus, transitive trust mechanisms must be applied that greatly
expand the range of available attacks to strategising or even malicious users.
On the other hand, if the level of indirection is chosen too low, peers might have
an insufficient knowledge base to take proper decisions regarding whom to reward
for previous contributions. This leads back to the problem that we have with direct
reciprocity in currently deployed P2P content distribution systems. Therefore, when
attempting to find a good balance between this issue and the different trade-offs
mentioned above, the most important question is: What level of indirection is sufficient
to promote long-term incentives for users? Or, to put it another way, given a random
peer pair in the interaction graph: How many intermediary nodes are at least required
to find contribution cycles between these nodes?
To ascertain this, we have utilised our long-term measurement data and performed
an analysis of the interaction pattern of the nodes, across torrents and time (see
Appendix A.4). Through this, we find that the current BitTorrent system exhibits small
world patterns. That is, peers cluster together based on their social interests, and, more
importantly, the majority of peers (74%) are indirectly connected to each other via
a small minority of ’power’ users accounting for more than half of the total system
demand. To this end, it can be shown that, when exploiting this one-hop relationship,
more than 96% of these users could claim back contribution as seeders immediately in
their next file download.
As one of our design principles is to keep things as simple as possible, we exploit
this observed small world pattern and thus opt for limiting the propagation of coupons
to one-hop in the overlay network, in favour of scalability and robustness. While
this design decision has the clear consequence that peers have only a very restricted
view onto the contribution network, we believe it is still a good trade-off between
the different properties. Furthermore, in Chapter 6, we also quantify what impact the
information loss has with regard to fairness and performance, compared to schemes
using global knowledge of the network (shared history).
5.4.2 Bootstrapping of Indirect Reciprocation
To bootstrap one-hop indirect reciprocation, peers must learn about common interaction
partners when encountering each other. To illustrate this, consider the example of
Figure 37. Here, peer A sends data to peer I in swarm 1, while after some time,
peer I sends data to peer B in swarm 2. When peer A and B meet in swarm 3,
peer B must recognise that A has indirectly contributed to B via intermediate node
I. Importantly, this must be possible without the requirement that peer I is currently
online in the system as this is often not the case, as described below. Thus, to meet
this requirement, each party must simultaneously perform the following steps during
connection establishment:
1. First, peer A produces a set SA, consisting of the identifiers of A’s prior inter-
action partners4. This set is then sent together with A’s public key to peer B,
using a Bootstrap Msg (cf. Table 7). Note that peer A’s public key must only be
transferred, when both peers encounter each other for the first time. Otherwise,
A’s public key will already be contained in peer B’s local database.
2. Upon receiving the Bootstrap Msg, peer B generates set SB consisting of the
identifiers of B’s previous interaction partners. Subsequently, it computes the
intersection of the sets SA and SB, denoted by SI = SA ∩ SB. As such, SI contains
the IDs of all intermediate nodes that both peers have in common.
4 Interaction partners of peer A are all those nodes with which A has a common coupon.
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Figure 37: One-hop indirect reciprocation across time and torrents.
Message Type Data Fields
Bootstrap Msg – Public key of peer A
– List of identifiers of A’s prior interaction partners
Bootstrap Reply Msg – Public key of peer B
– Coupons of common interaction partners of peer A and B
– Most favourable coupons of peer B + necessary public keys
New Peer Msg – Identifier of the new interaction partner
Coupon Msg (A,B) – Most recent version of coupon ζA,B
Table 7: Table of messages.
3. For each intermediate node I ∈ SI, peer B fetches the most recent coupon from
its local database and sends these coupons to peer A using a Bootstrap Reply
Msg5. Since peer A knows all those intermediate nodes from prior interactions,
the transferred coupons can be used to evaluate peer B’s contributions in the
past. This is essentially the main source of information to enable one-hop indirect
reciprocation.
4. Additionally, by using the same message, peer B selects a list of coupons that
are most favourable to it and sends these as well (including the necessary public
keys). We say that a coupon is favourable for a peer if it attests a positive account
balance for the node (i.e., the difference between the amount of provided and
consumed data is greater than zero). Although peer A will not use these coupons
to evaluate peer B, they are important to detect fraud attempts (see below).
5. Last, upon receiving the Bootstrap Reply Msg, peer A performs the following
two checks to verify peer B’s honesty:
a) Fraudulent concealment of intermediaries. The first check tests whether there is
an intermediary node I that both peers have in common, but a selfish peer B
tries to conceal (i.e., coupon ζI,B attests a negative account balance for B).
To test this, peer A only needs to verify if it already has a coupon ζI,B in its
local database that is not contained in the Bootstrap Reply Msg of peer B.
If this is true, peer A immediately bans peer B.
b) Replay attacks (withholding of newer coupon versions): The second check, on
the other hand, tests whether peer B has actually provided the most recent
coupon version of all coupons contained in the Bootstrap Reply Msg. This
5 Note that the public keys of the intermediate nodes must not be transferred, as those are already stored in
A’s local database due to prior interactions.
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is necessary because a selfish peer B could perform a replay attack by
sending an out-dated, but most beneficial coupon version.
It is important to note that the key to successfully prevent (i) the concealment of
intermediaries and (ii) replay attacks with older coupon versions, lies in the proactive
gossiping of a node’s most favourable coupons (step 4). As mentioned before, although
peers do not directly benefit from this coupon gossiping, it forces rational/selfish
nodes to honestly report common intermediate nodes and to send only a coupon’s
most recent version. In particular, a peer’s most favourable coupons are exactly those
that a dishonest node primarily seeks to suppress, because they most impair the
node’s standing in the system. However, particularly because of this coupon gossiping,
when encountering a new peer, a dishonest node never knows which coupons the
counterpart already possesses. This will highly restrict one of the above attacks, as
a peer has always to weigh-off between boosting its own account balance and not
receiving any data at all.
Finally, as coupons are tamper-proof and summarise the entire transaction history
between two nodes, peers can propagate those receipts in the system, even if their
producers have already left the system. This approach is intentional, because it circum-
vents the need for requesting intermediaries to attest contributions (i.e., as performed
in recent works such as [94, 15]). We believe that this approach is the only way to
bootstrap one-hop indirect reciprocation across time. Specifically, our long-term trace
data of the BitTorrent system reveals that the probability that an intermediary node is
online when two peers meet in the system, is only 29%. Thus, when relying on online
intermediaries, the effectiveness of approaches is significantly impaired, because in
most cases peers cannot approve their contributions.
5.4.3 Maintaining Indirect Reciprocation
During connection establishment, peers learn about previous interaction partners
that both peers share in common. This set of intermediate nodes, however, remains
static over the uptime of the nodes. Nonetheless, peers learn about new nodes when
downloading content and can thus also form new one-hop relationships. Consequently,
a mechanism is needed to detect such cycles instantly, as soon as they arise.
To accomplish this, our devised mechanism works as follows: Whenever a peer A
learns about a new interaction partner N, it sends a New Peer Msg to all overlay
neighbours (cf. Table 7)6. This message only consists of the identity of peer N and is
thus very lightweight. Each recipient R, on the other hand, checks whether it possesses
a coupon with this node. If this is true, sender A and recipient R mutually exchange
their corresponding coupons with N, using a dedicated Coupon Msg.
Figure 38 illustrates this algorithm using three overlay nodes A, B, and I. In this
example, we only consider the signalling traffic of peerA. The process remains the same,
however, for the other two peers. Assume now that all peers are already connected to
each other. Depending on the interaction pattern of the peers, the following messages
are exchanged between nodes:
1. Peer pair (A,B) is the first to interact with each other. Since this is also the first
interaction between the two nodes, a new coupon is generated. Subsequently,
peer A sends a New Peer Msg to peer I, containing the identity of B. As peer I
has never interacted with node B before, it simply discards the message.
2. At a later date, peer A also starts to exchange data with peer I and informs B
about its new interaction partner using a New Peer Msg. Similarly to situation (1.),
peer B discards this message, because it has no transaction history with I.
6 Recall that an interaction partner N is a peer with which a node A has exchanged at least one data unit.
Thus, a valid coupon ζA,N exists in the database of both peers.
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Figure 38: Formation of new triangular relationships to enable instant one-hop indirect recipro-
cation (peer A’s point of view).
3. After this, peer B and I begin to interact with each other. As a result of our
algorithm, peer A receives from both peers I and B a New Peer Msg.
4. Upon receiving these messages, peer A fetches the corresponding coupons from
its local database, and sends ζA,B to peer I and ζA,I to peer B, respectively. These
nodes answer with coupon ζI,B and a new triangular relationship is formed
enabling one-hop indirect reciprocation.
Note that the above specification is self-sustaining, because one of both interaction
partners has an inherent incentive to report the exchange of data with the newly
encountered node. In particular, in situation (3.) of Figure 38, the service provider of
the data transaction between peer I and B is highly interested in making this service
provisioning publicly available. Thus, in the worst case, either I or B will send the
corresponding New Peer Msg, which guarantees that A learns about ζI,B in step (4.).
5.4.4 Managing Coupon Versions
To inform overlay neighbours about the generation of a new coupon version, Fair-
Swarm.KOM follows an incentive-compatible push-approach. In particular, each time
a peer A generates a coupon ζA,B together with another peer B, it compares its cur-
rent account balance to node B with the balance of the coupon version that has been
previously submitted to other users. We define the account balance by the difference
between the amount of provided and consumed data. If the difference between the
two balances (i) is positive (i.e., the new coupon improves the peer’s standing) and (ii)
exceeds a given percentage threshold (e.g., >10%), the new coupon is sent to common
interaction partners of both peers using a dedicated Coupon Msg.
Restriction (i) prevents both parties from having to perform the redundant role of
informing their common interaction partners about the generation of new coupon
versions, which would effectively double the overhead traffic. Furthermore, giving the
update responsibility to the peer with the positive difference between the two account
balances is also intentional, because this peer has an inherent incentive to submit the
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coupon (i.e., it improves its chances when competing for download slots from other
peers).
Restriction (ii), the percentage update threshold, tackles the trade-off between a peer’s
profit from submitting a coupon and the communication costs arising. In particular,
the introduction of a percentage threshold results in frequent coupon updates when a
peer’s reputation is low (i.e., its account balance is around zero), which is desirable.
On the other hand, the more a peer’s account surplus/deficit increases, the more
transactions are needed to be performed until a new coupon version is submitted. This
is also desirable as peers must not be informed about the increase/decrease of a peer’s
account balance until the surplus/deficit amounts to a relatively high value, i.e., tens of
megabytes. In these ranges, minor information updates would probably not influence
the decisions taken by other nodes. Instead, it is only important to communicate major
changes, thereby saving signalling traffic.
5.5 data exchange specification
The success of FairSwarm.KOM crucially depends on the fact that peers obtain coupons
for their data provisioning, which can then be disseminated in the system. Conse-
quently, it is of particular importance that the issuing of these transaction receipts is
closely tied to the actual delivery of data. To this end, a sophisticated mechanism is
needed that allows two potentially mistrusting parties to exchange these items in a fair
way. This means, either the service provider obtains a valid coupon for its data delivery
and the service consumer actually receives the data it has requested, or, both peers
receive nothing. In this section, we present FairSwarm.KOM’s data exchange specification,
capable of fulfilling this need.
5.5.1 Requirements of Specification
While the simultaneous exchange of items can easily be performed in real life (e.g.,
face-to-face on a counter), the process becomes much more challenging in asynchro-
nous systems (i.e, the Internet). In particular, Even and Yacobi [29] have shown that, in
these kinds of systems, a fair exchange of two digital items is impossible to achieve
in a deterministic two-party protocol. Instead, exchange fairness always requires the
involvement of an intermediate node, also deferred to as mediator.
This observation has a major impact on the design of our data exchange specification.
In particular, it says that, without the involvement of a third-party, it is impossible
to guarantee that (i) a service provider actually receives a valid coupon for its data
provisioning, while (ii) the service consumer truly obtains the data it has requested and
attested. To see this, consider the simple state model of Figure 39. In the initial fair state
(beginning of a transaction cycle), each party possesses an item in which the other party
is interested in. That is, the provider owns the data while the consumer has the valid
coupon that later on attests the receipt of this data. Starting from this state, the goal is
to achieve the desirable final fair state in which both parties have obtained the other’s
item. However, as the communication over the Internet is always asymmetric and non-
simultaneous, both peers have to go through an unfair intermediate state. Accordingly,
one of both peers receives its item first; a circumstance that can be systematically
exploited by a dishonest node. Specifically, a malicious node could misbehave as
follows, depending on the role it is currently performing:
• Upon receiving the requested data, a dishonest consumer may deny having
received this data. For instance, it refuses to send a valid coupon attesting the
provider’s data provisioning.
5.5 data exchange specification 71
P
C
P
C
P
C
P
C
Initial fair state
Temporary unfair state
Final fair state
Figure 39: Exchange process of digital items between two parties in a non-simultaneous and
asymmetric computer network. P and C denote the service provider and consumer that
are initially possessing a data object and coupon, that is to be exchanged, respectively.
• Upon receiving a valid coupon, a dishonest provider may not upload any data
and yet claim to have delivered this data. For instance, it could submit the coupon
to third-parties.
• Upon receiving a valid coupon, a dishonest provider may upload garbage data,
either on purpose or due to a communication failure and yet claim credit for this
data provisioning, e.g., again by submitting the coupon to third-parties.
It is intuitive to see that as soon as only one of the above attacks is possible, the
information provided by the coupon propagation specification would be unreliable
and useless. Consequently, any realistic approach to address these attacks must rely
on a mediator node. Due to scalability reasons, however, the mediator’s involvement
should be reduced as much as possible. For instance, a straightforward but undesirable
solution is that both parties first submit their items to the mediator. Subsequently, the
mediator verifies the correctness of both items (i.e., if the coupon is properly prepared
and the data item is valid) and forwards them to the corresponding recipients. In such
a solution, however, a mediator node must act as data relay, and is, thus, likely to
become a bottleneck for a large-scale P2P content distribution system.
To remedy this, our purpose must be to design a data exchange specification, capable
of fulfilling the following requirements:
• Exchange Fairness. Any possible execution of the specification ends with one of the
following two results: (i) either the service provider has the corresponding coupon
for its data provisioning, and, at the same time, the consumer has received the
requested data, or, (ii) both peers go away empty-handed. Thus, the mechanism
is robust against all three types of attacks mentioned above.
• Data Integrity. A service provider can only obtain a coupon for data that fulfils
a predetermined structure to which both parties have mutually agreed. This
prevents peers from uploading garbage data.
• On-demand Mediator. If both peers follow the protocol specification, the exchange
of data as well as the issuing and sending of the corresponding coupon can be
settled without the involvement of a mediator. A mediator is only used as soon as
one party is misbehaving, i.e., it tries to cheat the other.
• Timeliness. The provider as well as the consumer can terminate the protocol
specification at any time. Importantly, there is no need for the cooperation of the
other node, while exchange fairness still remains guaranteed. This is of particular
importance as peers in P2P systems can disconnect arbitrarily at any time without
notice.
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Within the remainder of this section, we first give an conceptual overview of the
devised specification that fulfils these requirements. Following this, we present details
about the protocols belonging to this specification. We then conclude with a formal
confirmation of the properties achieved by our design.
5.5.2 Specification Overview
The data exchange specification of FairSwarm.KOM consists of an exchange protocol,
and three additional sub-protocols, i.e., the abort protocol, the recovery protocol and
the complaint protocol. The exchange protocol is the main protocol that needs to be
run for the exchange of data between two peers. As long as both peers follow this
protocol and no communication error occurs, exchange fairness is guaranteed without
the involvement of a mediator. That is, after the protocol execution, the provider obtains
a valid coupon for its service provisioning and the consumer receives the requested
data. We consider this situation as the normal case, as deviating from the protocol
is not beneficial. If a peer still does, one of the remaining three sub-protocols is run
to achieve exchange fairness with the help of a mediator. Depending on the concrete
circumstance, the mediator issues a receipt to declare a coupon as invalid or helps to
recover the requested data.
The basic idea of the exchange protocol can be briefly explained as follows (cf. Fig-
ure 40). Upon receiving a data request from a consumer, the provider decides whether
it wants to deliver the requested data. If so, it encrypts the data by using symmetric
cryptography and sends this to the consumer. Additionally, the provider generates a
new coupon that updates the coupon’s most recent version according to the parameters
of this transaction (i.e., it sets who is the provider and consumer, and updates the total
amount of data transferred from the provider to the consumer). This coupon is then
signed and also sent to the consumer. Upon receiving this message flow, the consumer
tests the correctness of the data fields of the new coupon and verifies the provider’s
signature on these. Subsequently, the consumer signs both the new coupon and the
provider’s signature, and sends this irrefutable evidence of receipt back to the provider7.
The provider, on the other hand, verifies the consumer’s signature and ultimately
releases the decryption key so that the consumer can decrypt its data. At this time, the
protocol ends and both peers have obtained their desired items.
Since the protocol is intended to operate in open platform systems and the communi-
cation over the Internet is unreliable, strict adherence to the above protocol specification
cannot be achieved in all situations. Instead, it is expected that there are always a few
peers that deviate from the above exchange specification, e.g., either on purpose or
unintentionally due to communication errors. To handle these abnormal situations,
FairSwarm.KOM provides three different sub-protocols (cf. Figure 40):
• Abort protocol: This protocol is run by the provider when the consumer fails to
send the evidence of receipt (the consumer’s signature) in time. This cancels the
transaction and the consumer loses its last chance to get the key for decrypting
its data.
• Recovery protocol: When the consumer provides its signature, but does not receive
the key to decrypt its data in time, it may execute the recovery protocol to still
achieve exchange fairness. This reconstructs the missing key with the aid of the
mediator, allowing the consumer to proceed as normal.
• Complaint protocol: This protocol is responsible for resolving situations in which
the consumer was able to decrypt the data, but it turns out that the data is
garbage. Depending on the evidence provided by the consumer, the mediator
7 Note that only with the consumer’s signature, the new coupon becomes valid and can be submitted to
third-parties in the system (see Section 5.3).
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Figure 40: Overview of data exchange specification with its corresponding protocols.
can then declare the corresponding coupon as invalid. Also, it can issue a receipt
that marks the identity of the provider as cheater.
In the following, we delineate the exchange protocol and the three different sub-
protocols in more detail. For the sake of clarity, however, we first introduce important
notations that are necessary for the understanding of the different protocols.
5.5.3 Protocol Notations
In each transaction, there are at most three parties are involved, namely the data
provider, the data consumer, and a mediator. As described in Section 5.3, the unique
identifiers of these nodes are obtained by using a collision-free hash function h(·) that
takes a user’s public key as the input. We abbreviate the IDs of the above mentioned
parties as P, C, and M, respectively. Finally, when we say P, C, or M, we also refer to
the corresponding users.
To describe the different protocol steps in detail, we use the notation < event >:
< description >. In this regard, < event > presents an action that can either be
the sending of a message from peer X to Y, denoted by X −→ Y, or a local com-
putation, marked by the node’s identity that is performing this action8. The label
8 Note that peer X and Y are only placeholders for the IDs of the different parties X,Y ∈ {P,C,M}.
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Actors and Items
P,C,M Unique identities of the data provider, data consumer, and the mediator
chosen for a given transaction L
O Data object that is delivered from P to C
OK Ciphertext of O, symmetrically encrypted with K
K The secret session key used to encrypt/decrypt data object O
KM Ciphertext of (L,K), using an asymmetric encryption algorithm under
the public key of M
ζP,C The latest coupon version of P and C, updated according to the transac-
tional parameters of L
L Unique label to identify a given transaction between P and C, with or
without the involvement of M
Cryptography
EX(·),DX(·) Asymmetric encryption and decryption algorithm using the public/pri-
vate key of users X
eK(·),dK(·) Symmetric encryption and decryption algorithm with the secret key K
SigX(·) Signature scheme that enables peer X to sign messages or other data
objects
h(·) A collision-free hash function
Mediator Receipts
REVζP,C Informs the recipient that coupon ζP,C is revoked.
FAX Irrefutable receipt that peer X has tried to cheat the system.
Table 8: Table of notations.
< description >, on the other hand, either details the content of the message or gives
information about the computation and its conditions.
Furthermore, we use a couple of very basic cryptographic mechanisms that are
abbreviated and defined as follows. Let (eK(·),dK(·)) be a pair of secure symmetric
encryption and decryption algorithms that operate based on a secret session key K.
For instance, the Blowfish-CBC with a 128 bit key and a 128 bit initialisation vector
fulfils this requirement [108]. Asymmetric cryptography, on the other hand, is labelled
by capital letters. To this end, (EX(·),DX(·)) denotes the asymmetric encryption and
decryption algorithms using peer X’s public and private key, respectively. Finally,
SigX(·) defines a signature scheme that allows peer X to sign messages or other data
objects. As usual, this signature is publicly verifiable by using the public key of peer X.
A standard (secure) asymmetric scheme that allows for both purposes is the RSA
algorithm [105].
To identify the protocol instance relating to a transaction between P and C, we use a
unique label L. This label is defined by
L = h
(
P,C,M,h(O),h(OK),h(K),h(ζP,C)
)
,
and clearly indicates that P is going to transmit the data object O to C, with or
without the help of a mediator M. Note that L contains a hash of the data object
that is to be transmitted, a hash of the already updated data fields of coupon ζP,C, a
hash of the secret session key K and a hash of the ciphertext of O that is encrypted
with K: OK = eK(O). The data contained in L is important to prevent peers from
uploading garbage data and/or release an invalid secret key K and yet claim credit
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for this. In particular, as shown later on, once a data provider signs (L,KM) where
KM = EM(L,K), a mediator can verify at any later date whether P has cheated on C.
Finally, during the execution of the data exchange specification, the mediator has
the opportunity to issue a receipt REVζP,C = SigM(’revocation’, ζP,C) that informs
any recipient about the revocation of a particular version of coupon ζP,C. Further,
the mediator can also issue the receipt FAX = SigM(’fraud attempt’,X) that acts as
irrefutable evidence that party X has tried to cheat another peer during the data
exchange process. Accordingly, both receipts can be submitted to third-parties that
were not directly involved in the transaction.
Even though it is intuitive, it should be still noted that the revocation receipt only
relates to the version of ζP,C, that is well-defined by REVζP,C . Earlier versions of this
coupon thus remain still valid. For the ease of understanding, Table 8 gives an overview
about all introduced notations.
5.5.4 Exchange Protocol
A prerequisite for the exchange protocol is that both peers have exchanged their public
keys, before the actual protocol starts. This is usually performed during connection
establishment. Furthermore, both peers must have agreed to an independent mediator M
and possess its public key9. This is necessary to prevent collusion between a dishonest
party and the potential mediator. Unless a problem arises, however, peer M will not be
informed of its role.
The exchange protocol begins when the consumer issues a data request for a given
object O, as shown in Table 9. Importantly, to uniquely identify data objects in the
system, this request message must contain the hash of objectO. Assume now provider P
is interested in serving this request, but only with the guarantee that it receives a
valid coupon for the delivery of object O. Consequently, P fetches the most recent
version of coupon ζP,C from its local coupon storage. If this is the first transaction
between both interaction partners, it issues a new coupon. Subsequently, it updates
the corresponding fields of ζP,C, according to the parameters that are specific to this
transaction. That is, it fills the coupon’s first three data fields with the identities of P,
C, and M, respectively, increments the coupon’s version number, and adds the object
size of O to the total amount of data transferred from P to C. After the coupon is
updated, it signs ζP,C and symmetrically encrypts O using a secret session key K, in
order to obtain the ciphertext OK = eK(O). Furthermore, it computes KM = EM(L,K)
and creates the signature SigP(L,KM). Finally, the provider sends message flow (e2) to
the consumer (cf. Table 9).
Upon receiving (e2), the consumer first verifies whether all entries of ζP,C are correct,
including the identity of the mediator and the updated data volume. Also, it checks
whether the provider’s signature SigP(ζP,C) can be verified correctly. Subsequently, it
computes h(OK) and h(ζP,C) to determine the unique transaction label L. This allows
the consumer to verify whether SigP(L,KM) is the provider’s signature on (L,KM).
Specifically, if the signature is valid, the consumer is convinced that either P or M
can reveal the secret K to it. If any test fails or the consumer simply does not want to
respond, it may quit the transaction without any liability. Otherwise, the consumer
signs the coupon as well as the provider’s signature and sends this signature back to
the provider in step (e3).
As soon as the provider obtains flow (e3), it verifies whether SigC
(
ζP,C,SigP(ζP,C)
)
is indeed valid. If this is true, P has got the appropriate receipt for its service provision-
ing and therefore reveals the secret key K in message flow (e4). However, if provider P
does not receive message flow (e3) in time (according to P’s definition), or consumer C
9 In Section 5.7.2, we present different ways on how such a mediator can be determined for the BitTorrent
system.
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(e1) C −→ P : h(O)
P : if interested in service provisioning then issue updated ζP,C
(e2) P −→ C : OK, ζP,C, h(K), KM, SigP(ζP,C), SigP(L,KM)
C : if signature checks fail or ζP,C is incorrect, then stop
(e3) C −→ P : SigC
(
ζP,C,SigP(ζP,C)
)
P : if SigC
(
ζP,C,SigP(ζP,C)
)
is invalid or flow (e3) does not
arrive in time, then run the abort protocol
(e4) P −→ C : K
C : if K is invalid or flow (e4) does not arrive in time, then run
the recovery protocol
C : if data encryption fails, then run the complaint protocol
Table 9: The Exchange Protocol.
has provided an incorrect signature, the provider may run the abort protocol to cancel
the transaction.
When flow (e4) arrives, the consumer first computes HK = h(K) and checks whether
HK ≡ h(K) as received in step (e2). If this equality holds, the consumer has ultimately
obtained the secret key K to decrypt OK. However, if C does not receive key K timely or
K is invalid (i.e, HK 6= h(K)), it may run the recovery protocol to reconstruct key K with
the aid of the mediator. Once C is in possession of key K, it computes O ′ = dK(OK)
verifies h(O) ≡ h(O ′). If this is true, the protocol finishes. If h(O) 6= h(O ′), however,
the consumer may request help from the mediator by initiating the complaint protocol.
5.5.5 Abort Protocol
The abort protocol enables the provider to cancel a transaction that is indexed by
labelL, as soon as it does not receive the evidence of receipt (the consumer’s signature)
in time. The reasons for this can be different; (i) message flow (e3) is lost due to a
communication failure; (ii) the consumer does not want to reply; or (iii) the message
arrives, but the consumer’s signature cannot be successfully verified. In either case, to
protect the provider from getting exploited from a potentially misbehaving consumer,
it must perform the following steps.
First, the provider issues the abort receipt AR = SigP( ′abort request ′,L) that indi-
cates that transaction L needs to be aborted. As shown in Table 10, this receipt is then
sent to the mediator in message flow (a1), together with the other information that is
necessary to cancel L.
Upon receiving flow (a1), the mediator first verifies whether the provider’s signature
on the abort receipt is valid. If this is not the fact, the abort request is simply ignored.
If it is valid, M computes the unique label L to check its local database whether this
protocol instance has previously been recovered by the consumer. If this is true, the
mediator must be in possession of the consumer’s signature which is immediately sent
to provider P.
However, if L is not recorded, the mediator signs the abort receipt of the provider, is-
sues the coupon revocation receipt REVζP,C , and records (L, state = aborted) together
with the information of flow (a1) in its local database. Subsequently, it confirms P that
the transaction has been successfully aborted by sending SigM(AR) in message flow
(a2). At the same time, REVζP,C is sent to C in message flow (a3). This receipt can then
be submitted to third-parties to revoke the latest version of coupon ζP,C.
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(a1) P −→M : AR = SigP( ′abort request ′,L), P, C, h(O), h(OK), h(K), ζP,C
M : if AR is invalid, then stop
M : if (state = recovered), then fetch SigC
(
ζP,C,SigP(ζP,C)
)
from local database
M −→ P : SigC
(
ζP,C,SigP(ζP,C)
)
and stop
M : else set (state = aborted) and issue REVζP,C
(a2) M −→ P : SigM(AR)
(a3) M −→ C : REVζP,C
Table 10: The Abort Protocol.
(r1) C −→M : P, C, h(O), h(OK), h(K), ζP,C, KM, SigC
(
ζP,C,SigP(ζP,C)
)
,
SigP(L,KM)
M : if signature checks fail, then stop
M : if (state = aborted), then
M −→ C : REVζP,C and stop
M : if KM is invalid, then
M −→ C : REVζP,C , FAP and stop
M : else set (state = recovered)
(r2) M −→ C : K
(r3) M −→ P : SigC
(
ζP,C,SigP(ζP,C)
)
Table 11: The Recovery Protocol.
Remark: Note that the sole intention of message flow (a2) is to convince provider P
that the protocol instance L has been successfully aborted. From there on, it is no
longer possible for consumer C to run the recovery protocol, i.e., in order to obtain the
secret key K. On the other hand, the sending of REVζP,C to C in flow (a3) is mandatory
to counteract the following two scenarios, where provider P may illegally obtain a
valid coupon: (1) After honest P has successfully aborted transaction L, it still receives
flow (e3) due to a communication delay; or (2) upon receiving the valid coupon in
flow (e3), a dishonest P immediately executes the abort protocol. Through this threat,
P would obtain the receipt for its service provisioning whereas C has no opportunity
to decrypt OK.
5.5.6 Recovery Protocol
The main functionality of the recovery protocol is to reconstruct the provider’s secret
key K with the help of the mediator, once consumer C does not receive message
flow (e4) timely or correctly. This situation is particularly annoying for C, because the
service provisioning of provider P is already attested with message flow (e3). That is,
P possesses C’s signature on the latest version of ζP,C, but C is unable to decrypt OK.
To still prevent that consumer C goes empty-handed, the recovery protocol is specified
as follows (cf. Table 11).
After receiving message flow (r1), the mediator first computes label L, and verifies
whether SigP(L,KM) and SigC
(
ζP,C,SigP(ζP,C)
)
are correct signatures. If both sig-
natures are valid, the mediator inspects its local database to see if L has previously
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(c1) C −→M : P, C, h(O), h(OK), h(K), ζP,C, OK, KM, SigP(L,KM)
M : if signature checks fail, then stop
M : if h(O ′) 6= h(O) then
M −→ C : REVζP,C , FAP
M : else do nothing
Table 12: The Complaint Protocol.
been aborted. If this is true, M retrieves REVζP,C from its local database and sends it to
consumer C.
However, if the protocol instance has not been aborted before, the mediator inspects
the correctness of KM. To this end, KM is correctly prepared if and only if (K ′,L ′) =
DM(KM), h(K ′) = h(K), and L ′ = L. If these equalities do not hold, it is evident that
peer C is victim of a fraud attempt of P. Accordingly, the mediator issues REVζP,C and
FAP and sends both receipts to the consumer. As mentioned previously, receipt REVζP,C
allows node C to revoke ζP,C, while receipt FAP can be submitted to third-parties,
proving that dishonest provider P has cheated.
On the other hand, if KM is indeed valid, the mediator records (L, state = recovered)
together with the information of flow (r1) in its local database. After that, it reveals
the secret key K to the consumer through message flow (r2). In addition to this, the
provider obtains the consumer’s evidence of receipt in message flow (r3).
Remark: Once the recovery request is successfully completed, it is intended that M
forwards C’s signature on ζP,C to P, thereby attesting P’s service delivery. Otherwise,
upon receiving flow (e2), a dishonest node C could always get the secret key K
by immediately running the recovery protocol, without sending the corresponding
evidence of receipt. Finally, in both the abort and the recovery protocol, we attach
importance to the fact that the mediator is only provided with the hashed value of OK,
instead of receiving the entire ciphertext. This increases the privacy and efficiency of
the approach, because (i) without the ciphertext OK the mediator cannot derive O, and
(ii) transferring a 160-bit long hash value consumes significantly less communication
overhead than sending the entire ciphertext.
5.5.7 Complaint Protocol
Consumer C can execute the complaint protocol, if it receives the secret keyK, either
directly through provider P in message flow (e4) or with the aid of the mediator in
message flow (r2), but it turns out that h (eK(OK)) 6= h(O). To solve this conflict, the
consumer has to proceed as depicted in Table 12.
After receiving message flow (c1), the mediator computes label L to test whether
the provider’s signatures on (L,KM) can be correctly verified. After that, the mediator
computes (K,L) = DM(KM) to decrypt OK: O ′ = dK(OK). Finally, it tests whether
h(O ′) = h(O). If it turns out that this equality does not hold, it is proven that the
provider has cheated the consumer. In this situation, the mediator issues receipt
REVζP,C and FAP, which are both sent to C. Otherwise, the provider has delivered the
correct data as well as the proper secret key. In this case, the mediator simply ignores
the consumer’s complaint.
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5.5.8 Summary
In the following, we briefly summarise how our devised data exchange specification
meets the requirements posed in the beginning of this section.
First of all, if both parties follow the specification of the exchange protocol, the
provider receives a valid coupon ζP,C for its data provisioning. While, at the same
time, the consumer obtains the desired data object O. Importantly, this is achieved
without the involvement of a mediator. Therefore, the devised solution is optimistic
by relying on an on-demand mediator. In addition to this, our specification satisfies the
following security properties. For conciseness and simplicity of presentation, however,
we omit proofs on why these properties hold. The interested reader can found them in
Appendix A.3.
Lemma A.3.1 For a dishonest consumer C, it is impossible to obtain data object O,
without sending the correctly prepared evidence of receipt.
Lemma A.3.2 For a dishonest provider P, it is impossible to obtain a valid coupon ζP,C,
without sending the correct encryption key K.
Lemma A.3.3 For a dishonest provider P, it is impossible to upload garbage data, and
yet obtain a valid coupon ζP,C for this illegal service provisioning.
To put it another way, Lemma A.3.1 guarantees that a service provider always
receives a valid coupon for its proper service provisioning. While Lemma A.3.2 and
A.3.3, on the other hand, say that a consumer always receives the data it has requested,
once it has attested the receipt of the data. Therefore, the devised data exchange
specification ensures that exchange fairness and data integrity is always guaranteed,
even if one party tries to cheat the other. Note that in the special case in which both
parties are dishonest, the protocol implicitly ends fairly; in this particular situation, it is
assumed that none of the parties prepare the correct items, and, consequently, neither
party gets an advantage over the other.
Finally, timeliness is guaranteed because the provider as well as the consumer can
terminate the protocol at any time, while the other party can always run one of the
three sub-protocols (i.e., the abort, recovery, and complaint protocol) to still achieve
exchange fairness.
5.6 service policies
A common property of currently deployed P2P content distribution systems is that
peers are only connected to a small subset of neighbours. Out of these, a peer has
to choose an outdegree k — the number of neighbours to serve simultaneously with
data. In FairSwarm.KOM, the selection of those peers is regulated by a so-called service
policy.
Depending on the instantiation of such a policy, different objectives can be pursued.
For instance, system designers can establish an incentive compatible fairness norm, i.e.,
peers receive only as much as they give and high contributors are more likely to be
chosen for uploading to. In contrast to this, if fairness properties are secondary or even
not important at all, a service policy can also be tailored to optimise overall system
throughput.
Thus, through the decoupling of the mechanism that prescribes how to use reputation
(the Service Policy) from the mechanism providing this information (the Coupon
Propagation Specification), system designers can freely evolve their own service policy
depending on the environment the system is operating in. In the following, we first
propose FairSwarm.KOM’s default service policy, designed:
80 a new p2p incentive mechanism – fairswarm.kom
• to incite users to maintain their identities because the long-term persistence of
user accounts is beneficial from a rational point of view.
• to meet the fairness-performance dilemma that arises due to peer heterogeneity.
Specifically, to provide service differentiation by rewarding peers proportional to
their upload contributions.
• to provide increased robustness against untruthful peer behaviour such as collu-
sion and Sybil attacks.
Since system designers or individual users do not have to follow this recommenda-
tion, we also present a few variations including a brief discussion on their advantages
and potential drawbacks.
5.6.1 Default Policy
While our data exchange specification protects a peer from getting cheated by a
dishonest node, it cannot prevent a group of colluders creating and distributing
coupons to each other, without having exchanged any data at all. Moreover, since
our system design does not assume any centralised authority infrastructure to which
users must register, this attack can also be performed by a single peer, using multiple
zero-cost identities. In literature, this threat is often referred to as Sybil attack [26].
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Figure 41: The effectiveness of the Sybil attack without and with the MaxFlow algorithm as
countermeasure. Note that C ′ and C ′′ are Sybil/collusion nodes under the control of
service consumer C. These nodes artificially increase C’s account balance, i.e., they
generate and distribute coupons, without having exchanged any data at all.
If unaddressed, collusion or even Sybil attacks can heavily impair the correctness of
an indirect reciprocation scheme. In particular, FairSwarm.KOM uses direct experiences
as well one-hop contributions via intermediate nodes to evaluate the cooperativeness of
a requesting service consumer C. Therefore, without any countermeasure, any service
provider P would simply accept the coupons of consumer C, generated with common
intermediate nodes, e.g., intermediate peer C ′ and C ′′ in Figure 41a. However, if a
dishonest C is in control of these two nodes (e.g., due to peer collusion or a Sybil
attack), node C can attest itself arbitrarily high contribution values. It is apparent that
this attack can significantly boost node C’s standing in the system, making it likely to
succeed against all the other peers simultaneously competing for downloading slots.
While Cheng et al. [19] has shown that incentive mechanisms relying on third-
party information (i.e., indirect reciprocation schemes) can never defend completely
against these kind of attacks, FairSwarm.KOM utilises the max-flow min-cut theorem
to reduce their impact [37]. In particular, if a service provider P wants to compute the
total upload contribution of a candidate peer C, it cumulates the amount of services
that flow directly and indirectly (via one hop) from C to itself. To see this, consider
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Algorithm 1 The default service policy of peer P.
Require: requesting_peers[], downloading_peers[]
1: for all consumer C requesting service do
2: if C /∈ downloading_peers[] then
3: AccountBalanceC ← Computed using Equation 5.1
4: candidates← (C, AccountBalanceC)
5: else
6: Ignore request
7: end if
8: end for
9: Cmax = max(candidates)
10: downloading_peers[]← Cmax
11: return Cmax
Figure 41b. In this graph, the directed edges are labelled with two values. The first
value is obtained from the data field of the corresponding coupon, prescribing the
peer’s long-term contribution. The second weight, on the other hand, is the fraction of
the maximum flow from C to P, when applying the max-flow min-cut theorem.
From the figure, it is noticeable that irrespective of how many Sybil nodes peer C
controls, it can claim only those contributions from provider P that each Sybil node has
directly provided to P. This mitigates the issuing of coupons attesting fake contributions,
as exemplified by edge (C ′,C) and (C ′′,C). Since this approach can also be applied
to compute a candidate C’s total amount of downloaded data, provider P obtains a
consumer’s account balance by using the following formula,
AccountBalance(C)P = flow(C→ P) − flow(P → C). (5.1)
After detailing this important countermeasure to restrict collusion and Sybil attacks,
Algorithm 1 ultimately shows how FairSwarm.KOM handles competing requests for
downloading slots. Our default policy enforces that a requesting peer C can obtain
at most one out of k downloading slots of provider P (line 2). This prevents a user
with a high account surplus from claiming all download slots of peer P for itself alone,
thereby removing the possibility of other peers participating in the download process.
In addition to this, it can be seen that our policy ranks peers according to Equation 5.1,
while the peer with the maximum account balance is chosen for uploading (line 3 + 9).
This gives users incentive to maintain their identities in the long term, as (i) one-
hop contributions across time and torrents are inherently max-flow conformant and
(ii) these interaction relationships can bootstrap cooperation between new peer pairs.
In fact, the more common interaction partners two peers share (currently or in the
past), the more contribution flows between these nodes exist. This potentially increases
a peer’s account balance and thus increases its chances of reciprocation. In contrast
to this, when newly arriving in the system, a peer has no contribution history and
must therefore wait until it receives the first chunks from other nodes to prove its
cooperativeness.
5.6.2 Alternative Policies
Our default service policy is only one way to evaluate the cooperativeness of peers,
based on the coupons gossiped from the nodes. However, there are many other
alternative ways to realise such a policy, which are briefly introduced in the following.
When devising a service policy, a system designer has always to weigh-off the
different challenges it seeks to address. These challenges include the delicate trade-off
between performance and fairness, and the robustness against attacks such as free-
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riding, whitewashing, collusion, and Sybil attacks. To date, no policy exists (including
ours) that is capable of effectively addressing all these challenges at the same time.
Instead, optimising for one property often comes at the expense of others. For instance,
to bootstrap cooperation and find better peering partners (performance issue), the
designers of BitTorrent accept the risk that free-riders could exploit the optimistic
unchoke functionality. In fact, being susceptible to one attack is indeed a negative
property. However, as exemplified by BitTorrent, the free-riding of some users is neither
the cause for its current performance issues nor does it directly induce the system’s
break down [132].
Next, we detail three major classes of alternative service policies, each of them
striving to achieve a certain goal.
Design Alternative 1: Optimising for Fairness
A policy that optimises for contribution fairness should keep track of the peers’ share
ratio in the system (the total amount of data provided divided by the total amount
of data consumed). To this end, a peer is only considered as a potential candidate, if
its share ratio is equal or above one. Intuitively, the approach would then select peers
exhibiting the highest ratios for downloading. This enables that peers receive exactly
as much as they give (which seems fair).
Introducing such a contribution threshold clearly incites users to continuously
provide data to avoid being unable to download content at a later occasion. Further,
guaranteeing contribution fairness can be an important incentive for users to participate
in the system, especially in settings where Internet Service Providers charge users on
uplink usage or uplink bandwidth is scarce. In those systems, asymmetries in terms of
data provided and consumed should not be systematic.
The drawback of contribution thresholds is, however, that the peers’ upload slots may
remain unused once no candidate peer can be found exceeding these thresholds. Ac-
cordingly, the peers’ upload utilisation may be far from optimum, which demonstrably
hurts system throughput [31]. Furthermore, while a share ratio threshold complicates
free-riding, peers have a clear incentive to ’whitewash’ identities. In particular, a white-
washer could initially obtain a chunk, immediately leave the system and rejoin it with a
new identity to repeat this procedure. Apparently, this attack is particularly effective in
systems where identities are for free and peers do not need to register to a centralised
authority.
Design Alternative 2: Optimising for Performance
A policy that optimises performance must pursue the goal that users (especially
high capacity peers) are kept engaged as long as possible in the data distribution
process [31, 11]. To achieve this in a distributed way, uploader selection must be
non-discriminative [31]. That is, users must randomly select downloading candidates
irrespective of a peer’s account balance.
Consequently, when optimising for total system throughput, the demands of a
particular user must be subordinated to the welfare of the system. This clearly sug-
gests, however, that fairness cannot be guaranteed. For instance, that a peer that
contributes more finishes earlier or that peers receive exactly what they give. Further-
more, non-selective uploading makes free-riding easily possible, because peers ignore
the contribution histories of other nodes. Also, due to the same reason, the approach
lacks incentives for seeders. Consequently, this policy is not suitable for P2P content
distribution systems that attempt to achieve long-term availability of content. However,
it is still appropriate for scenarios where a content provider wants to quickly replicate
a single file object to a large number of users, e.g., a critical software update.
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Design Alternative 3: Maximum Robustness against Attacks
As mentioned above, it is impossible to make a system based on third-party experiences
resistant to all forms of strategic or malicious attacks [19]. The best one can do is
to reduce the effectiveness of these attacks, and thus to apply a policy that is as
conservative as possible.
To mitigate collusion or Sybil attacks, users must only consider coupons that were
issued by themselves, i.e., due to direct interactions with a given peer. This means that
information about third-party experiences will not be considered at all. Further, to
hamper free-riding, a one-chunk deficit threshold should be introduced. That is, a peer
can only download a file chunk if it provides one in return. This is particular effective
in the current BitTorrent system, because a single file object is typically composed of
thousands of data chunks. However, as shown by our large-scale measurements, a
typical BitTorrent swarm amounts to less than 170 online peers. Thus, regardless of
whether a free-rider obtains a chunk in the first interaction, it would have to wait a
long time to eventually download the entire file.
Clearly, there is an trade-off between the first data provisioning to bootstrap cooper-
ation and the long-term protection of participants against whitewashing [38]. To tackle
this issue, peers should adopt an adaptive policy that treats newcomers based on the
experiences they had with other newcomers in the past [58]. For instance, a peer would
only initially cooperate if newcomers have continuously reciprocated in the past. This
allows generosity when others are being generous, reasonably addressing the above
trade-off.
While this service policy ensures strict fairness (i.e., the one-chunk deficit threshold is
an extreme form of the policy optimising for contribution fairness) and is highly robust
to attacks, care must be taken with regard to download performance. In particular,
the users’ upstream capacity remains unused, unless at least one interaction partner
recoups its contribution deficit. This occurrence, however, can easily double download
times, compared to the currently employed incentive strategies of BitTorrent [54].
Finally, as seeders would limit their contributions to at most one chunk, the approach
is not suitable for environments where long-term availability of content is desired.
5.6.3 Discussion
Our default service policy represents an interesting trade-off between the different
design extremes with regard to performance, fairness, and robustness.
First, our policy attempts to address the performance-fairness dilemma by preserving
each of both properties to a certain extent. In particular, as seen in Algorithm 1, the
default policy refrains from using contribution thresholds that a peer must exceed to
obtain data. This ensures that the users’ uplinks is always utilised, which is clearly in
favour of system throughput. However, to still guarantee a reasonable level of fairness,
peers do not perform non-discriminative uploading. Instead, the upload strategy is
selective, meaning that users that have contributed more are likely to receive more
downloading slots in the system (line 9). This clearly enables service differentiation
proportional to the users’ upload contributions.
To evaluate peers in the system, our default policy uses direct experiences as well as
one-hop information. For that reason, it is vulnerable to collusion and Sybil attacks.
However, as shown in our solution space analysis, using information beyond direct
observations is a necessity to provide robust incentives for seeders (cf. Requirement 1
in Section 4.4). Thus, the best one can do is to reduce the impact of those attacks, which
we address by applying the min-cut max-flow theorem.
In fact, the lack of contribution thresholds in FairSwarm.KOM’s default policy
makes the approach susceptible to free-riding. However, through the use of a selective
uploading strategy, free-riding is highly complicated. Specifically, to obtain data, a free-
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rider must win the auction for a downloading slot. However, since these kinds of users
are typically characterised by an account deficit, this situation will occur rather seldom
in practise. Furthermore, compared to free-riders, a whitewasher seems to be better
positioned, since its account balance can be ’whitewashed’ to zero. However, when
doing so, it loses the opportunity to boost its account balance through one-hop indirect
reciprocation, which hampers the competition against obedient nodes maintaining
their identities in the long-term. We come back to these issues in Chapter 6, when we
thoroughly study the robustness properties of our default policy against most common
attacks of P2P systems.
5.7 implementing fairswarm .kom in bittorrent
FairSwarm.KOM’s data exchange specification as well as its unstructured way of
propagating coupons in the system are orthogonal to the basic principles of P2P
content distribution. Therefore, the approach can be easily deployed on top of any
currently existing P2P content distribution system, without altering the system’s
basic functionality. In particular, in P2P content distribution, a transaction typically
relates to the transmission of the entire file or even file chunks when using multi-
source downloading. Accordingly, it is straightforward to extend a system’s data
exchange process with the specification provided in Section 5.5, in order to automate
the generation of coupons for each data transfer. Second, in P2P content distribution
systems, peers typically maintain overlay connections to a small subset of nodes (e.g,
to exchange control traffic or to transfer user data). This communication infrastructure
can be exploited by FairSwarm.KOM’s coupon propagation algorithms to establish
an indirect reciprocation infrastructure. Therefore, there is no need for an additional
overlay network on top of the application, introducing additional complexity and
overhead.
Consequently, when implementing FairSwarm.KOM in the BitTorrent system, only
slight changes are necessary. More precisely, a basic design principle of FairSwarm.KOM
is to enable indirect reciprocation without the need of any centralised authority in-
frastructure that mints identities, provides accounting, and punishes dishonesty. This
goal aligns well with the usage model of BitTorrent that is also characterised by open-
ness and no centralised trust. As a consequence, the usage of FairSwarm.KOM with
BitTorrent does not require the introduction of new actors or other infrastructural
components. Instead, the only thing that needs to be clarified is (i) how to enable
long-term identification of users in the BitTorrent system, (ii) how to efficiently incor-
porate FairSwarm.KOM’s data exchange and coupon propagation specification, and,
lastly, (iii) how to provide the flexibility of supporting different service policies. In the
following, we give answers to each of these issues.
5.7.1 Identity Management
In BitTorrent, peers do not have permanent identifiers (IDs). Instead, whenever a user
starts a BitTorrent client, a 20 byte long random session identifier is generated. To still
enable the long-term identification of peers in BitTorrent (which is a prerequisite for
FairSwarm.KOM to work), the ID generation process should be changed as follows.
First, to participate in the system, a user must initially generate a public/private key
pair which is persistently stored on its hard disk. When connecting to the BitTorrent
network, the user hashes its public key Kpub using SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm
1) [125]. The output is a 160-bit string that represents the user’s unique identifier in
the system. Since SHA-1 belongs to the class of hash functions that is collision-free,
it is impossible to obtain another public key K ′pub such that h(K
′
pub) = h(Kpub).
Consequently, once the public key is submitted to other users, i.e., for signature
verification, these nodes can be sure that a message clearly originates from the node
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Algorithm 2 Modified unchoking mechanism of BitTorrent.
Require: candidate_peers[], downloading_peers[], available_slots
1: while available_slots > 0 do
2: Cmax ← apply Algorithm 1 to candidate_peers[]
3: if Cmax == null then
4: break
5: else
6: available_slots← available_slots −1
7: downloading_peers← downloading_peers.add(Cmax)
8: perform data exchange process with Cmax (see Figure 42)
9: end if
10: end while
belonging to a given ID. This simple principle enables not only the identification, but
also the authentication of users in BitTorrent, without the need of any complex public
key infrastructure.
5.7.2 Unchoking
In BitTorrent, unchoke decisions are performed in fixed time intervals. In particular,
every 10 seconds, each user selects a predefined number of peers for sending content to.
These peers are then allowed to download data until the next period of 10 seconds is up.
In addition to this, both to probe for better peering partners and to bootstrap coopera-
tion, every 30 seconds, at least one peer is randomly selected for optimistic unchoking.
This time-driven model must be replaced with FairSwarm.KOM’s transaction-based
approach. In particular, FairSwarm.KOM requires that (i) upon the completion of
every single transaction, both peers receive a coupon about the actual data exchange,
and, after this, (ii) the occupancy of the respective downloading slot is re-evaluated
according to the adopted service policy.
To meet these two requirements, Algorithm 2 presents a modified unchoking mecha-
nism for BitTorrent. Before this algorithm is executed, a BitTorrent peer first determines
the amount of available upload slots. This can simply be computed by subtracting
the amount of downloading peers from a peer’s outdegree k. Subsequently, for each
available upload slot, the algorithm then determines a winner out of a set of candidate
peers using a predefined service policy, e.g., FairSwarm.KOM’s default service policy
(line 2). Note that a peer belongs to the set of candidate peers if and only if its interested
flag is set to true. To this end, we say a peer is interested in another one if it possesses
at least one chunk that the interested peer wants to download. If no peer can be found,
i.e., all the candidate peers are already occupying a downloading slot or none of them
is interested, the algorithm stops (line 3 + 4). Otherwise, the data exchange process
is initiated as illustrated in Figure 42 (line 8). To inform the chosen candidate peer
about the possibility to download content, it receives an unchoke message from the
data provider. The data consumer then replies with a chunk message containing the
hashed index of the chunk it wants to download. From then on, everything proceeds
according to the data exchange specification, described in Section 5.5.
An important issue for FairSwarm.KOM’s data exchange specification is to find an
appropriate mediator that is independent from a given peer pair, exchanging content.
In the BitTorrent system, this can be achieved in different ways. For instance, one
alternative is to use a peer whose identifier is ’closest’ to the hashed valued HC of the
chunk to be transferred. Since a peer’s identifier is calculated by applying a collision-
free hash function to its corresponding public key, it is impossible to generate a public
key Kpub such that h(Kpub) = HC. Thus, none of both parties may influence the
86 a new p2p incentive mechanism – fairswarm.kom
Encrypted data + commitments
Valid coupo
n for data pr
ovisioning
Provider Consumer
Chunk Msg (Re
quest for data)
Secret decryption key
Unchoke Msg
Data Exchange 
Specification
Figure 42: Data exchanges in BitTorrent when incorporating FairSwarm.KOM’s data exchange
specification.
choice of the mediator in its favour. On the other hand, since a mediator cannot infer
detailed information about a peer’s transaction history (i.e., when and which content a
peer has downloaded exactly), we recommend to delegate this task to the entry point
of the system, namely the tracker of a BitTorrent swarm. By doing so, a user can directly
obtain the mediator’s public key when connecting to the system. Moreover, a tracker
can be considered as more reliable and long-lived, compared to ordinary peers.
5.7.3 Propagation of Coupons
So far it has been discussed how the process of issuing coupons can be incorporated
into BitTorrent. To establish FairSwarm.KOM’s one-hop reciprocation infrastructure,
on the other hand, these coupons must be disseminated in the system, according to the
specification presented in Section 5.4. This is, however, straightforward in BitTorrent.
In particular, every peer typically maintains a number of TCP connections to a subset
of the peers participating in a given BitTorrent swarm. These overlay neighbours
are potential recipients and providers of data. This is inline with FairSwarm.KOM’s
coupon propagation specification that only distributes coupons to those nodes that
are interaction candidates. Thus, there is no necessity to create any additional overlay
connection for the dissemination of coupons. Instead, FairSwarm.KOM’s coupon
propagation specification can simply exploit the already existing communication
infrastructure of BitTorrent.
5.8 solution requirements revisited
Section 4.4 has provided a set of key requirements that a more sophisticated incentive
mechanism must meet to improve the performance and availability properties of the
BitTorrent system. This section delineates how these requirements have been incorpo-
rated into our proposed solution approach.
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• Requirement 1 (Multilateral Incentive Design). The solution must be designed for
detaching incentives from time, content, and individual peers.
– FairSwarm.KOM is an indirect reciprocation scheme that allows a user to
contribute data to a peer X at a given time and receive reciprocation from
another peer Y at another point in time (via one-level of indirection), without
encountering this node before. More importantly, this is regardless of what
swarm these users operate in (cf. Section 5.4). As such, the approach is ag-
nostic to time, content, and individual users. Consequently, Requirement 1 is
clearly fulfilled by FairSwarm.KOM.
• Requirement 2 (Decentralisation). The solution must be designed to operate without
the involvement of any pre-trusted or centralised authority infrastructure.
– FairSwarm.KOM uses coupons (bidirectional transaction receipts) that are
propagated in the system to enrich the knowledge base of the nodes. This is
the only source of information that peers use to evaluate the cooperativeness
of others. As such, the approach is fully decentralised and does not require
any pre-trusted or centralised authority infrastructure, thereby meeting Re-
quirement 2.
• Requirement 3 (Robustness to Impersonation). The solution must be designed to
hinder a malicious peer to adopt the identity of other participants in the system, thereby
preventing misbehaviour in the name of the victim.
– Since coupons contain the unique identifiers of their producers, and are
protected through their signatures, it is hardly possible for a third-party to
misbehave in the name of another user in the system. This fulfils Require-
ment 3.
• Requirement 4 (Robustness to Rational Attacks). The solution must be designed to
provide robust countermeasures against peer collusion, whitewashing and the Sybil attacks
such that the benefit from running one of these attacks is limited.
– This solution requirement has been addressed through the proposal of Fair-
Swarm.KOM’s default service policy. In particular, users who continuously
change their identities (i.e., whitewashers) lose an important opportunity
to boost their account balance through one-hop indirect reciprocation. This
hampers the competition against obedient nodes maintaining their identities
in the long-term. Furthermore, the min-cut max-flow theorem is used to
mitigate peer collusion and Sybil attacks.
• Requirement 5 (Robustness to Churn). The solution must be designed to allow peers to
reliably store and lookup experiences about third-party behaviour, irrespective of whether
some nodes suddenly crash or leave forever.
– Since FairSwarm.KOM limits the propagation of coupons to at most one hop
in the overlay network, the sender of a coupon is always its producer. Thus,
no information can be lost due to churn, because peers persistently store their
own coupons in their local database. This clearly meets Requirement 5.
• Requirement 6 (Self-sustainability). The solution must be designed to incite users for
propagating protocol relevant messages.
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– In FairSwarm.KOM, peers have a clear incentive to distribute coupons to their
neighbours. More precisely, through the use of one-hop indirect reciprocation,
one of both coupon producers (i.e., the peer with an account surplus) is al-
ways interested in submitting a given coupon to third-parties. This improves
its standing in the system and increases its chances to receive reciprocation.
As such, the gossiping of coupons and, thus, the establishment of an indirect
reciprocation infrastructure is inherently self-sustaining in FairSwarm.KOM,
thereby fulfilling Requirement 6.
• Requirement 7 (Contribution Fairness). The solution must be designed to provide
service differentiation that is proportional to the upload contribution of the participants.
– This solution requirement has been addressed through the proposal of Fair-
Swarm.KOM’s default service policy. The uploading strategy of this policy is
selective, meaning that users that have contributed more are likely to receive
more downloading slots in the system.
Intuitively, Requirement 4 and 7 cannot be formally verified and quantified, and will
therefore by critically analysed in the evaluation of FairSwarm.KOM (see Chapter 6).
5.9 conclusions
This chapter has presented the newly devised P2P incentive mechanism, named
FairSwarm.KOM. First, a conceptual overview of FairSwarm.KOM’s principle elements
was given. Following this, each of these elements was presented in detail, while major
design decisions were justified. Though the resulting P2P incentive mechanism is a
generic solution that can be adapted to a variety of P2P content distribution systems,
it was detailed how FairSwarm.KOM can be implemented in the BitTorrent system.
Finally, the solution requirements of Section 5.4 were revisited to show how they have
been taken into account by FairSwarm.KOM’s design. The key features of the resulting
mechanism can be summarised as follows:
• FairSwarm.KOM is fully decentralised and self-sustainable (i.e., peers always have
an incentive to follow the protocol specification).
• In contrast to currently deployed incentive mechanisms (i.e., tit-for-tat), Fair-
Swarm.KOM allows peers to evaluate others by using information that goes be-
yond local histories and direct observations. As such, it is a multilateral incentive
scheme that is agnostic to time, content, and individual peers.
• FairSwarm.KOM exploits the long-term interaction pattern of the users and limits
the propagation of third-party experiences to at most one-hop in the overlay
network. This fosters scalability and provides increased robustness (i.e., to churn
and attacks).
• FairSwarm.KOM employs a novel coupon-based approach to persistently docu-
ment the bilateral interaction pattern of two peers over time. This enables one-hop
indirect reciprocation across time without the need for requesting intermediate
nodes to attest contributions (i.e., as performed in recent works such as [94, 15]).
This is highly important as these intermediaries are offline in the majority of
cases (71%).
• FairSwarm.KOM decouples the mechanism prescribing how to use reputation
(the Service Policy) from the mechanism providing this information (the Coupon
Propagation Specification). This allows to cope with the performance-fairness
dilemma in P2P content distribution (cf. Section 1.3).
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To conclude, through the development of FairSwarm.KOM, the second research goal
of this thesis has been addressed (cf. Section 1.4). The next step to take is to evaluate
FairSwarm.KOM’s strengths and weaknesses when integrated into the BitTorrent
system.

6E VA L U AT I O N O F FA I R S WA R M . K O M
Upon presenting the design of the devised incentive mechanism FairSwarm.KOM, this chapter
now focuses on the evaluation of this scheme. Our goal is to validate how FairSwarm.KOM
overcomes the limitations of currently deployed incentives strategies (i.e., tit-for-tat) and
therefore offers improved performance and availability properties to the BitTorrent system.
6.1 introduction
So far, the basic principles and algorithms of FairSwarm.KOM have been detailed. To
this end, it has been also explained how FairSwarm.KOM’s design incorporates the
requirements outlined within Section 4.4. Based on these requirements, the next step is
to evaluate the efficiency of the approach. In the following, we begin by stating our
concrete evaluative aims. Since a number of different approaches could be taken, we
then delineate our evaluation methodology. Subsequently, we present the results and
insights obtained, and conclude with a critical evaluative summary.
6.1.1 Evaluative Aims
The overarching goal of this evaluation is to find the strengths and weaknesses of
FairSwarm.KOM with a focus on performance, availability, fairness, overhead, and
robustness. In particular, we wish:
• to measure and quantify the potential performance and availability benefits that
FairSwarm.KOM can offer BitTorrent.
• to ascertain if FairSwarm.KOM can improve BitTorrent’s performance and avail-
ability without damaging user and system-wide fairness.
• to measure the overheads related to utilising FairSwarm.KOM under current
environments and workloads.
• to validate that FairSwarm.KOM is robust against common P2P attacks and to
ensure that malicious users do not achieve superior performance to those that
adhere to FairSwarm.KOM’s policies.
6.1.2 Evaluation Methodology
An extensive analysis of P2P incentive mechanisms is often very complex, since many
important aspects must be considered at the same time. For instance, it is insufficient
to study only one system property (e.g., availability), but neglect other issues such as
client download performance, fairness, overhead, and robustness to attacks. This is
because each of these properties directly influences each other, and optimising one
may come at the expense of another (cf. Section 5.6). In addition to this, quantifying
the effectiveness of incentive strategies for promoting long-term incentives for seeding –
a key requirement to overcome the availability and performance issues of current P2P
content distribution systems – requires a workload model that must itself be long-term
and lifelike. That is, it must capture the user behaviour over a prolonged period of time
as well as other characteristics describing the operational environment of the system.
To reasonably meet these evaluation challenges, we utilise our rich long-term mea-
surement data of the BitTorrent system and perform a threefold analysis of Fair-
Swarm.KOM:
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• System Parameter Tuning. First, we study important system parameters of Fair-
Swarm.KOM for controlling overhead, fairness, performance, and robustness
properties of the approach. Here, our goal is to obtain an appropriate setup of
parameters for BitTorrent-like workloads, while finding a good balance between
the above properties.
• Comparing P2P Incentive Mechanisms. Upon assigning values to important system
parameters, we compare FairSwarm.KOM with regard to performance, availabil-
ity, fairness, and overhead to the tit-for-tat incentives of BitTorrent. Additionally,
since BitTorrent uses solely local observations for decision making, while Fair-
Swarm.KOM additionally incorporates experiences of one-hop neighbours, we
also compare these two incentive approaches to an artificially assumed shared
history system that has global knowledge about all occurred interactions in the
network. It is intuitive that such an oracle-like incentive approach can never exist
in reality. However, we are interested in finding out how much performance,
availability, and fairness could improve compared to (deployable) approaches
that use less information for decision-making. Therefore this oracle-based shared
history mechanism represents an upper bound for the information that can be
available at the peers, and thus constitutes a second baseline for FairSwarm.KOM.
• Robustness to Untruthful Peer Behaviour. Lastly, we test the robustness of Fair-
Swarm.KOM against dishonest users attempting to gain an advantage in the
system. Specifically, since the usage of third-party experiences greatly expands
the range of possible attacks to strategising and malicious users, this analysis
comprises (i) attacks that are common in already existing P2P content distribution
systems (i.e., free-riding) and (ii) more sophisticated attacks that may arise due
to the sharing of information among the peers.
Note that FairSwarm.KOM is an indirect reciprocation protocol (incentive mecha-
nism) that is intended to operate on top of an already existing P2P content distribution
system that provides a content delivery and discovery component. Thus, when refer-
ring to the term FairSwarm.KOM in the remainder of this chapter we implicitly assume
that FairSwarm.KOM operates on top of the basic functionality provided by BitTorrent.
Accordingly, FairSwarm.KOM only replaces the incentive mechanism of BitTorrent by
using its own mechanisms and protocols to foster cooperation (cf. Section 5.7).
6.2 system parameter tuning
The coupon propagation specification of FairSwarm.KOM defines precisely when and
whom to send coupons to, thereby establishing an indirect reciprocation infrastructure
(cf. Section 5.4). However, we have deliberately delayed the assignment of two workload-
dependent parameters: (i) the percentage threshold for coupon updates and (ii) the
total amount of probabilistic coupons to send during bootstrapping. We now study
these parameters to find an appropriate system setup for the comparative analysis
following in the next section. Before presenting, however, the results obtained, we first
detail our methodology.
6.2.1 Experimental Methodology
Each of the two system parameters under study requires a specific experimental
methodology. Concretely, the first tuneable parameter, the percentage threshold for
coupon updates, can only be studied when peers are truly exchanging data. This is
because the update period of coupons solely depends on the frequency and intensity
of data transactions between the peers. Since it is highly challenging to setup live
experiments with several thousands of users exchanging only a single file, we opt for a
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Context Parameter Value
Simulated environment
Number of Leechers 1,000
Number of Seeders 10
Client bandwidth distribution Trace-based [50]
File size (in MB) 10, 100, 750
User Arrival Time Flash-Crowd
FairSwarm.KOM parameters
Percentage threshold (in %) 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50
Peer outdegree k 5
Max. number of overlay neighbours 50
Service Policy default
Table 13: Overview of experiments with different percentage thresholds for coupon updates.
simulation-based approach to evaluate the influence of this parameter. To achieve this,
we use the simulation tool delineated in Section 4.3.1 that has been extended to use the
FairSwarm.KOM protocol.
For the second system parameter, on the other hand, we seek to determine the total
number of coupons to gossip when establishing a neighbourhood connection to a
new peer. The concrete value of this parameter clearly depends on the users’ prior
interaction partners in the past. Therefore, to ascertain this we directly inspect our
long-term measurement data of the BitTorrent system. This data allows us to ascertain
which torrents a given peer has participated in and whom it could have interacted
with.
6.2.2 Percentage Threshold for Coupon Updates
The first parameter that needs to be assigned is the percentage threshold for coupon
updates. This parameter determines the frequency of coupon updates and, thus, con-
trols the trade-off between information up-to-dateness and communication overhead.
Especially the former can be important for decision making, as up-to-date information
allows peers to recognise and reward contributions of other users in a fair way.
To see what impact different parameter values have on fairness and communication
overhead, we consider a few variations in our simulation-based study. Table 13 presents
an overview of the different experiments. For each experiment, we assume a flash-
crowd scenario in which 1,000 leechers attempt to download a single file object. This
file is served from 10 seeders such that enough aggregate system capacity is available
to replicate the file with exponential capacity of service [71, 129]1. In order to have a
representative client bandwidth distribution for leechers and seeders, we assign the
access links of the users according to the measurement data of Isdal et al. [50]. This
data is taken from more than 100,000 BitTorrent users and is thus to be considered
as very representative for the current BitTorrent system. Furthermore, the number of
overlay neighbours to whom a peer connects to as well as the peer’s outdegree k (the
amount of users to whom a peer simultaneously uploads) is directly derived from the
BitTorrent system [21]. This is because FairSwarm.KOM operates on top of BitTorrent’s
content delivery component, meaning that content-delivery specific settings that are
optimised for BitTorrent can be also directly taken for FairSwarm.KOM. The only two
parameters that have been varied in our experiments is the file size and the percentage
threshold for coupon updates.
1 Studying such a flash-crowd scenario represents an extreme situation with regard to the system load that is
sufficient for our needs to get a broader understanding on the impact of different parameter values.
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Figure 43: Influence of different percentage thresholds for coupon updates on overhead, fairness
and performance. Error bars in Subfigure (a) are min-max values, while for Subfigures
(b) and (c), we present 95% confidence intervals.
We study three evaluative metrics while investigating this parameter. The first one,
the percent overhead, quantifies the communication overhead caused by FairSwarm.KOM.
For each individual user, it is defined as follows: (aggregate amount of data sent and
received due to FairSwarm.KOM / total amount of data sent and received at this node).
The second one, the fairness correlation coefficient ρU,D, quantifies the relation between
the upload rate of users (U) and their experienced download rate (D). This fairness
metric has already been used in our solution space analysis in Section 4.3. Finally, since
performance and fairness properties are closely tied together [31], we also measure
the users’ download throughput, defined by the total download amount divided by the
download time.
In Figure 43, we present the overhead, fairness and performance results obtained
from varying percentage threshold values and file sizes. All results except the fairness
correlation coefficient are average values, computed over all participants. Further, for
reasons of statistical representativeness, all experiments have been repeated 20 times
with different random seed values.
We begin by inspecting the communication costs of FairSwarm.KOM, as depicted in
Figure 43a. It is interesting to see that the overhead curve drops off exponentially when
increasing the percentage threshold value. This can be clearly observed for small-sized
and medium-sized content, while this trend flattens out for very large object sizes. The
reason for the latter is that the control traffic produced by FairSwarm.KOM seems to
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Figure 44: Gossiping of probabilistic coupons.
have little impact compared to the user data traffic generated by the content delivery
component.
With regard to fairness, we observe for medium and large content sizes a strong
correlation between the users’ upload speed and download throughput, confirming
superior fairness properties of the approach (cf. Figure 43b). We also observe positive
fairness properties for smaller-sized content. Fairness is, however, reduced because
download times are too low such that some peers have already finished their down-
loads, when others receive their first chunk [57]. Moreover, it can also be noted that
increasing the value of the percentage threshold decreases the fairness for all file sizes.
The direct consequence of this is that higher provisioned nodes must stay longer in the
system to finish their downloads which positively influences the download times of the
remaining users. As a consequence, decreasing levels of fairness results in improved
average download throughput, as shown in Figure 43c.
Comparing the different results obtained, we set FairSwarm.KOM’s percentage
update threshold for the BitTorrent system to 30%. This is well-founded by the fact
that the achieved overhead improvement for values higher than 30% is only marginal,
while the chosen parameter value seems to represent a good trade-off between the two
competing properties of fairness and performance.
6.2.3 Number of Probabilistic Coupons
Upon assigning a value to the percentage update threshold, we next focus on our second
tuneable parameter: the number of probabilistic coupons. Specifically, when two peers
encounter each other in FairSwarm.KOM, they mutually exchange (i) coupons about
common intermediate nodes and (ii) coupons that are most favourable to either party
(cf. Section 5.4). The gossiping of favourable coupons (or synonymously probabilistic
coupons) is necessary to provide increased robustness against selfish users attempting
to unfairly improve their standing in the system. Specifically, these dishonest users
could suppress the existence of coupons that identify their previous high resource
consumption (and potentially poor resource provision).
To mitigate this attack, the gossiping of probabilistic coupons is highly helpful as
illustrated in Figure 44. In overlay swarm 1, dishonest peer A has obtained 1 GB of
data from peer I. When peer B meets node I in overlay swarm 2 at a later date, assume
that peer I proactively gossips coupon ζI,A to node B, because this coupon is one of
the peer’s most favourable ones. Subsequently, when B encounters dishonest peer A
in overlay swarm 3, peer A may attempt to suppress the existence of intermediate
node I, because the sending of coupon ζI,A would significantly decrease its standing at
peer B2. That is, peer B would immediately know that I has previously consumed 1 GB
of data in the system, and, thus, it is likely that peer B would prefer other nodes for the
2 Recall that this attack might also be worthwhile from a selfish user’s point of view, as the probability that
intermediate node I is online in the system is only 29% (cf. Section 5.4.2).
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Figure 45: Success probability for the detection of fraudulent concealment of intermediate nodes.
Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
uploading of content to. However, since peer B is already in possession of coupon ζI,A,
node A’s fraud attempt will fail to succeed.
When considering this simple example, the fundamental question is how many
coupons must be proactively gossiped to successfully address fraud attempts such as of node A?
Ideally, to answer this question in an accurate way, one must know when exactly and
how much data has been transferred between the different participants in the system.
This is, however, impossible to infer without having access to the logs of all BitTorrent
clients, residing at users’ home PCs.
To remedy this issue, we utilise our long-term BitTorrent measurement data to deter-
mine the number of probabilistic coupons required. Specifically, through the use of the
PEX protocol [103], we are able to infer that, on average, each user connects to 37 other
participants per hour. Moreover, by using the technique described in Appendix A.1,
we are able to determine the session times of users. These two aspects can then be
combined to identify the interaction partners of the nodes, i.e., we periodically draw a
random subset from the pool of online nodes of a given torrent. Furthermore, when
two peers encounter each other (i.e., they become interaction partners), we assume
that each party gossips a tuneable number of probabilistic coupons from previous
or current interaction partners. These coupons are drawn randomly from the peers’
local databases. Through these assumptions, we are able to compute the likelihood
for a given peer pair (A,B) that peer B possesses at least one coupon that peer A may
attempt to conceal.
Due to the computational and memory complexity of such an analysis, we cannot
test the above for every peer pair in our trace data. Instead, we opt for drawing a
representative number of peer pairs (89,239) from this data (each of them is randomly
chosen). In Figure 45, we summarise the results obtained. The x-axis presents the total
amount of probabilistic coupons that peers have gossiped in our experiments, while
the y-axis shows the average success probability of detecting the aforementioned fraud
attempt. In particular, we say that a detection was successful when peer B meets a
given peer A, and B possesses at least one coupon ζI,A that is detrimental for peer A.
From the figure, it can be observed that the gossiping of 40 probabilistic coupons is
enough to mitigate the concealment of common intermediate nodes with high probabil-
ity (>95%). We therefore set this tuneable protocol parameter to 40 for BitTorrent-like
workloads. Nevertheless, this number can easily be adapted at run-time (further in-
creased if necessary), as the overhead for gossiping 40 coupons is still relatively low,
compared to the sizes of file objects being transferred. For instance, transferring 40
coupons including the mandatory public keys of the corresponding nodes requires
only 40 · (168 bytes + 128 bytes) / 1,024 ≈ 11.6 KB.
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6.3 comparing p2p incentive mechanisms
The previous section has provided values for the workload-dependent system pa-
rameters of FairSwarm.KOM. This section compares FairSwarm.KOM to BitTorrent’s
tit-for-tat, to see whether it can improve the performance and availability properties
of the BitTorrent system. To this end, we have the goal that these properties must be
achieved in a low overhead manner and without hurting the individual users’ fairness.
As a second baseline to compare FairSwarm.KOM against, we make use of an oracle-
based incentive mechanism that is identical to FairSwarm.KOM, but possesses global
knowledge of the P2P network. In particular, FairSwarm.KOM uses direct observations,
as well as one-hop experiences to evaluate the cooperativeness of the participants. In
this regard our intention is to see how much performance, availability, and fairness
could improve when using a shared history in which every interaction becomes globally
visible. We notice, however, that we refrain from considering overhead aspects, as well
as design issues to implement such an oracle approach in a reliable and robust manner
in practise. This is out of scope of this thesis.
6.3.1 Experimental Methodology
When evaluating the different incentive mechanisms in live experiments (i.e., field
study), it would be necessary to build-up user communities consisting of several
thousands of participants that are solely running the corresponding protocol under
study. Further, to see the long-term effects of the different incentive strategies with
regard to file availability and performance, these users would need to be monitored
over a prolonged period of time. Most importantly, however, in order to enable a
fair comparison between the different incentive approaches, the characteristics of the
overlay swarms considered (e.g., peer arrival times, user Internet access connection, file
types, total amount of online users, etc.) must be identical for all experiments carried
out. It is intuitive to see that the installation of such an evaluative environment is
highly challenging in practise and goes beyond the scope of this thesis.
Instead, we opt for trace-based simulations using the OctoSim simulator, developed
by Microsoft Research [9]. In particular we proceed in a similar manner to our solution
space analysis (cf. Section 4.3) and take our long-term BitTorrent measurement data
as input. This rich data comprises all the necessary information to obtain a long-term
workload model that reflects a BitTorrent community in a lifelike manner. This model
is then repeatedly used to assess the impact of the different incentive strategies in
practise.
In the following we first present details about how this workload model is com-
posed from this data. Subsequently, we describe how the different incentive strategies
are modelled in the simulator and provide the parameter setup that applies to our
experiments.
Workload Model
Here, we describe which aspects have been taken into account to obtain a workload
reflecting a BitTorrent community in the long-term.
• Selecting the torrents. The macroscopic data set encompasses data from more than
46,000 overlay swarms, measured over a period of several weeks. This is far more
than the simulator is able to handle. Hence, we chose a random subset of 100
torrents from the set of torrents affected by seedless states, with varying file sizes
between 3 and 1,500 MB. This procedure has been repeated five times, resulting
in five different torrent subsets with which we have experimented with. The logs
of each of these subsets contain data of more than 45,000 downloads, distributed
over at least four weeks.
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• User behaviour. Similar to our solution space analysis, we do not use any artificial
peer arrival function to model the content access pattern of the users. Instead, we
bring up peers according to the trace logs. To model the number of swarms that a
peer joins, we calculate the probability distribution over our entire data set (4.98
on average). When re-joining the network, FairSwarm.KOM users always persist
as file replicas in torrents that they have previously downloaded. Furthermore,
any user that cannot download the file within 36 hours aborts the download3.
Finally, although BitTorrent does not explicitly provide incentives for seeding,
most of the users altruistically stay some time after downloading. To realistically
model this time period, we use the seeding time distribution of the peers in our
microscopic crawlings, with an average of 3.37 hours (see Figure 22).
• Speed distributions. To realistically reflect the Internet access connection of the
different users contained in our trace logs, we first associate each IP address with
a country, using a freely available geolocation database [82]. Based on the country
of origin, the Ookla database [121] provides us with the median down/uplink
capacity of each user4. To see the characteristics of these speeds on a per-country
level, we make reference to Figure 31.
Incentive Model
We have extended the existing BitTorrent implementation of the OctoSim simulator as
described in Section 4.3.1. To this end we have also validated the correctness of the
implementation by comparing the simulation results produced with live experiments
(see Appendix A.4).
To model FairSwarm.KOM, we have accurately implemented the different protocol
specifications presented in Chapter 5. Also, we have modified the existing BitTorrent
implementation such that FairSwarm.KOM can operate on top of BitTorrent’s content
delivery and discovery mechanism. Details about the changes performed can be found
in Section 5.7. Importantly, our simulation model of FairSwarm.KOM also considers the
exchange of messages between the peers to establish a one-hop indirect reciprocation
infrastructure. This allows us to study overhead aspects of FairSwarm.KOM.
To model the Shared History incentive mechanism, we utilise the FairSwarm.KOM
implementation. However, instead of using one-hop information for decision making,
every peer has global knowledge about all transactions occurred in the P2P network
(without exchanging any network messages). This represents an upper bound with
regard to a peer’s knowledge database that can only be approximated in reality when
all participants of the system would share their local experiences.
Finally, Table 14 gives an overview of important protocol parameters that we use
in our evaluation. The peers’ outdegree k as well as the peers’ neighbourhood size is
taken from the default setup of currently existing BitTorrent clients. As mentioned in
the previous section, these are delivery-specific parameters that are optimised for mesh-
based systems such as BitTorrent. To enable a fair comparison, we have simply adopted
these values for all three incentive approaches. Since FairSwarm.KOM users exchange
messages to share information about third-party behaviour, the table also contains the
chosen parameter values as determined in previous section. Finally, FairSwarm.KOM
as well as the Shared History approach employ our proposed default service policy for
decision-making (cf. Section 5.6.1).
3 We find through simulations that 36 hours is enough time to get a download success ratio over 99% in the
presence of seeders for all access links and file sizes used in our experiments.
4 Note that we refrain from using the bandwidth distribution of Isdal et al. [50] in this experiment, since
this data does not contain a mapping from the geographical location of the peers to their corresponding
download and upload speeds.
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BitTorrent FairSwarm.KOM Shared History
Incentive Details
Incentive bilateral multilateral multilateral
Ranking of peers rate-based volume-based volume-based
Information horizon local view 1-hop view oracle view
Common parameters
Peer outdegree k 5 5 5
Max. number of overlay neighbours 50 50 50
FairSwarm.KOM-specific parameters
Percentage update threshold (in %) – 30 –
Number of probabilistic coupons – 40 –
Service Policy – default default
Table 14: Overview of incentive mechanisms and parameter values used in our evaluation.
6.3.2 Availability
We next present the results of the competitive analysis of the different P2P incentive
mechanisms under study. To be consistent with our solution space analysis, we report
only the results obtained from one out of the five torrent subsets. Note that the results
of the other torrent subsets are, however, very similar to those presented below.
We begin by studying the long-term availability of content achieved by each incentive
approach. From a technical perspective, a file can be considered as unavailable if at
least one of its chunks is not accessible within a swarm. As shown in Section 3.4.2,
this often coincides with the lack of seeders. In seedless states, (i) users are typically
not able to reconstruct a complete file and (ii) users’ download rates rapidly drop to
0KBps. Consequently, a prominent metric for measuring unavailability is the user-level
abortion rate, as most users are only prepared to wait a limited length of time during
an unavailability period. Recall that this time amounts to 36 hours at maximum in our
experiments, which is a very conservative assumption compared to the impatience of
users observed in reality (cf. Section 3.3.2).
Since one of our main objectives is to show that FairSwarm.KOM increases the
availability properties of the BitTorrent system, we first compare the abortion rates of
BitTorrent to FairSwarm.KOM. Figure 46a gives an overview of the obtained results on
a per-torrent level. In particular, the x-axis of this figure sorts the torrent swarms in
descending order, according to the abortion rates observed with BitTorrent. The y-axis,
on the other hand, depicts the download abortion rate of a given torrent. In general, we
can observe that, in BitTorrent, overlay swarms suffer heavily from file unavailability,
with abortion rates amounting up to 74%. This observation is inline with the findings
of our measurement study in the BitTorrent system. FairSwarm.KOM, however, seems
to significantly improve file availability, as most of the torrents exhibit abortion rates
of <1%, with 4.55% in the worst case.
One limitation of Figure 46a is that it clearly hides content popularity. That is, the
torrent-wise representation does not reflect how many users have participated in the
different torrents. Therefore, to extend this analysis, we also consider statistics on a
system level. Figure 46b summarises the abortion rates of all users, irrespective of the
torrents they have participated in (note that the y-axis is in log-scale). This time, we
also incorporate the results obtained from the Shared History incentive mechanism. We
see that, in BitTorrent, 19.67% of the users are unable to finish their downloads. This
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Figure 46: Overview of abortion rates on a per-torrent level (Subfigure (a)) and system level
(Subfigure (b)).
clearly highlights that file unavailability is not only a problem of unpopular content, as
in our simulation-based study every 5th BitTorrent user is affected by this problem.
FairSwarm.KOM, in contrast, can reduce this significant abortion rate from 19.67%
to 0.11%, thereby ensuring almost persistent file availability (>99%). Interestingly,
the Shared History mechanism cannot even improve this figure. Here, we observe a
download abortion rate of 0.12%.
6.3.3 Performance
So far we have validated that FairSwarm.KOM indeed improves file availability in
the BitTorrent system. The next important step is to see whether this improvement
comes at the expense of client download performance. This is important because
we have observed this issue already in our analysis of the eMule-based tit-for-tat
incentive. Specifically, this approach guaranteed file availability, but users experienced
an extremely low perceived quality of service (cf. Section 4.3.3). Download performance
is, however, highly important, as it determines user satisfaction and thus the success of
the entire system. Once it becomes too low, users tend to abort downloads [59].
To quantify performance, we measure the download throughput of the users; this is
defined by the total download amount divided by the download time. Similar to the pre-
vious analysis, we begin by inspecting the performance achieved by FairSwarm.KOM
in comparison to BitTorrent. In this regard, Figure 47 gives an overview of the mean
average download throughput achieved by both approaches on a per-torrent basis. In
general, we see that FairSwarm.KOM clearly outperforms BitTorrent in the majority
of overlay swarms. Specifically, the approach improves the mean average download
performance of a given overlay swarm by more than 103%. That is, it decreases the
download times on a per-torrent level by a factor of more than 2.
Clearly, the torrent-wise representation of download throughputs neglects content
popularity and also hides performance constraints that could be caused by file un-
availability. Therefore, Figure 48 also plots the cumulative distribution function of
user download throughputs for BitTorrent, FairSwarm.KOM, and the Shared History
mechanism. To compute this figure, we have considered all the users participating in
our simulation-based study. From the depicted results, we can make three major obser-
vations. First, more than 20% of the BitTorrent users achieve a download throughput
of less than 1 KBps. This coincides with the fraction of users that abort downloads, as
observed in our availability analysis.
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Second, it can be also noted that FairSwarm.KOM vastly improves the download
performance of BitTorrent users. More precisely, it increases the median download
throughput of BitTorrent by more than 86%. Further, we find 43.3% of the users
would gain a performance boost of more than 88% when switching from BitTorrent to
FairSwarm.KOM in our workload under study. While these results are at first glance
surprising, FairSwarm.KOM benefits from the significant increase in nodes (>19%)
which now find content available. This allows users, which previously could not access
the content, to download at high rates. Also, it frees up additional upload bandwidth
that increases total system capacity.
Last, when comparing the throughput curves of FairSwarm.KOM and the Shared
History approach, it can be noticed that both incentive mechanisms achieve a similar
performance (cf. Figure 48). This means, even with global knowledge, the system
would not perform better as it already does with one-hop reputation. An important
issue, however, is whether FairSwarm.KOM achieves this high level of performance at
the expense of fairness. We will further investigate this issue in the following.
6.3.4 Fairness
The previous subsections have studied the long-term effectiveness of FairSwarm.KOM
with regard to file availability and download performance. In this regard, it has
been found that FairSwarm.KOM offers superior performance and availability when
compared to BitTorrent. Furthermore, these properties could not be improved by even
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the Shared History approach, indicating that FairSwarm.KOM is highly effective at
disseminating the necessary information. Recent work has shown that high download
performance can be subject to systematic unfairness [31]. The last step to take is,
therefore, to analyse the fairness properties of the different approaches.
To quantify fairness, we make use of our definition presented in Section 4.3.2, which
defines fairness by the amount of reciprocated data generated by contributions. This
means, any peer x with an upload rate Ux should get a higher download through-
put than any other peer y with an upload rate Uy < Ux. To measure this for the
entire system, we compute the relation between the upload rate of users (U) and
their experienced download throughput (D), which is represented by the correlation
coefficient ρU,D. More precisely, we compute this coefficient for all users that join
(i) just a single torrent and (ii) multiple torrents, as shown in Figure 49. Splitting users
into these two groups allows us to quantify whether users persisting as file replicas
(cross-torrent seeders) truly receive reciprocation for contributions in torrents that they
have previously downloaded in.
In general, Figure 49 shows that all incentive mechanisms offer highly positive
fairness properties. That is, there is a high correlation between the users’ upload
contribution and download rewards. This suggests a good service differentiation for
the entire upload capacity spectrum. When comparing the different approaches to
each other, we observe that FairSwarm.KOM even improves the fairness properties
of BitTorrent. In particular, compared to BitTorrent, FairSwarm.KOM increases the
fairness correlation coefficient ρU,D by 19.29%. Importantly, this also holds for multi-
torrent users, acting as file replicas in multiple overlay swarms. Furthermore, it can
be also observed that even if users have global knowledge for decision making, the
fairness properties of FairSwarm.KOM would only be improved further by 4%. In fact,
these observations highlight that FairSwarm.KOM’s reputation infrastructure provides
sufficient information to the users such that they can recognise contributions of others
participants across time and torrents.
To conclude, after inspecting the fairness properties of the different approaches, we
can confidently say that FairSwarm.KOM’s performance and availability improvements
do not come at the expense of the individual users’ fairness. In contrary, it has been
shown that FairSwarm.KOM achieves fairness levels that are comparable to those
of an incentive system using global knowledge of the network. Most importantly,
FairSwarm.KOM achieves this by only incorporating the information of one-hop
neighbours.
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6.3.5 Overhead
So far it has been shown that FairSwarm.KOM has outperformed BitTorrent in all
metrics under consideration. The last step we take is to inspect the overhead of Fair-
Swarm.KOM. As discussed in the previous chapter, one of FairSwarm.KOM’s design
principles is to propagate reputation information to at most one-hop in the overlay
network, both to promote scalability and robustness. While the superior simulation
results of FairSwarm.KOM already indicate that FairSwarm.KOM’s signalling traffic
is not the dominating factor in network communication, it is still important to under-
stand how significant overhead is in comparison to the total amount of data exchanged
[47]. Furthermore, FairSwarm.KOM’s data exchange specification requires that data
chunks are symmetrically encrypted when being transmitted, inducing an additional
computational overhead. To this end, other approaches such as network coding have
already failed deployability in P2P systems, particularly because of their computational
complexity [40, 124]. Thus, we also consider this as an important overhead metric to
study. We briefly focus on these two overhead aspects in the following.
Communication Overhead
BitTorrent’s incentive mechanism solely relies on direct observations and local histo-
ries. Thus, the approach does not introduce any communication overhead. In Fair-
Swarm.KOM, however, peers must exchange messages about third-party behaviour.
To quantify how much this control traffic contributes to the total network traffic, we
divide the aggregate amount of data sent and received due to FairSwarm.KOM traffic
by the total amount of data sent and received at a given node. Figure 50 summarises
this percentage overhead for every user in our simulation-based study, alongside the
total data volume sent and received. Note that both axis are in log-scale.
In general, the figure shows that the communication overhead of FairSwarm.KOM
is very low, compared to the overall traffic caused by data exchanges. Specifically, on
average, FairSwarm.KOM’s control traffic accounts only for 0.11% of the total traffic.
As can be also seen, this is irrespective of how much users upload and download,
highlighting the scalability of the approach. Finally, even in the worst case, this overhead
figure never exceeds 0.63% for a user.
In fact, although the percentage overhead is extremely low, it can still be a value of
note when considering large files. However, even with the added signalling traffic of
FairSwarm.KOM, the users still yield a median performance improvement of more
than 86% compared to BitTorrent, making this bandwidth investment worthwhile.
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FairSwarm.KOM operation (data provider) Time
CPU-centric operation
1 Encrypt chunk (256 KB) 1.45 ms
2 Hash encrypted chunk (256 KB) 0.92 ms
3 Hash coupon 0.08 ms
4 Hash secret key 0.01 ms
5 Signature coupon (RSA) 1.78 ms
6 Signature transaction label + secret Key (RSA) 1.98 ms
7 Verification of consumer’s signature (RSA) 0.12 ms
8 Asymmetric encryption of secret key (RSA) 0.18 ms
= 6.52 ms
Communication operation
10 Data transmission (256KB chunk) 20,480.00 ms
Table 15: Timing of cryptographic and sending operations, assuming an average per slot band-
width of 100 Kbps. Timings for operations 1-8 are determined using the average value
of 1,000 executions.
Moreover, if really necessary, overhead can be adapted (i.e., further reduced) through
parameter modification based on different environments (cf. Section 6.2).
Computational Overhead
In FairSwarm.KOM, peers have to perform cryptographic operations during the ex-
change of data (see Section 5.5). While a data consumer must only prepare its signature
attesting the receipt of data, the provider must perform a few operations that can
delay the sending of user data. Table 15 presents a listing of all operations that must
be performed at the provider’s site (operation 1-8). For each of these operations, the
table also lists the CPU time needed when performing this operation using the Java
cryptography architecture FlexiProvider5. Specifically, to measure these times, we
have used a dual core Pentium 2.4 GHZ with 2 GB RAM and assumed a chunk size
of 256 KB. This figure represents the average chunk size observed in our BitTorrent
measurement study. We see from the table that the different cryptographic operations
are highly efficient, as only symmetric cryptography is employed to encrypt/decrypt
the data to be transferred. Added up, we obtain a CPU-time of 6.52 milliseconds per
data transaction.
We now contrast this time against the time needed for transferring a data chunk
of 256 KB. Let us assume the following without the loss of generality: the typical
outdegree k of a user in BitTorrent/FairSwarm.KOM is 5 [21]. Further, most ISPs offer
upstream bandwidths of 500 Kbps or less [25]. Thus, per upload slot, a peer usually
has 100 Kbps upstream capacity available. When assuming that the bottleneck between
a data provider and consumer is upstream capacity, the sending process of a 256 KB
chunk will last 20.48 seconds. Consequently, the computational overhead introduced
by FairSwarm.KOM reduces the uplink utilisation of a peer by only 0.03%, which is
negligible.
In summary, the results show that FairSwarm.KOM’s communication and com-
putational overheads are marginal and by all means justifiable, compared to the
improvements that this incentive mechanism offers to the tit-for-tat incentive scheme
of BitTorrent.
5 http://www.flexiprovider.de
6.4 robustness to untruthful user behaviour 105
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The previous section has validated that indirect reciprocation is vital for overcoming
the limitations of current P2P content distribution systems, particularly BitTorrent.
However, the use of information that goes beyond direct observations and local histories
(i.e., experiences of third-parties) has a significant disadvantage; it greatly increases
the range of potential attacks possible by strategic peers. In this section, we study
FairSwarm.KOM’s robustness against the most common of these threats.
In the following, we begin by stating our methodology, while presenting the threat
models we consider. Subsequently, for each individual threat, we report the results
obtained and conclusions drawn.
6.4.1 Experimental Methodology
When analysing the vulnerability of FairSwarm.KOM to strategic or malicious attacks,
it is important to study the impact of those threats in a large variety of overlay swarms.
For example, it is intuitive that torrents predominantly consisting of seeders may
favour free-loading, because these kinds of swarms offer enough excess capacity to be
exploited by free-riders. Also, sparsely populated swarms further ease the exploitation
of this source of altruism, because non-contributors must only compete with a few
other participants. On the other hand, when a swarm is dominated by leechers, the
situation may be reversed to the disadvantage of the attacker. From this, we can deduce
that the success of a given threat depends on the characteristics of the swarm it is
performed in. Thus, when studying only a single torrent configuration, one will gain
only a very limited understanding of the effectiveness of different attacks in the wild.
To remedy this issue, we make use of our macroscopic measurement data and opt
for trace-based simulations. Specifically, this data allows us to reconstruct a wealth of
overlay swarms as they exist in the Internet today. These swarms are then taken as
input for our experiments to simulate different threats to FairSwarm.KOM. As in all
simulations before, we use for our experiments the OctoSim simulator, with all the
modifications presented in Section 4.3.1.
Within this subsection, we first present the different threat models that we consider
in our analysis. Subsequently, we detail our approach to generate a large set of
overlay swarms in which the different attacks are carried out. Finally, we describe the
characteristics of attackers and control nodes operating in these swarms.
Threat Models
For the purpose of our analysis, we assume that selfish/malicious nodes can misbehave
as follows in FairSwarm.KOM. First, a peer may attempt to download content without
contributing anything to the system. In particular, this free-loading can be performed
by maintaining the peer’s identity (ordinary free-riding) or by continuously changing
its identity (whitewashing). Importantly, since FairSwarm.KOM users can generate
identities arbitrarily and at will without being charged for this, both attacks appear
likely. Furthermore, a peer may attempt to boost its standing in the system by creating
multiple FairSwarm.KOM accounts, each attesting data transactions that have not
occurred in reality. This can be performed with Sybil nodes that maintain their identities
and participate in the data exchange process (Sybil attack with fixed identities). Or,
alternatively, it can be run with Sybil nodes that change their identities as soon as they
have consumed a pre-defined amount of data (Sybil attack with changing identities)6.
6 Note that we refrain from studying collusion between multiple peers, as this threat is implicitly covered by
the Sybil attacks under study.
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Parameter Percentile
5th 25th 50th 75th 95th
File size (in MB) 2 45 240 733 1,440
Number of online leechers 2 5 10 33 998
Seeder-to-leecher ratio 0 (0.01) 0.32 0.93 2.38 8.6
Table 16: Overview of simulation input parameters. Note that the seeder-to-leecher ratio below
the 17th percentile is 0. As content is unavailable in those circumstances, we use the
17th percentile (=0.01) as most-left value instead.
Workload Model
To generate a wealth of lifelike overlay swarms, we make use of our macroscopic data
set consisting of trace logs from more than 46,000 BitTorrent swarms. Through this,
we are able to compute the cumulative distribution function of the ratios between
seeders and leechers, content sizes, and the absolute number of downloaders/seeders.
From each of these distributions, we have taken the 5th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 95th
percentile, which are shown in Table 16. This allows us to preserve the most important
characteristics of currently existing overlay swarms. For instance, as can be seen from
the table, skewness is high in all distributions, which is common for P2P environments.
Each of these values is then combined by fixing one parameter while varying the
values from the others. This results in 125 different torrent configurations. To have a
representative client bandwidth distribution in these overlay swarms, we assign the
Internet access links of the users according to the measurement data of Isdal et al. [50].
Since the resulting access link distribution of each torrent depends on the chosen
random seed, we have used 20 different seed values. All things considered, our final
workload consists of (20 · 125) = 2,500 characteristic overlay swarms, that we use for
our study.
Attackers and Control Nodes
To understand the worst-case scenario, we provision attackers with infinite down-
load capacity. This is a reasonable assumption because most of the Internet access
connections today are highly asymmetric with downstream capacities that are often
a multiple of the upstream capacity (cf. Figure 14). Furthermore, in fraud attempts
where available upstream capacity becomes important, we consider three different
types of attackers: a low capacity peer (LCP), a medium capacity peer (MCP), and a
high capacity peer (HCP), each endowed with upstream capacities of 512, 1,024, and
4,096 Kbps, respectively. The rationale behind this is to evaluate the effectiveness of a
given threat with regard to the wide-spectrum of currently available Internet access
links [25].
For comparability reasons, in each experiment, we always bring up three cooperative
control nodes that (i) simultaneously join the swarm with the node(s) performing a
given attack and (ii) also possess the same upload capacity as the attackers. As such,
these control nodes act as reference point and reflect the performance that can be
achieved when users adhere to FairSwarm.KOM’s protocol specification.
6.4.2 Free-Riding and Whitewashing
We begin by studying the vulnerability of FairSwarm.KOM to free-riding. This includes
ordinary free-riding as observed in many currently deployed P2P content distribution
system (e.g., BitTorrent, eMule, and Gnutella), and free-riding with the change of
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Parameter Value
Simulated environment
Overlay swarms considered 2,500 (cf. Table 16)
Swarm population Either FairSwarm.KOM or BitTorrent users
Client bandwidth distribution Trace-based [50]
Attacker types Free-rider, whitewasher
Attacker bandwidth (down-/upstream) ∞/0 Kbps
FairSwarm.KOM-specific parameters
Number of probabilistic coupons 40
Percentage threshold (in %) 30
Peer outdegree k 5
Maximum number of overlay neighbours 50
Service policy default
Attacker-specific parameters
Identity change of whitewasher After each downloaded chunk
Table 17: Overview of experiments: Free-riding and whitewashing.
identities, also called whitewashing. The latter threat is only relevant for incentive
schemes relying on long-term incentives, e.g., FairSwarm.KOM. To this end, an attacker
attempts to escape the consequences of its past by re-joining the system as a legitimate
newcomer.
To study and quantify FairSwarm.KOM’s robustness to both kinds of attack, we
have performed three types of experiments. In the first experiment, we monitored
the performance of an ordinary free-rider when downloading content in the 2,500
characteristic overlay swarms. These overlay swarms consist solely of FairSwarm.KOM
users, using the protocol settings depicted in Table 17. The second experiment repeats
the previous one, but measures the performance of a whitewasher that continuously
changes its identity upon downloading a single file chunk. Finally, to have a baseline
for the results, we also monitor the performance of an ordinary free-rider when the
overlay swarms solely consist of BitTorrent users employing the tit-for-tat incentive
strategy.
Table 18 summarises the download throughputs of the attacker nodes in BitTorrent
and FairSwarm.KOM. For comparability reasons, the table also contains the through-
puts achieved by the three different types of control nodes. We start with considering
the performance of ordinary free-riders in BitTorrent and FairSwarm.KOM. It should
be noted that free-loading is highly effective in the current BitTorrent system; a free-
rider achieves almost the same download performance as a low provisioned node,
contributing with a non-negligible amount of upstream bandwidth (512 Kbps). Worse,
this picture does not even change for an extremely well-resourced node, contributing
4,096 Kbps upstream capacity. In particular, compared to a free-riding node, the high
capacity peer achieves a performance improvement of only 16.69 %.
On the other hand, Table 18 shows that FairSwarm.KOM does also not prohibit
free-riding. That is, the free-riding node achieves a mean average download throughput
of 124 KBps and eventually finishes its download in all overlay swarms under consider-
ation. The latter is, however, expected as our default service policy refrains from using
contribution thresholds that peers must exceed to download content. This is a necessity
to enable new nodes to join in the system and to improve overall system throughput (cf.
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User Type (upstream bandwidth) BitTorrent FairSwarm.KOM
Speed (KBps) Speed (KBps)
Attackers:
Free-rider (0 Kbps) 877.76 124.08
Whitewasher (0 Kbps) (–) 230.45
Control nodes:
Low capacity peer (512 Kbps) 885.15 652.52
Medium capacity peer (1,024 Kbps) 931.33 804.17
High capacity peer (4,096 Kbps) 1,024.08 1,034.81
Table 18: Overview of performance of free-riders, whitewashers, and three cooperative control
nodes, when downloading content in 2,500 characteristic overlay swarms. All figures
are average values, computed over all swarms.
Section 5.6). Nevertheless, compared to BitTorrent, FairSwarm.KOM’s default service
policy highly limits the opportunity for effective free-loading, as non-contributors
achieve only 11-19% of the performance of obedient nodes.
The reason for FairSwarm.KOM’s increased robustness to free-loading must be
clearly attributed to the use of one-hop information for decision making. In particular,
FairSwarm.KOM users (particularly seeders) have the opportunity to evaluate whether
leechers reciprocate to other users in the system. This means, in order to obtain a
downloading slot, leechers must prove their cooperativeness by forwarding content
to other participants. In bilateral incentive schemes (i.e., tit-for-tat), however, seeders
cannot see this and can thus easily be exploited by free-riders.
To demonstrate this, we group the different torrents by their seeder-to-leecher
ratio, and, for each category obtained, we compute the users’ average download
throughput. Figure 51 shows these results for BitTorrent and FairSwarm.KOM. In fact,
it can be observed that in overlay swarms with seeder-to-leecher ratios greater than
0.32 (more than 70% of all existing torrents), free-riders can easily achieve a similar
download performance than the highest contributing BitTorrent node (cf. Figure 51a).
In FairSwarm.KOM, however, the free-rider’s performance increases only slightly with
increasing seeder-to-leecher ratios (cf. Figure 51b), clearly confirming our hypothesis.
Last, in FairSwarm.KOM, a free-rider could also attempt to whitewash its account
by re-joining the system with different identities. In fact, our trace-based simulation
analysis has revealed that this attack improves the performance of an ordinary free-
rider by 88%. However, as shown in Table 18, compared to the cooperative control peers,
these users also fail to achieve superior download performance, primarily because they
can never generate a positive account balance. Consequently, both leechers and seeders
rarely select these peers for uploading.
In essence, our analysis has revealed that FairSwarm.KOM is unable to entirely
block free-riding because it refrains from using contribution thresholds that peers
must exceed to download content. This design choice is, however, intentional in
favour of total system throughput and to bootstrap cooperation (see Section 5.6). On
the other hand, it must be also noted that FairSwarm.KOM significantly limits the
effectiveness of free-riding in comparison to current tit-for-tat incentive strategies.
Importantly, this has been confirmed in the entire range of currently existing overlay
swarms characteristics. Last, due to FairSwarm.KOM’s selective uploading strategy, the
effectiveness of whitewashing is also clearly mitigated, even if not blocked. However,
as mentioned before, the random contributions from which these users benefit are
necessary in P2P content distribution systems. This is because obtaining information
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Figure 51: Download performance of three control nodes and free-riders for different seeder-to-
leecher ratios. Error bars correspond to 95% confidence intervals.
about the cooperativeness of users requires contributing to all peers in the system,
beneficial or not.
6.4.3 Sybil Attack with Fixed Identities
In FairSwarm.KOM, a more sophisticated attack could be that multiple strategising
nodes cooperate to defraud the system, or, alternatively, a single node generates multi-
ple identities to attest contributions that have never occurred. To see how this attack
could work, consider Figure 52. Here, the strategising node has two FairSwarm.KOM
accounts: its main account represented by node A and its Sybil account given by
node S. Peer A is ordinarily participating in the download process (i.e., it downloads
and uploads), while node S solely uploads content to other peers in the system. The
intuition behind this is that both peers establish one-hop relationships to obedient
FairSwarm.KOM nodes, so that peer A can claim back direct contributions as well as
indirect contributions (via node S) from a common intermediate node I. To enable
this, the attacker illegally issues and periodically updates a coupon ζA,S, attesting
fake contributions from peer A to S. This coupon is then submitted to all common
intermediate nodes to improve peer A’s standing in the system.
Clearly, the recipients of coupon ζA,S could easily detect this attack by keeping track
of the amount of data that has been exchanged between two peers. For instance, it
appears unrealistic that A contributes to S one gigabyte of data within a minute. Further,
abnormally high account balances that deviate significantly from the accounts of others
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Figure 52: Illustration of a Sybil attack with fixed identities in FairSwarm.KOM.
Parameter Value
Simulated environment
Simulated overlay swarms 2,500 (cf. Table 16)
Overlay swarm population FairSwarm.KOM users
Client bandwidth distribution Trace-based [50]
Attacker types low capacity peer (LCP), medium capacity peer
(MCP), high capacity peer HCP)
Attacker bandwidth (down-/upstream) LCP (∞/512 Kbps), MCP (∞/1,024 Kbps),
HCP (∞/4,096 Kbps)
FairSwarm.KOM parameters
Number of probabilistic coupons 40
Percentage threshold (in %) 30
Peer outdegree k 5
Maximum number of overlay neighbours 50
Service policy default (without MaxFlow), default
Table 19: Overview of experiments: Sybil attacks with fixed identities.
may be also suspicious. On the other hand, the attacker could simply circumvent this
check as follows. Every t minutes, it increases the data field of coupon ζA,S according
to a data volume V that is proportional to the peer’s upload capacity, e.g., double of
its upload capacity U. Volume V can thus simply be computed by V = t ·U · 2. When
doing so, the strategising node will be only hardly distinguishable from other nodes in
the system.
To study the effectiveness of the above attack, we have performed two experiments. In
both experiments, three types of attackers (solely differing in their upstream capacity)
attempt to download content in the 2,500 characteristic overlay swarms. All participants
in these swarms are FairSwarm.KOM users, using the protocol settings illustrated in
Table 19. In the first experiment, however, FairSwarm.KOM users refrain from using
the max-flow min-cut theorem to detect Sybil attacks (cf. Section 5.6.1). In the second
experiment, on the other hand, these users follow our recommendation and use the
MaxFlow algorithm. Further, in both experiments, we set t = 2 minutes and assume
that a strategising user allocates a fifth of its available upload capacity to node S7.
The latter is necessary to establish one-hop relationships between a victim I and the
attacker accounts A and S. Otherwise, victim I would not accept the coupon ζA,S
gossiped by node A.
Figure 53 summarises the mean average download throughput for the different
attackers types, either when FairSwarm.KOM users are using our proposed counter-
7 We have also experimented with smaller/higher time intervals and different bandwidth allocations, but the
conclusions drawn are similar to those presented here.
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Figure 53: Download throughput of Sybil attackers in FairSwarm.KOM. Without (w/o) and with
countermeasure means that FairSwarm.KOM users either refrain from using or use
the min-cut max-flow theorem to protect themselves against Sybil attacks.
measure to Sybil attacks or when they do not. To benchmark the performance achieved,
the figure also shows the download throughputs of the corresponding control nodes.
The results of Figure 53 clearly suggest that a Sybil attacker can achieve supe-
rior download performance in FairSwarm.KOM, when users refrain from using the
MaxFlow algorithm (w/o countermeasure). Specifically, the figure shows that the
attacker’s download throughput improves by 28-42%, compared to an obedient control
node originating from the same bandwidth class. In fact, due to this significant gain in
performance, this threat is therefore likely to become adopted by other selfish users.
On the other hand, when using FairSwarm.KOM’s default service policy (with
countermeasure), the impact of this attack is effectively blocked. As noticeable in Figure
53, the download throughput of the attack nodes are almost identical to those of the
corresponding control nodes. Concretely, the medium capacity attacker performs 1.8%
better, while the low and high capacity attacker performs 1.1-1.6% worse. This proves
that, through the aid of the min-cut max-flow theorem, a Sybil attacker can only claim
back contributions that it has truly provided to other nodes in the system.
Also, as already discussed in Section 5.6.1, it is important to recognise that this
situation will not change for an attacker, if it creates additional Sybil nodes, e.g., S ′,S ′′,
and so on. This is because the attacker must always allocate a fraction of its total
upstream capacity to these Sybil nodes, in order to establish one-hop relationships.
However, when applying the MaxFlow algorithm, the sum of contributions achieved
by the Sybil nodes is always bounded by the attacker’s total upload capacity. In other
words, this is equivalent to the case when serving content with full capacity of service
to other participants using a single identity.
To conclude, from the point of view of selfish users, the Sybil attack as described
above is not beneficial in FairSwarm.KOM. This is because the attackers have to
undertake an additional effort to realise such an attack. In particular, they must
maintain multiple identities, introducing an additional communication overhead for
the gossiping of illegally created coupons, without achieving any performance gain.
6.4.4 Sybil Attack with Changing Identities
So far we have studied the effectiveness of selfish/malicious users that are reluctant to
contribute upload resources. In addition to this, we have also considered a Sybil attack
where an attacker A creates a single identity (or alternatively multiple ones) attesting
fake contributions to it. By doing so, the attacker attempts to claim back contributions
using one-hop indirect reciprocation. However, alternatively, the attacker could also
approach the attack from the opposite way round. That is, instead of requesting content
112 evaluation of fairswarm.kom
AFake uploadS
Sybil node of attacker
Obedient nodes
Attacker node
Upload  
of dataI
Download
of data
Change of 
identity
A
S
Figure 54: Illustration of a Sybil attack with changing identities in FairSwarm.KOM.
Parameter Value
Simulated environment
Simulated overlay swarms 2,500 (cf. Table 16)
Overlay swarm population FairSwarm.KOM users
Client bandwidth distribution Trace-based [50]
Attacker types low capacity peer (LCP), medium capacity peer
(MCP), high capacity peer HCP)
Attacker bandwidth (down-/upstream) LCP (∞/512 Kbps), MCP (∞/1,024 Kbps),
HCP (∞/4,096 Kbps)
FairSwarm.KOM parameters
Number of probabilistic coupons 40
Percentage threshold (in %) 30
Peer outdegree k 5
Maximum number of overlay neighbours 50
Service policy default
Attacker-specific parameters
Identity change after P% of file download 10%, 20%, 50%
Table 20: Overview of experiments: Sybil attacks with changing identities.
by itself, the attacker could give this responsibility to a Sybil node that continuously
changes its identity.
To see how this attack could work with changing identities, consider Figure 54.
Assume that attacker node A and Sybil node S are able to simultaneously access a
shared folder. For instance, if the attack is carried out from a single physical ma-
chine, this is can be implemented without any problems. In this scenario, the sole
responsibility of node A is then to serve other participants with already downloaded
content. Importantly, to yield the maximum profit, this must be done with the full
service capacity. The reason behind is to create as many outgoing contribution edges
as possible in the network, so as to boost peer A’s standing in the system. Sybil node S,
on the other hand, attempts to exploit the continuously increasing account surplus of
peer A. To do so, both nodes illegally issue and periodically update a coupon ζA,S,
attesting fake contributions from peer S to A. Node S then gossips this coupon to
common intermediate nodes (e.g., node I in Figure 54), to simultaneously request
content from these nodes. This attack is also likely to work in practise, because node S
pretends to have uploaded to node A, and A has truly uploaded to intermediate peer I
(S→ A→ I). Thus, peer S is indeed allowed to claim back contributions via one-level
of indirection from node I.
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There are a few things that limit the effectiveness of such a sophisticated attack.
For one, the above attack can only be launched against leechers in FairSwarm.KOM.
This is because peer A cannot upload to seeders, and, therefore, one-hop relationships
cannot be established with these users. Furthermore, the effectiveness of the attack
against leechers depends on three points: (i) peer A’s upload speed, (ii) peer S’s success
at establishing an overlay connection to leechers that are consuming from peer A,
and (iii) peer S’s account balance compared to other leechers in the system. The first
issue clearly depends on peer A’s physical upstream bandwidth. The second point,
however, becomes challenging for large swarm sizes (> 50 peers) in which users could
have already exceeded their maximum neighbourhood size, which is by default 508.
Finally, the third point needs a closer inspection. It appears intuitive that the more
content peer S downloads, the lower is its chance to win a download slot among other
competing leechers. Thus, a logical consequence would be to continuously change
peer S’s identity to best exploit peer A’s increasing standing in the system. Frequent
changes of identities have, however, the consequence that Sybil node S may be unable
to reconnect to victim I, since other users have already occupied its neighbourhood
place. Also, content requests from the same IP-address, but with a frequently changing
long-term identifier can be easily detected and blocked.
To address this, we make the following assumptions. First, we assume that every
t = 2 minutes, both nodes S and A illegally increase the corresponding data field of
coupon ζA,S by data volume V , thereby attesting fake contributions from S to A. As in
our previous experiments; the exact data volume is given V = t ·U · 2, whereas U is the
attackers upload capacity9. Further, we assume that Sybil node S changes its identity
as soon as it has downloaded another P percent of the file, where P is varied in our
experiments.
To study the effectiveness of the Sybil attack with changing identities, we have
monitored the download performance of three types of attackers when attempting
to download content in the 2,500 characteristic overlay swarms. All participants in
these swarms were FairSwarm.KOM users, using the protocol settings illustrated in
Table 20. Furthermore, we have repeated these experiments for P=10%, 20%, and 50%.
Figure 55 summarises the average download throughputs observed. When comparing
the results of attackers and control nodes, we clearly observe that the attackers achieve
a significantly lower performance. In particular, depending on the chosen parameter
value P and the attacker’s upload capacity, the observed performance loss is between
59-75%. Considering that these attackers serve content with the same capacity as our
control nodes, the performance degradation is significant.
After a closer inspection of the results obtained, we find that the attack fails to
succeed, mainly because the attackers lose their opportunity to download content from
seeders. That is, since they cannot demonstrate their cooperativeness to seeders, obedi-
ent FairSwarm.KOM users are always preferred in the seeders’ upload queues. This
situation only changes when all other (obedient) users have finished their downloads
and enough excess capacity is available that can be ultimately tapped by the attackers.
Apparently, this is highly detrimental for download performance of the attack nodes.
We would like to add that we have also experimented with allocating a small fraction
(i.e., a fifth) of node A’s upload capacity to Sybil node S. The intuition behind it was to
see if this improves performance, since in this case, Sybil node S is also contributing
to the system, potentially improving its chances to obtain downloading slots from
seeders. However, we observed no significant change in download performance, which
must be attributed to the combination of two things. First, since node A’s available
upload capacity is decreased, its standing in the system increases more slowly. Second,
8 This is further exacerbated by the fact that users quickly drop overlay connections to peers that are solely
downloading without contributing back. We neglect this fact, however, for the purpose of this analysis.
9 We also have experimented with other values of t, but observed no significant deviations between the results.
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Figure 55: Download throughput of Sybil attackers with changing identities in FairSwarm.KOM.
Every time P percent of the file is downloaded, the attacker changes the identity of
nodeS (cf. Figure 54).
the comparatively less contribution of peer S cannot outweigh the node’s resource
consumption, so that it is only seldom favoured by seeders.
In essence, it has been shown that the discriminative uploading of FairSwarm.KOM’s
default service policy in combination with the peers’ one-hop basis for decision making
clearly mitigates the effectiveness of Sybil attacks with changing identities. In particular,
for the same amount of upload contribution, the attacker nodes achieve a 59-75% lower
performance than obedient nodes adhering to FairSwarm.KOM’s protocol specification.
6.5 evaluative summary
This chapter has provided a quantitative evaluation of FairSwarm.KOM with respect
to different properties. This section now revisits our evaluative aims to ascertain how
well they have been fulfilled (cf. Section 6.1.1).
Our first evaluative aim was to measure and quantify the potential performance and
availability benefits that FairSwarm.KOM can offer BitTorrent. This aim has been addressed
through the use of up-to-date trace-based simulations, taking our month long measure-
ment data of the BitTorrent system as input. Most notably, it was found that:
• FairSwarm.KOM provides superior performance compared to BitTorrent’s tit-for-
tat incentive. Specifically, the approach increases the mean average download
throughput of overlay swarms by more than 103%. This improves the download
rates of the users by 86.38% on median.
• FairSwarm.KOM reduces the abortion rate of users in the BitTorrent system from
19.67% to 0.11%, thereby guaranteeing almost persistent file availability (>99%).
Our second evaluative aim was to ascertain if FairSwarm.KOM can improve BitTorrent’s
performance and availability without damaging user and system-wide fairness. The trace-
based simulations have revealed that FairSwarm.KOM provides high levels of fairness.
In particular, it improves the already existing fairness properties of BitTorrent’s tit-
for-tat incentive mechanism by 19.23%, thereby achieving service differentiation that
is proportional to the users’ upload contribution. Thus, the newly devised incentive
approach offers improved performance and availability properties, without hurting
user and system-wide fairness.
Our third evaluative aim was to measure the overheads related to utilising FairSwarm.KOM
under current environments and workloads. This aim has been also addressed through the
use of trace-based simulations to find that the signalling traffic of FairSwarm.KOM
accounts for only 0.11% of a user’s total traffic on average, and for 0.63% in the worst
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case. Importantly, this percentage overhead remains constant, irrespective of how much
users download and upload, highlighting the scalability of the approach. Furthermore,
it was also shown that FairSwarm.KOM’s computation costs for cryptographic oper-
ations are negligible and do not introduce any significant delay that could impair a
peer’s uplink utilisation. To conclude, the overheads of FairSwarm.KOM are marginal
and by all means justifiable, compared to the improvements that this mechanism offers
to the tit-for-tat incentive scheme of BitTorrent.
Finally, our fourth evaluative aim was to validate that FairSwarm.KOM is robust against
common P2P attacks and to ensure that malicious users do not achieve superior performance to
those that adhere to FairSwarm.KOM’s policies. This analysis is of particular importance,
because relying on third-party experiences clearly increases the vulnerability of the
approach to users attempting to strategise. To reasonably address this aim, exten-
sive trace-based simulations of a large variety of existing overlay swarms have been
performed. It was found that FairSwarm.KOM significantly limits the opportunity
for effective free-riding. Moreover, it even offers increased robustness properties to
this threat, when compared to current tit-for-tat incentive schemes. Specifically, while
a free-rider in BitTorrent achieves almost the same download performance than a
cooperative peer contributing with a non-negligible amount of upstream bandwidth
(e.g., 512 Kbps), FairSwarm.KOM reduces the download rates of such non-contributors
to only 11-19% of the performance of the contributing nodes. Despite this, it was shown
that whitewashing and Sybil attacks are also highly mitigated in FairSwarm.KOM.
This is because these attackers must undertake a non-trivial effort to realise such fraud
attempts, but do not achieve any performance gains compared to users adhering to the
protocol specification. In essence, these results clearly demonstrate FairSwarm.KOM’s
robustness to common attacks of strategising users, thereby meeting our last evaluative
aim and completing our evaluation of FairSwarm.KOM.
With the evaluation provided in this chapter, we have also successfully addressed
the third research goal of this thesis (cf. Section 1.4) and quantitatively confirmed that
our devised solution meets the solution requirements posed in Section 4.4. Finally, a
notable and interesting finding that is worth to be mentioned is that even when users
have global knowledge for decision making, the results achieved by FairSwarm.KOM
would not further improve. In more detail, our trace-based simulations have revealed
that the performance, availability, and fairness properties achieved by the oracle-based
incentive mechanism are close to what FairSwarm.KOM achieves by using only one-
hop reputations. Thus, for the current BitTorrent system, the usage of complex virtual
currency-based approaches to improve these properties cannot be justified.

7C O N C L U S I O N
This chapter concludes the dissertation. First, we briefly summarise the content and main
findings of this thesis. Following this, the major contributions of the thesis are detailed, alongside
other significant results. Subsequently, we revisit our research goals to ascertain how effectively
they have been fulfilled. Last, we give an outlook on concrete future work opened up by the
research performed in this thesis.
7.1 summary of thesis
Peer-to-peer content distribution offers many advantageous characteristics compared
to the traditional client-server model for both content providers and end-users alike.
Existing P2P systems, however, suffer from serious limitations with regard to providing
continuously accessible content. This thesis addresses this issue to improve the download
performance and file availability in such systems.
Chapter 1 “Introduction” motivated the benefits of the P2P paradigm with regard
to content distribution over the Internet for both content providers and end-users.
Alongside this, it also discussed certain prominent limitations, specifically in terms of
performance and content availability. Accordingly, the key objective of this thesis was
identified and decomposed into a set of research goals.
Chapter 2 “Background and Related Work” was structured into three sections. The
first section introduced the basic principles and important terminology in the field
of P2P content distribution. The second section then gave an abstract overview of a
set of prominent P2P protocols used for online content distribution. The information
presented formed the basis for understanding the rest of the thesis. Since a core research
goal of this thesis was to design a new P2P incentive mechanism, the third section
reviewed related work in this domain. To this end, P2P incentive mechanisms were
classified into three categories: direct reciprocity (bilateral schemes), indirect reciprocity
(multilateral schemes), and virtual currency systems. It was primarily concluded that
currently deployed P2P content distribution systems solely rely on bilateral tit-for-
tat incentives strategies, because of their ease of implementation and robustness to
untruthful peer behaviour.
Chapter 3 “Measurements and Analysis of the BitTorrent System” detailed two major
measurement studies that we performed in the popular BitTorrent system. The purpose
of this was to (i) validate our critique of P2P content distribution with regard to
providing continuous content distribution and (ii) to discover vital properties that
cause these limitations. To this end, we found that BitTorrent indeed suffers from large-
scale performance and availability problems, affecting millions of users. Specifically,
users in BitTorrent download with a median rate of only 30 KBps. Worse, every 12th
user is unable to download content at all, confirming very high levels of content
unavailability. Our root cause analysis revealed that insufficient incentive design is
core reason for the issues observed. In particular, we demonstrated that BitTorrent’s
tit-for-tat strategy only offers incentives when users are in the process of downloading
a file, and can only take place between peers downloading the same file. Thus, users are
given no incentive to remain online to serve a file after their download has completed
(i.e., to act as seeders). As a consequence, most BitTorrent swarms lose these important
users after only a few days. However, as shown by our measurement data, these
seeders play a vital role in BitTorrent’s performance as they provide resources without
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consuming any, and ensure that a complete copy of the file remains in the system.
Finally, the chapter then concluded that, therefore, any viable solution must incentivise
seeders to persist in the system.
Chapter 4 “Analysis of Solution Space” studied a set of feasible solutions with regard
to the issues found in Chapter 3, both to narrow the solution space and to shape our
incentive design in Chapter 5. In this regard, three abstract cross-torrent approaches,
as well as single-torrent incentive mechanisms were considered and quantitatively
analysed through extensive trace-based simulations. Most notably, it was found that
bilateral incentive strategies (i.e., tit-for-tat) are generally insufficient to provide robust
incentives for seeding. This is because most users (i) do not meet each other repeatedly,
and (ii) do not simultaneously require each other’s content. Instead, it was demon-
strated that the only way to overcome performance and availability issues would be to
use multilateral incentive strategies. These kinds of incentives allow users to contribute
data to one user yet receive reciprocation from another. Last, through these insights, a
set of key solution requirements were derived.
Chapter 5 “A New P2P Incentive Mechanism – FairSwarm.KOM” focussed on the design
of a novel P2P incentive mechanism that was devised to meet the solution requirements
posed in Chapter 4. Within this chapter, a conceptual overview of FairSwarm.KOM’s
basic concepts and major building blocks was given. Following this, each building
block was presented and discussed in detail, while important design decisions were
justified. The result was a generic incentives solution that propagates bidirectional
transaction receipts (called coupons) in the network to broaden the users’ knowledge
base for decision-making.
Chapter 6 “Evaluation of FairSwarm.KOM” evaluated the newly devised P2P incen-
tive mechanism. After presenting the aims and methodology, a threefold analysis
of FairSwarm.KOM was performed. The first analysis studied workload-dependent
parameters controlling performance and overhead aspects of the approach. The second
analysis then compared FairSwarm.KOM to BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat incentive strategy
and an oracle-based incentive mechanism, in which users have global knowledge of
the network. Through the use of trace-based simulations, it was shown that, unlike
BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat incentive, FairSwarm.KOM guarantees almost persistent file avail-
ability in all overlay swarms under consideration (i.e., >99% of the users were always
able to successfully download content). Furthermore, when compared to BitTorrent’s
tit-for-tat incentives, the approach yields a median performance improvement of more
than 86%. We demonstrated that these two properties are achieved without hurting
the fairness of individual users, providing service differentiation proportional to the
users’ upload contribution. Importantly, this analysis also showed that the oracle-based
approach offers very little improvement over FairSwarm.KOM, thereby highlighting
the effectiveness of FairSwarm.KOM’s coupon distribution. Following this, an overhead
analysis was performed to find that FairSwarm.KOM’s signalling traffic accounts on
average for only 0.11% of a user’s total traffic and for 0.63% in the worst case. We
also pointed out that this percentage remains constant, irrespective of how much users
download or upload, highlighting the scalability of the approach. The final analysis
in this chapter studied FairSwarm.KOM’s susceptibility to untruthful peer behaviour.
Here, it was proven that FairSwarm.KOM provides increased robustness against (i)
attacks that are common in already existing P2P content distribution systems (i.e.,
free-riding), and (ii) more sophisticated attacks that may arise due to the sharing of
information among the peers (e.g., Sybil attacks).
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7.2 major contributions
A Novel Incentive Solution to Address the Seeder Promotion Problem
The first major contribution of this thesis is the design and implementation of Fair-
Swarm.KOM: a generic P2P incentive solution to address what we call the seeder
promotion problem [60]. As highlighted in BitTorrent, this problem occurs when users
refuse to continue serving content after their own download has been completed (i.e.,
to act as seeders). Therefore, we have shown that it is the primary reason for the
performance and availability issues currently observed in P2P content distribution
systems (cf. Chapter 3).
FairSwarm.KOM addresses this problem by building multilateral incentive strate-
gies that are agnostic to time, content, and individual users. However, unlike digital
currency systems [75, 113, 123], in which contribution information is globally visible,
FairSwarm.KOM uses a one-level of indirection propagation scheme to provide ro-
bust incentives for seeding. More precisely, it follows a novel receipt based-approach
that persistently documents the bilateral interaction pattern of two nodes in so-called
coupons. These coupons are then propagated in the network, both to enrich the knowl-
edge base of other users and to allow peers to claim back prior contributions. Instead of
simply flooding these coupons in the system, FairSwarm.KOM exploits the long-term
interaction patterns of the users and, thus, limits the propagation of coupons to at
most one hop in the overlay network. This restriction fosters scalability and provides
increased robustness (i.e., to untruthful peer behaviour and peer turnover). Therefore,
the devised incentive solution is extremely lightweight and also fully decentralised.
Measurement and Analysis of BitTorrent File Availability and Performance
The next major contribution of this thesis is the measurement-based analysis of the
BitTorrent system to ascertain the causes, characteristics, and repercussions of BitTorrent’s
limitations with regard to providing continuous content distribution. To explore this,
two large-scale measurement studies were conducted. The first study investigated
BitTorrent on a macroscopic level by periodically probing over 46,000 overlay swarms
to (i) ascertain their high level characteristics such as swarm size and seeder/leecher
ratio, and to (ii) obtain important information about the users’ arrival patterns. To
this end, we collected data on more than 29 million users worldwide. The second
study then investigated BitTorrent on a microscopic level by contacting over 700,000
individual peers in 832 torrents to discover relevant properties such as their download
rates and chunk availability. These studies go significantly beyond any previous work
such as [84, 97, 110, 51, 43, 42, 8] by combining per-node, per-torrent, and system-
wide observations. Consequently, this rich measurement data allowed us to extend
previous works to obtain far more accurate results (e.g., the causes for file unavailability
occurring and the repercussions of this).
Solution Space Analysis of the Seeder Promotion Problem
Another major contribution is the detailed analysis of the role of seeders in BitTorrent.
Many recent works have primarily focussed on how to improve the robustness, fairness,
and performance properties of BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat incentives without effectively
offering strong incentives for seeding [72, 77, 78, 112, 93]. This, however, has been
shown to be a necessity for guaranteeing high download performance and long-term
content availability. The research conducted in this thesis is, therefore, the first that
objectively investigates the solution space for dealing with the seeder promotion
problem. Specifically, both single-torrent and cross-torrent incentive approaches were
investigated to ascertain which is superior based on three key metrics: availability,
performance, and fairness. To achieve this, we utilised our BitTorrent measurement
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data to execute accurate trace-based simulations for the different abstract solutions
considered. Using the results, we ascertained the different trade-offs between the four
general solutions: extending seeding times, cross-torrent bartering, local persistent
histories, and global shared histories. Finally, with this information, we proposed a
set of concrete requirements that a solution must fulfil to overcome the shortcomings
observed in BitTorrent. We believe that these requirements can also serve as helpful
guidelines for other researchers when attempting to design novel incentives in the area
of P2P content distribution.
7.3 other contributions
Demonstrating the Feasibility of FairSwarm.KOM
Through the use of trace-based simulations and measurement analysis, we have demon-
strated that the design of FairSwarm.KOM is indeed a viable solution to the seeder
promotion problem. This means, under current operating environments in BitTorrent,
it is guaranteed that FairSwarm.KOM users can recoup their contributions when acting
as seeders in torrents that they have previously downloaded from (i.e., cross-torrent
seeding). Furthermore, this approach has also been shown to often offer superior per-
formance, availability, and fairness. More generally, this further confirms the feasibility
of using third-party observations in P2P systems, as well as the viability of using
information gossiping to support this.
Development of a Secure Data Exchange Specification
The success of FairSwarm.KOM crucially depends on the fact that peers obtain coupons
for their data provisioning, which can then be disseminated in the system. Conse-
quently, it is of particular importance that the issuing of these transaction receipts is
closely tied to the actual delivery of data. To this end, a sophisticated specification
has been developed that allows two potentially mistrusting parties to exchange these
items in a fair way. That is, any possible execution of the specification ends with one of
the following two results: (i) either the data provider has the corresponding coupon
for its service provisioning and, at the same time, the data consumer has received the
requested data, or, (ii) both peers go away empty-handed. This can be guaranteed even
in the presence of communication failures or users attempting to cheat the system.
The Introduction of Pluggable Service Policies
FairSwarm.KOM’s design decouples the mechanism prescribing how to use reputation
(the Service Policy) from the mechanism providing this information (the Coupon
Propagation Specification). This concept allows system designers or individual users
to change their own service policy according to any pertinent criteria. In particular,
depending on the chosen policy, different objectives can be pursued. For instance, a
service policy can be chosen to provide maximum robustness against strategic attacks,
optimised for total system throughput or configured to foster better fairness. Also, a
mix of all of these aspects is possible, as exemplified by FairSwarm.KOM’s proposed
default service policy. To aid in this, some brief guidelines have also been presented
for system designers when attempting to optimise these criteria (cf. Section 5.6.2).
Proving the Unfeasibility of Single-Torrent Solutions to Address File Unavailability
This thesis has proven that any single-torrent incentive solution that attempts to
lengthen users’ online times (e.g., with monetary awards or file encryption) will fail
to provide long-term availability in BitTorrent. This is because it is only possible to
lengthen the user online times by a relatively limited period (e.g., 10 minutes, 1 hour,
etc.). However, as shown in this thesis, the user arrival rates in BitTorrent follow
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an exponentially decreasing pattern. This means, after a short period of time, the
inter-arrival times between two consecutive peers can quickly exceed 24 hours (cf.
Section 3.4.3), leaving such single-torrent approaches totally ineffective. In fact, the
measurement data indicates that, on average, seeding times would have to be increased
by a factor of 10 to gain 99% availability. This requires an average seeding time of more
than 34 hours per user.
7.4 research goals revisited
Chapter 1 detailed three core research goals. This section now revisits these to ascertain
how effectively they have been fulfilled.
• To investigate the shortcomings of current P2P content distribution systems with regard
to providing continuous content distribution. Specifically, to understand how existing
incentive mechanisms fail to fulfil performance and availability requirements.
– This research goal has been addressed through the deployment of two major
measurement studies in BitTorrent. It was found that existing incentive schemes
fail to fulfil performance and availability requirements, because they fail to
promote seeding. For that reason, user seeding times are consistently too short
to compensate for the exponentially increasing inter-arrival times of users. As
a result, overlay swarms inevitably lose seeders over time; a fact that reduces
both performance and availability.
• To design and build a new P2P incentive mechanism that addresses any discovered perfor-
mance and availability limitations of existing systems.
– This research goal has been first addressed by performing a quantitative analysis
of the abstract solution space using both trace-based simulations and measure-
ment data analysis. The purpose was to reduce the solution space to gain an
understanding of the best general approach to take. Through this, we derived a
set of key requirements that a concrete solution must fulfil to overcome the per-
formance and availability issues discovered. The newly designed P2P incentive
mechanism FairSwarm.KOM took all of these requirements into account.
• To show the superiority of the new incentive mechanism; specifically to (i) validate that
improved performance and availability can be achieved compared to existing tit-for-tat
mechanisms, and to (ii) ensure that this can take place in a robust, fair, and low overhead
manner considering current operating environments.
– This research goal has been investigated through the use of up-to-date trace-
based simulations, taking our long-term BitTorrent measurement data as an
input. More specifically:
* The FairSwarm.KOM protocol has been accurately implemented in a well-
known BitTorrent simulator [10], which has been extended to realistically
model a BitTorrent community over a prolonged period of time. The correct-
ness and accurateness of the resulting simulation model has been validated
with live experiments.
* To benchmark FairSwarm.KOM, two extremes in the design space of P2P
incentives were considered, (i) BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat incentive, which oper-
ates solely on local observations, and (ii) an artificial oracle-based incentive
mechanism, through which user have global knowledge of the system.
* The long-term effectiveness of FairSwarm.KOM with respect to performance,
availability, and fairness was shown through the use of simulations based
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on our month-long BitTorrent measurement study. It was shown that Fair-
Swarm.KOM performs superior to BitTorrent’s tit-for-tat in all three proper-
ties and performs close to what the oracle-based system achieves.
* The light-weightness of the new incentive mechanism was also demonstrated
by evaluating FairSwarm.KOM’s signalling traffic and computational over-
head. The communication traffic generated is minor compared to the users’
service traffic, while the computational overhead of the scheme is negligible.
* The robustness of the scheme was demonstrated by considering both (i)
attacks that are common to already existing P2P content distribution sys-
tems and (ii) more sophisticated attacks that arise due to use of third-party
experiences. All attacks considered were handled effectively through Fair-
Swarm.KOM’s default service policy, using one-hop information for decision
making.
To conclude, through the fulfilment of these research goals, the key contribution of
this thesis has been to strengthen and improve the download performance and file
availability of P2P content distribution systems. Importantly, this contribution has been
validated through an extensive evaluation, based on up-to-date measurement traces.
7.5 future work
Through the contributions made in this thesis, a very important problem in the area of
P2P content distribution has been addressed: offering incentives to ensure the long-
term availability and high performance P2P delivery of content. This has been achieved
through the development of a novel incentive mechanism, which specifically deals
with the seeder promotion problem [60]. However, a number of interesting areas of
future work remain; some of which are presented in the following.
The evaluation of FairSwarm.KOM assumes a clean slate approach, in which all
users employ the newly designed P2P incentive mechanism using FairSwarm.KOM’s
default service policy. This policy has been devised to address the research challenges
presented in Chapter 1. Concretely, it represents an interesting trade-off between the
different design extremes: performance, availability, fairness, and robustness. However,
as already stated in Chapter 5, the proposed policy only represents one point in
the design space. Since system designers or individual users do not have to follow
this recommendation, we have also presented a few variations and included a brief
discussion of their pros and cons. Valuable future work could extend this by studying
the repercussions of peers mixing these strategies. Furthermore, FairSwarm.KOM’s
design allows the protocol to be incrementally deployed in already existing P2P
content distribution systems. To this end, it would be interesting to see how a single
FairSwarm.KOM peer or a small minority of them would perform when tit-for-tat
incentive clients hold the majority.
Moreover, in our current implementation of FairSwarm.KOM, file objects have an
equal value over time and among users. That is, the amount of data provided is directly
stored in the digital receipts (coupons) that are gossiped in the system, irrespective
of the time the contribution was made or the object popularity. Another line of future
work could be to extend this approach by additionally taking content popularity into
account. For instance, a user that acts as a file replica for highly unpopular content
could receive more credits than users providing popular content files that are anyway
highly replicated in the system.
Despite the above areas of future work, FairSwarm.KOM is a generic incentive
solution that can be adapted to a variety of P2P content distribution systems. This
thesis, however, has focussed on the integration of FairSwarm.KOM into the BitTorrent
protocol. This choice was motivated by the fact that BitTorrent represents the current
de-facto standard for scalable content distribution. It is used by millions of users
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world-wide and is responsible for transferring terabytes of data per day. Hence, a
solution for BitTorrent was seen as the most urgent. An interesting avenue of future
research is to extend our work for other popular P2P content distribution systems,
such as eMule or Gnutella. This need was also validated, for instance, through the
investigation of the eMule file-sharing system, to show that it suffers from serious
performance problems [77].
Finally, P2P streaming services have recently gained increasing popularity, as ex-
emplified by P2P IPTV applications such as PPStream1, PPLive2, or SOPCast3. In this
regard, recent work has shown that bilateral incentives do not work effectively for
streaming applications [111, 95]. This is because peers usually have different playback
positions, meaning that they rarely have a mutual interest in each other, i.e., peers can
only download chunks from users that are further in their local playback point, with-
out being able to offer something valuable in return. Therefore, multilateral incentive
schemes such as FairSwarm.KOM may offer an effective solution, since uploading data
to one user could be rewarded by a different user (who is currently at a later playback
point).
7.6 concluding remarks
This thesis has identified and highlighted the need for multilateral incentive schemes
in the area of P2P content distribution. In particular, current popular P2P content
distribution systems almost exclusively rely on tit-for-tat incentive strategies. As a
result, most of these systems suffer from significant performance and availability
problems, as exemplified by BitTorrent. This thesis has proposed a novel incentive
design that is capable of addressing these serious limitations.
While, in practise, the complexity of multilateral incentive schemes has recently
deterred system designers from using such approaches, this thesis has demonstrated
that such a sophisticated design can be implemented in an extremely light-weight and
robust manner. Moreover, when considering the insights obtained in this thesis, one
thing is clear; to fully exploit the potential of P2P systems with regard to providing
continuous content distribution, it is often required that users resort to information
that goes beyond local histories and direct observation, desirable or not.
1 http://www.ppstream.com
2 http://www.pptv.com
3 http://www.sopcast.com
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AA P P E N D I X
a.1 session time estimation
In this section, we explain the procedure used to calculate the session time of users in
our macroscopic measurement data, which is also presented in [107].
As detailed in Section 3.2.3, our multi-tracker crawler connects to the tracker of a
given BitTorrent swarm, in order to obtain a random subset of the IP-addresses of the
participating users. While this approach is highly efficient to discover new peers in the
system, it still imposes some restrictions to compute a user’s session time in a given
torrent. In fact, if a peer is contained in a tracker report, one can assume that this peer
is actually online in the swarm. However, the converse argument does not hold. That
is, if the IP-address of given peer is not included in the tracker report, it may still be
online. This makes the estimation of the users’ session time, however, very inaccurate.
To remedy this, we first define a model to estimate the number of tracker queries
(m) required, in order to obtain the IP-address of a user with a given probability P.
Specifically, let us assume that we have a torrent with N peers, and each tracker query
returns a random set of W IP-addresses. Accordingly, if the user is online in the torrent,
the probability P of obtaining its IP-address in m consecutive queries is given by:
P = 1−
(
1−
W
N
)m
(A.1)
Furthermore, we find that 90% of the overlay swarms in the Mininova community
have at most 165 online nodes. Therefore, we set N = 165, which is an upper bound
allowing us to remove the noise introduced by churn. In addition to this, we make a
second conservative assumption: in each response, the tracker gives us W = 50 random
IPs (in some cases, we obtain up to 200 IP-addresses). With these numbers and the
proposed model, we can assure that, if the user is in the torrent, we will discover it in
m = 13 tracker queries with a probability of more than 99%.
Trace data analysis further reveals that 90% of the tracker queries are less than 18
minutes apart. For that reason, we assume that the time between two consecutive
tracker queries is 18 minutes. Moreover, when multiplying this time with the number
of queries required (m), we obtain the time span that must pass to consider a peer
as offline. Consequently, we consider a given user as offline if its IP-address is not
gathered by our crawlers within 1860 · 13 ≈ 4 hours.
To ultimately compute the session of a peer, we assume that it comes online the first
time it is reported by the tracker, and stays online until it is not included in the tracker
reports for 4 hours.
a.2 investigating the causes of swarm resilience
The bitfield analysis of Section 3.4.2 has identified a notable percentage (14%) of torrents
that can maintain availability even without any seeders. This section investigates how
they can survive such seedless states (cf. Kaune et al. [59]).
For the purpose of our analysis, we separate torrents into those that survive in the
absence of seeders (resilient torrents) and those that do not (susceptible torrents). We then
investigate quantitative properties of these two groups to ascertain how they differ
at various points in their lifecycles. All of the identified metrics have been calculated
for each group (across all member torrents) every 10 minutes using information from
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Metric Time after torrent’s birth
6 hours 24 hours
Resilient Susceptible Resilient Susceptible
Swarm speed (in KBps) 95.72 53.50 62.99 44.82
Seeder/Leecher ratio 0.19 0.19 0.32 0.43
Firewalled/NATed peers (in %) 51.30 56.05 54.94 58.44
Distribution Entropy E(T) 0.91 0.90 0.92 0.91
Least replicated chunk (# of copies) 15.34 14.21 21.33 23.55
Churn factor CF 0.07 0.11 0.08 0.07
Online leechers 134.05 82.71 163.12 89.55
Online seeders 12.05 11.25 18.17 21.34
Metric Time before seedless state
1 hour 6 hours
Resilient Susceptible Resilient Susceptible
Swarm speed (in KBps) 58.83 23.88 68.58 24.99
Seeder/Leecher ratio 0.15 0.03 0.14 0.04
Firewalled/NATed peers (in %) 70.86 61.09 62.30 60.67
Distribution Entropy E(T) 0.93 0.94 0.92 0.93
Least replicated chunk (# of copies) 9.21 1.61 8.38 2.82
Churn factor CF 0.03 0.21 0.08 0.15
Online leechers 281.34 111.61 250.48 101.55
Online seeders 5.28 1.51 6.11 1.80
Table 21: Characteristics of resilient torrents (those that maintain availability in seedless state)
and susceptible torrents (those that cannot reconstruct the file).
the microscopic traces and the tracker reports. These values have then been averaged
together over each time period investigated.
Table 21 gives an overview of all metrics used in this analysis. We calculate these
over two time periods: the beginning of the torrents’ lifecycle and just before the last
seeder goes offline. Although not included in the table, we also investigated the effects
of file size and content type without ascertaining any correlation. Most metrics are
straightforward, however, two require some explanation: Distribution Entropy (E(T))
and the Churn Factor (CF).
The E(T) investigates the distribution of chunks within the swarm; this is to inves-
tigate whether torrents that can survive achieve a superior distribution of chunks.
We therefore characterize the distribution entropy in a torrent T at a given time t by
introducing the following Entropy Index:
E(T) =
(∑P
j=1
∑N
i=1 Vij
)2
P ·∑Pj=1 (∑Ni=1 Vij)2 (A.2)
Recall that N defines the number of nodes in the swarm, P is the number of chunks
a file is composed of and Vi is the bitfield of node i. This index is similar to Jain’s
Fairness Index [52] and achieves a value of 1 if all chunks are equally distributed
among the peers.
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The Churn Factor CF investigates whether torrents that can survive have more
stable populations. This factor is defined by Ndisc/Nall where Ndisc is the number
of users that have left the swarm during a given time period (t) and Nall is the total
number of users observed during this same period. A factor of 0 indicates that no user
disconnected within t; by default t = 10 mins.
From the data in Table 21, we can make the following important observations,
• Torrent Popularity: From the beginning, resilient torrents exhibit higher leecher
population sizes. Larger torrents possess an increased probability of replicating
rare chunks before the loss of seeders.
• Low Churn Factor: High churn in small torrents creates a greater risk of losing
vital chunks; if this coincides with the loss of a seeder then it becomes impossible
to recover these chunks again until a seeder returns. Resilient torrents have
significantly lower churn factors than susceptible torrents.
• Seeder/Leecher Ratio: Resilient torrents exhibit a higher seeder/leecher ratio and,
as a derivative of this, experience download rates that are over twice as high
as susceptible torrents. This superior performance is highly beneficial for the
survival of chunk replicas as it allows the quick duplication of rare chunks. Before
seedless state occurring, resilient torrents therefore have many more replicas of
the rarest chunk when compared to susceptible torrents.
In summary, these results show that swarm resilience is a product of large, stable
populations that can achieve higher download rates due to beneficial seeder/leecher
ratios. The combination of these factors results in rarest chunk replication rates that
are over 5 times greater than their susceptible counterparts. This makes such swarms
highly resilient to the loss of any seeders. Importantly, it also can be concluded that
unavailability cannot be addressed by modifying any of BitTorrent’s algorithms (e.g.,
chunk selection) but, instead, must be solved by incentivising users to modify their
behaviour. This is exemplified by the lack of any correlation between resilience and
distribution entropy.
a.3 security analysis of data exchange specification
In this section, we prove different security properties of FairSwarm.KOM’s data ex-
change specification. In order to understand these proofs, it is recommended to first
read the protocol specifications presented in Section 5.5.
Lemma A.3.1 For a dishonest consumer C, it is impossible to obtain data object O, without
sending the correctly prepared evidence of receipt.
Proof From Section 5.5.4, it is easy to see that, when the consumer denies to send the
correctly prepared evidence of receipt SigC
(
ζP,C,SigP(ζP,C)
)
in message flow (e3),
the provider will immediately run the abort protocol to cancel the transaction. If this
happens, the consumer loses its last opportunity to get the decryption key K, both
from the provider and the mediator. Nevertheless, there is still some time in between
that the consumer could use to illegally obtain object O.
First, consumer C could try to decrypt the received ciphertext OK using brute force
attacks. However, it is assumed that provider P uses a secure symmetric encryption
scheme for the encryption of O (cf. Section 5.5.3). Thus, it is impossible for consumer C
to defeat this encryption. Consequently, the only way to decrypt OK is to obtain the
encryption/decryption key K. In general, key K can be obtained by (i) defeating the
asymmetric encryption scheme that is used to encrypt KM, (ii) through provider P,
or (iii) through mediator M.
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Case (i): It is assumed that KM is protected by the use of secure asymmetric
cryptographic algorithms, as detailed in Section 5.5.3. Thus, it is impossible to defeat
this encryption.
Case (ii): To obtain the session key K from provider P, node C must sent a correctly
prepared evidence of receipt in message flow (e3). However, through the use of hashed
identities (cf. Section 5.3.2), this digital evidence can be only properly prepared if C
gives its signature on the newly generated coupon ζP,C using its correct identity. That
is, any fraud attempt by using the identity of another node (e.g., peer C ′) to obtain
key K will be detected by provider P. Therefore, it is impossible for node C to illegally
obtain key K from the provider P.
Case (iii): To obtain key K from the mediator, dishonest node C may directly run
the recovery protocol upon obtaining ciphertext OK in message flow (e2). To this end,
node C may proceed as follows:
1. it properly sends message flow (r1), including the correctly prepared evidence of
receipt SigC
(
ζP,C,SigP(ζP,C)
)
(cf. Table 11).
2. it properly sends message flow (r1), but prepares the evidence of receipt incor-
rectly.
3. it may attempt to manipulate message flow (r1) such that the mediator reveals
the desired keyK mistakenly.
In situation (1), node C indeed obtains key K, but provider P also receives the
evidence of receipt (cf. Table 11). Thus, the fraud attempt fails.
In situation (2), the signature checks performed by mediator M will simply fail.
As a consequence, the request of node C will be ignored and C receives nothing (cf.
Table 11).
In situation (3), node C may attempt to manipulate the data of message flow (r1)
to illegally obtain key K. However, since node C does not possess key K, it cannot
adapt or newly prepare KM that is sent in message flow (r1). Thus, to obtain key K,
it must forward KM as received from provider P in message flow (e1). Because of
this fact, however, it is also impossible for node C to manipulate the remaining data
objects of flow (r1). This is because upon receiving flow (r1), mediator M will use this
data to compute the unique transaction label L ′. Subsequently, it compares L ′ with
KM = (L,K). Accordingly, if C has manipulated only one data object of flow (r1), it
is L 6= L ′ and mediator M will simply ignore C’s request. For that reason, it is also
impossible for consumer C to illegally obtain key K from mediator M.
To conclude, the analysis of case (i), (ii) and (iii) have shown that it is impossible
for a dishonest consumer C to illegally obtain data object O, without sending the
correctly prepared evidence of receipt.
Lemma A.3.2 For a dishonest provider P, it is impossible to obtain a valid coupon ζP,C,
without sending the correct encryption key K.
Proof As depicted in Table 9, once consumer C (i) receives an invalid secret key K
via message flow (e4), (ii) does not receive message flow (e4) timely, or, alternatively,
(iii) the data encryption with the received key K fails (i.e., due to the sending of a
wrong key k), node C will contact the mediator for help. In either case, the mediator
then checks the honesty of provider P.
In particular, in case of situation (i) and (ii), the consumer is supposed to run
the recovery protocol, in order to obtain the secret key K with the aid of the mediator.
To this end, the mediator tests whether KM is properly prepared by provider P
(cf. Section 5.5.6). If invalid, the mediator issues receipt REVζP,C that revokes C’s
signature on the most recent version of coupon ζP,C. Thus, the consumer’s signature
on coupon ζP,C, that is (illegally) received in message flow (e3), becomes useless for
provider P.
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In case of situation (iii), the consumer is supposed to run the complaint protocol by
sending ciphertext OK to the mediator (cf. Section 5.5.7). The mediator then decrypts
OK: O ′ = dK(OK) to subsequently test whether h(O) = h(O) ′. If this check fails,
it is proven that provider P has cheated in the system and the mediator issues the
revocation receipt REVζP,C . Similarly to the recovery protocol; the illegally obtained
signature for coupon ζP,C becomes then useless for provider P.
From the above, it is therefore intuitive to see that it is impossible for provider P to
obtain a valid coupon ζP,C, without sending the correct encryption key K.
Lemma A.3.3 For a dishonest provider P, it is impossible to upload garbage data, and yet
obtain a valid coupon ζP,C for this illegal service provisioning.
Proof As detailed in Section 5.5.4, before peer P and C exchange a data object O, a
unique transaction label L is generated to which provider P must commit itself (i.e.,
it signs (L,KM)). Label L contains the hash value of the updated coupon, as well as
the hash of the data object O to be transferred. Consumer C gives its signature on the
updated version of coupon ζP,C if and only if (i) L is correctly prepared and (ii)
provider P has provided its valid signature on this digital commitment. Accordingly,
when provider P uploads encrypted garbage data O ′K in message flow (e2), consumer
C will detect this fraud attempt upon receiving session key K in flow (e4). This is
because the hash value of the obtained data object O ′ will not match with the value of
the data object O that peer C has requested (h(O ′) 6= h(O)). As a consequence, peer C
runs the complaint protocol by sending KM, O ′K, as well as the provider’s signature on
KM in message flow (c1) to the mediator (cf. Table 12). The mediator then computes
the transaction label L and decrypts O ′K to verify consumer C’s complaint. If h(O
′)
does indeed not match to the hash value contained in label L, it is proven that provider
P has cheated consumer C. Subsequently, receipt REVζP,C is sent to node C, making
coupon ζP,C useless for provider P.
Finally, as a last alternative, provider P could also run the abort protocol, upon
sending garbage data in flow (e2) and receiving C’s signature on coupon ζP,C in
flow (e3) (cf. Table 9). When running the abort protocol, however, the mediator will
send receipt REVζP,C to consumer C (cf. Table 10). This revokes C’s signature on
coupon ζP,C, making coupon ζP,C again useless for provider P.
Thus, in any case, it is impossible for provider P to upload garbage, and yet obtain a
valid coupon ζP,C for this illegal service provisioning.
a.4 analysing user interaction pattern
Section 5.4.1 has detailed that the users’ knowledge about the network explosively
increases with each level of indirection. On the other hand, it has also been discussed
that this comes at the expense of vulnerability to attacks and scalability issues. To
find a good ’deal’ between these trade-offs, an important research question is: What
level of indirection is required so that users can actually claim back previous contributions?
For instance, if most of the peers are unable to recognise previous contributions of
other nodes, the chosen level of indirection is clearly too small. Instead, it must by all
available means be increased, even though this might impair robustness and scalability.
In one-hop indirect reciprocation, peers can only claim back contributions when
situated in a triangular relationship to each other, e.g., A → I → B. Thus, they must
share a common interaction partner, currently or in the past. Two-hop indirection, on
the other hand, is less restrictive and increases the probability for reciprocation. This is
because it also detects cycles with two-hop intermediaries in the contribution graph
(e.g., A → I1 → I2 → B), in addition to the one-hop relationships. The same applies
for any higher level of indirection. It can therefore be deduced that the answer to the
above question is clearly a matter of the interaction pattern of the nodes. For instance,
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Figure 56: Amount of common prior interaction partners in the BitTorrent system.
Download behaviour Seeding times
As measured Extended (by one hour)
Active in original torrents Single-Torrent Single-Torrent (ext. seeding)
Active in original and former torrents Cross-Torrent Cross-Torrent (ext. seeding)
Table 22: Overview of different behavioural strategies.
if the interaction graph of the peers is uniform random, several levels of indirections
may be needed to find any cyclic contribution cycle.
Through extensive trace analysis of our one month long BitTorrent trace data, we
find, however, that the interaction pattern of current P2P content distribution systems
exhibit small world patterns. Specifically, it can be observed that the interaction graph
has a clearly clustered structure. This occurs because 79.21% of users fetch content
always from the same content category (e.g., Movies, eBooks, Pictures, etc.). Thus, the
observed interaction clusters mainly arise due to the users’ social interests. Second, it
can also be noted that these clusters are interconnected through a number of ’power’
users that participate in a wealth of BitTorrent swarms, originating from different
content categories. For instance, the top 10% of multi-torrent users download more
than 32 torrents on average and, thus, account for 52.23% of the total system demand.
Accordingly, these users interact with up to several thousand users in only one month.
These findings clearly suggest that many users are closely adjacent in the interaction
graph. To affirm this hypothesis, we performed a trace data analysis to test the
effectiveness of indirect reciprocation, particularly with one level of indirection. We
were interested to find out whether users share common interaction partners in the
past, when newly encountering each other. Due to the memory and computational
complexity of this analysis, we chose random peer pairs from the measurement data,
instead of performing this analysis for all nodes in our trace logs.
Figure 56 shows the cumulative distribution of the amount of common interaction
partners, as obtained from all examined peer pairs. To further investigate the possible
influence of novel incentive mechanisms (e.g., incentives for seeders), the figure also
takes two variations of peer behaviour into account: extended seeding times and
cross-torrent collaboration. These two variations lead to four possible combinations as
depicted in Table 22.
As can be seen, even in the case of standard BitTorrent (combination: ’Single-Torrent’),
which corresponds to the measurements with direct reciprocity, from 91,239 randomly
chosen peer pairs only 23,538 (25.8%) did not have a common interaction partner. Hence,
about 74% of all peer pairs share an one-hop relationship, that could be exploited
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to significantly improve a peer’s standing in the system. Also, 96.3% of these users
encounter such one-hop interaction partners already in the next file download. Only
3.7% have to wait for two file downloads and more. Thus, the majority of peers could
experience reciprocation for previous contributions very quickly. Finally, assuming
prolonged online times and cross-torrent collaboration (combination: ’Cross-Torrent
ext. seeding’), even up to 81% of the peer pairs are connected indirectly over one hop.
To conclude, due to the small-world like interaction pattern of the nodes, one level
of indirection already suffices to enable indirect reciprocation for most of the users.
a.5 accuracy of the simulation model of bittorrent
In order to validate the correctness of the simulation results produced by the OctoSim
BitTorrent simulator of Microsoft Research [9], we have re-simulated an overlay swarm
from a well-known BitTorrent measurement study of Legout et al. [71]. In this work,
the authors perform a wealth of experiments in the PlanetLab testbed to explore the
characteristics of important mechanisms associated to BitTorrent. These experiments
include a study of BitTorrent’s effectiveness to find peers with similar bandwidth
capacities, the interdependency between upload contribution and download reward in
BitTorrent, and the importance of the revised unchoking mechanism in seeder state.
According to the work of Legout et al. [71], we consider an overlay swarm consisting
of a single initial seeder and 40 leechers. These users are classified into three groups:
slow, medium, and fast. In particular, 13 ’slow’ leechers have an upload capacity of 20
KBps, 14 ’medium’ leechers have 50 KBps, while the remaining 14 ’fast’ leechers (in-
cluding the initial seeder) are endowed with 200 KBps upload capacity. Also, analogous
to the work of Legout et al. [71], we provision leechers with infinite download capacity.
Furthermore, Legout et al. noted that, in their experiments, all peers joined the overlay
swarm at the same time. Therefore, in our experiments, we bring up peers within
one second. This is probably closer to what happened in Legout et al.’s experiments,
considering the TCP connection setup time, as well as network latencies. Finally, as
stated in [71], the file to be downloaded by the peers is 113 Megabytes in size divided
into 453 chunks, 256 Kilobytes each.
Legout et al. have provided several result plots in their paper. Six of these have
been re-produced with the OctoSim simulator (cf. Figures 57 - 62). All of these plots
(with the exception of Figure 62) are averaged results of ten simulation runs using
different random seeds. As mentioned previously, in their measurement study, Legout
et al. were especially interested in studying the clustering behaviour of peers in
BitTorrent. Different aspects of this behaviour are demonstrated in Figure 57, 58,
and 59. Specifically, Figure 57 shows the clustering index, which is defined for a given
peer in a given class (fast, medium, or slow) as the ’ratio of the duration of regular
unchokes to the peers of its class over the duration of regular unchokes to all peers’
[71]. Accordingly, a high clustering index indicates a strong preference to upload to
peers in the same class.
In general, the simulation results show that all peers favour users from their own
bandwidth class for uploading (cf. Figure 57b). We can also notice that the slow peers
slightly prefer the medium over the fast ones, while the fast peers slightly prefer the
medium over the slow ones. In contrast, the medium peers do not prefer any of the
two other groups. All of these facts are also visible in Legout et al.’s version of the plot
(cf. Figure 57a).
Furthermore, for each individual peer, Figure 58 plots the total time peers unchoked
each other via a regular unchoke. In addition to this, Figure 59 shows the amount
of data peers have uploaded to each other. As in Legout et al.’s experiments (cf.
Figure 58a and 59a), Figure 58b and 59b show a pattern of three darker squares
along the diagonal. This suggests that peers cluster inside their bandwidth class,
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highlighting that the simulator very realistically reflects the clustering behaviour of
peers in BitTorrent.
In addition to this, Figure 60 shows the downloading speed for each individual peer.
Because of the clustering pattern, the users’ download speed is clearly determined
by their uploading bandwidth. To this end, Figure 61 also shows the cumulative
distribution function of the download completion times for each bandwidth class. In
general, we observe that the simulated times are comparable to those reported by
Legout et al., although the simulator tends to produce slightly shorter completion
times. This is, however, expected as the simulator does not model network latencies
and BitTorrent signalling traffic [9].
Finally, Figure 62 shows the duration of unchokes performed by the initial seeder. It
can be observed that the simulated and measured results are almost identical; leechers
are unchoked in a uniform manner, irrespective of their upload speed. This is expected,
as the ’new’ seeder state choking algorithm, described by Legout et al. [71], is used in
our experiments.
In summary, the simulation results clearly demonstrate that the OctoSim simulator
very realistically reflects the BitTorrent protocol. Specifically, all results produced are
close to what Legout et al. have measured in their live experiments.
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Figure 2: Clustering index for all peers, averaged over all runs, in the
presence of a well-provisioned seed. Errorbars represent the 10th and
90th percentiles. Peers 1 to 13 have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 14
to 27 have a 50 kB/s upload limit, and peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s
upload limit. The seed (peer 41) is limited to 200 kB/s. Peers show a
strong preference to unchoke others in the same class.
their own class, thereby forming clusters. Further experiments with
upload limits following a uniform distribution also show that peers
have a clear preference for peers with similar upload capacities.
Although from Figure 1 it might seem that slow peers show a
proportionally stronger preference for their own class, this is an ar-
tifact of the experiment. Slow peers take longer to complete their
download (as shown in Figure 3), and so they perform a higher
number of regular unchokes on average than fast peers. Also no-
tice that medium peer 27 interacts frequently with slow peers. This
peer’s download capacity is inherently limited, arguably due to ma-
chine or local network limitations, as seen in Figure 4 that plots
observed peer download speeds over time. As a result, it stays con-
nected to the torrent even after all other peers of its class have com-
pleted their download. During that last period it has to interact with
slow leechers, since those are the only ones left.
Figure 1 also shows that reciprocation is not necessarily mutual.
Slow peers frequently unchoke medium peers, but the favor is not
returned. Indeed, the slow peers unchoked medium peers for a to-
tal of 501,844 seconds, as shown by the relatively dark center-left
partition. However, the medium peers unchoked slow peers for only
273,985 seconds, as shown by the lighter bottom-center. This lack
of reciprocation is due to the fact that slow peers are of little use to
medium ones, since they cannot offer high enough upload rates.
In summary, the choking algorithm facilitates clustering, where
peers mostly interact with others in the same class, with the occa-
sional exception of random optimistic unchokes.
4.1.2 Sharing Incentives
We now examine whether BitTorrent’s choking algorithm provides
effective sharing incentives, in the sense that a peer who contributes
more to the torrent is rewarded by completing its download sooner
than the rest. Figure 3 indeed demonstrates this to be the case. We
plot the cumulative distribution of completion time for the three
classes of leechers in the previous experiment. The vertical line in
the figure represents the optimal completion time, the earliest pos-
sible time that any peer could complete its download. This is the
time the seed finished uploading a complete copy of the content.
On average, this time is around 650 seconds for the experiment.
Fast leechers complete their download soon after the optimal
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of the download completion time
for the three different classes of leechers, in the presence of a well-
provisioned seed (limited to 200 kB/s), for all runs. The vertical line
represents the earliest possible time that the download could complete.
Fast peers finish much earlier than slow ones.
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Figure 4: Peer download speeds for all 60-second time intervals dur-
ing the download, averaged over all runs. Darker rectangles represent
higher speeds (the unit of the color bar on the right is in kB/s). Peers 1
to 13 have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 14 to 27 have a 50 kB/s upload
limit, while peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s upload limit. The seed (peer
41) is limited to 200 kB/s. Peer 27 achieves lower download rates than
other peers in its class, while peer 8 is the last one to finish.
completion time. Medium and, especially, slow leechers take signif-
icantly longer to finish. Contributing to the torrent enables a leecher
to enter the fast cluster and receive data at higher rates. This in turn
ensures a short download completion time. The choking algorithm
does indeed foster reciprocation by rewarding contributing peers. In
experiments with upload limits following a uniform distribution, the
peer completion time is also uniform: completion time decreases
when a peer’s upload contribution increases. This further indicates
the algorithm’s consistent properties with respect to effective shar-
ing incentives.
Note, however, that this does not imply any notion of data vol-
ume fairness. Fast peers end up uploading significantly more data
than the rest. Figure 5, which plots the actual volume of uploaded
data averaged over all runs, demonstrates that fast peers are the ma-
jor contributors to the torrent. Most of their bandwidth is expended
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(b) Simulation results.
Figure 57: Clustering index for all peers. Note that Subfigure (b) is a reproduction o Figure 2 of
L gout et al. [71] (cf. Subfigur (a)). The data is averaged over ten runs with different
random seeds. The error bars represent the 10th and 90th percentiles. Peers 1 to 13
represent the ’slow’ peers (20 KBps upload capacity), peers 14 to 27 the ’medium’
peers (50 KBps upload capacity), and peers 28 to 40 the ’fast’ peers (200 KBps upload
capacity).
somewhat lower completion times thanks to the extra help from
leechers in content dissemination, but appear otherwise similar.
3.3 Experiment Rationale
The goal of our experiments is to understand the dynamics of the
choking algorithm. To that end, we consider four metrics.
Clustering: The choking algorithm aims to encourage high peer
reciprocation by favoring peers who upload. Therefore, we
expect that peers will more frequently unchoke other peers
with similar upload capacities, since those are the ones that
can reciprocate with high enough rates. The rules for peer se-
lection by Qiu et al. [21] also support this hypothesis. Conse-
quently, it is expected that the choking algorithm converges
towards good clustering shortly after the beginning of the
download by grouping together peers with similar upload ca-
pacity. This behavior, however, is not guaranteed and has
never been previously verified experimentally. Indeed, let’s
consider a simple example. Peer A will unchoke peer B if B
has been uploading data at a high rate to A. In order for B
to continue uploading to A, A should also start sending data
to B at a high enough rate. The only way to initiate such
a reciprocal relationship is via an optimistic unchoke. Yet,
since optimistic unchokes are performed at random, it is not
clear whether and when A and B will get a chance to inter-
act. Therefore, in order to preserve clustering, optimistic un-
chokes should successfully initiate interactions between peers
with similar upload capacities. In addition, such interactions
should persist despite potential disruptions, such as optimistic
unchokes by others or network bandwidth fluctuations.
Sharing incentives: A major goal of the choking algorithm is to
give peers an incentive to share data. The algorithm strives
to encourage peers to contribute, since doing so will improve
their own download rates. We evaluate the effectiveness of
these sharing incentives by measuring how peers’ upload con-
tributions affect their download completion time. We expect
that the more a peer contributes, the sooner it will complete its
download. However, we do not expect to observe strict data
volume fairness, where all peers contribute the same amount
of data; peers who upload at high rates may end up contribut-
ing more data than others. They should be rewarded though,
by completing their download sooner.
Upload utilization: Upload utilization constitutes a reliable met-
ric of efficiency in peer-to-peer content distribution systems,
since the total upload capacity of all peers represents the max-
imum throughput the system can achieve as a whole. As a re-
sult, a peer-to-peer content distribution protocol should aim
at maximizing peers’ upload utilization. We are interested in
measuring this utilization in BitTorrent systems, and identify-
ing the factors that can adversely affect it.
Seed service: The modified choking algorithm in seed state bases
its decisions on the time peers have been waiting for seed ser-
vice, in addition to their download rates from the seed. Thus,
we expect to see uniform sharing of the seed upload band-
width among all peers. It should also be impossible for fast
leechers to monopolize the seed.
4 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
We now report the results of representative experiments that demon-
strate our main observations. For conciseness, we present only re-
sults drawn from the three-class torrent configuration, but our con-
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Figure 1: Time duration that peers unchoked each o r via a r gular
unchoke, averaged over all ru s. Darker squares r present long r un-
hok times (t unit of the col r bar on the right is in se onds). Peers 1
to 13 have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 14 to 27 have a 50 kB/s upload
limit, and peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s upload limit. The seed (peer
41) is limited to 200 kB/s. The creation of clusters is clearly visible.
clusions are consistent with our observations from other configura-
tions as well.
4.1 Well-Provisioned Initial Seed
We first examine a scenario with a well-provisioned initial seed,
i.e., a seed that can sustain high upload rates. We expect this to be
common for commercial torrents, whose service providers typically
make sure there is adequate bandwidth to initially seed the torrent.
An example might be Red Hat distributing its latest Linux distri-
bution. Section 4.2 shows that peer behavior in the presence of an
underprovisioned initial seed can differ substantially.
We consider an experiment with a single seed and 40 leechers:
13 slow peers (20 kB/s upload limit), 14 medium peers (50 kB/s
upload limit), and 13 fast peers (200 kB/s upload limit). The seed,
which is represented as peer 41 in the following figures, is limited
to upload 200 kB/s, as fast as a fast peer. Different peer upload lim-
its are defined in order to model different levels of contribution. The
results we report are based on thirteen experiment runs. Although
the official BitTorrent implementation would set the number of par-
allel uploads based on the defined upload limit (4 for the slow, 5
for the medium, and 10 for the fast peers and the seed), we set this
number to 4 for all peers, which in fact is what most other clients
would do. This ensures homogeneous conditions in the torrent and
makes it easier to interpret the results.
4.1.1 Clustering
As explained in Section 3.3, we expect to observe clustering based
on peers’ upload capacities. Figure 1 demonstrates that peers in-
deed form clusters. The figure plots the total time peers unchoked
each other via a regular unchoke, averaged over all runs of the ex-
periment. It is clear that peers in the same class cluster together,
in the sense that they prefer to upload to each other. This behavior
becomes more apparent when considering a metric such as the clus-
tering index. We define this for a given peer in a given class (fast,
medium, or slow) as the ratio of the duration of regular unchokes
to the peers of its class over the duration of regular unchokes to
all peers. A high clustering index indicates a strong preference to
upload to peers in the same class. Figure 2 plots this index for all
peers and demonstrates that peers prefer to unchoke other peers in
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(a) Measurem nt r sult of Legout et al. [71].
 0  10  20  30  40
Uploading peer ID
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
Do
wn
loa
din
g p
ee
r I
D
 0
 100
 200
 300
 400
 500
 600
 700
(b) Simulat on results.
Figure 58: Time duration that peers unchoked each other via a regular unchoke. Note that
Subfigure (b) is a reproduction of Figure 1 of Legout et al. [71] (cf. Subfigure (a)). The
data is averaged over ten uns with diff rent r ndom seeds. Peers 1 to 13 represent th
’slow’ peers (20 KBps upload capacity), peers 14 to 27 the ’mediu ’ peers (50 KBps
upload capacity), and peers 28 to 40 the ’fast’ peers (200 KBps upload capacity).
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Figure 5: Total number of bytes uploaded by peers to each other, aver-
aged over all runs. Darker squares represent more data (the unit of the
color bar on the right is in bytes). Peers 1 to 13 have a 20 kB/s upload
limit, peers 14 to 27 have a 50 kB/s upload limit, and peers 28 to 40
have a 200 kB/s upload limit. The seed (peer 41) is limited to 200 kB/s.
Fast peers upload much more data than the rest.
on other fast peers, per the clustering principle. Interestingly, the
slow leechers end up downloading more data from the seed. The
seed provides equal service to peers of any class, as we show in
Section 4.1.4, but slow peers have more opportunities than others
to download from the seed, since they take longer to complete.
In summary, BitTorrent provides effective incentives for peers
to contribute, as doing so will reward a leecher with significantly
higher download rates. Recent studies [16, 17, 23] have shown that
limited free-riding is possible in BitTorrent under specific circum-
stances, although such free-riders do not appear to severely impact
the quality of service for compliant peers. However, these studies
do not significantly challenge the effectiveness of sharing incentives
enforced by the choking algorithm. Although free-riding is possi-
ble, such peers typically achieve lower download rates than they
could if they followed the protocol. As a result, if peers wish to ob-
tain the highest possible rates, it is in their best interest to conform
to the protocol.
4.1.3 Upload Utilization
We now turn our attention to performance by examining whether
the choking algorithm can maintain high utilization of peers’ upload
bandwidth. Figure 6 is a scatterplot of such utilization in the afore-
mentioned setup. A utilization of 1 represents taking full advantage
of the available upload capacity. Average utilization for each of the
thirteen runs is plotted once per minute. The metric is torrent-wide:
for each minute, we sum the upload bandwidth used by the peers
during that minute, and divide by the upload capacity available over
that minute for all peers still connected at the minute’s end. The to-
tal capacity decreases over time as peers complete their downloads
and disconnect. Utilization is low at the beginning and the end of
the session, but close to optimal for the majority of the download. It
rises slightly after approximately 15 minutes, which corresponds to
when fast peers leave the torrent. Perhaps the four-peer limit on par-
allel uploads restricts fast peers’ utilization. In any case, utilization
is good overall.
In summary, the choking algorithm, in cooperation with other
BitTorrent mechanisms such as rarest-first piece selection, does a
good job of ensuring high utilization of the upload capacity of
leechers during most of the download. Low utilization during the
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Figure 6: Scatterplot of peers’ upload utilization for all 60-second time
intervals during the download, in the presence of a well-provisioned
seed (limited to 200 kB/s). Each point represents the average upload
utilization over all peers for a given experiment run. Utilization is kept
high during most of the download session.
startup period may pose a problem for small contents, for which
it could dominate the total download time. We discuss a potential
solution to this in Section 5.2.
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Figure 7: Duration of all unchokes (regular and optimistic) performed
by a well-provisioned seed to each peer. Results for a single representa-
tive run. Peers 1 to 13 have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 14 to 27 have
a 50 kB/s upload limit, and peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s upload limit.
The seed (peer 41) provides uniform service to all leechers.
4.1.4 Seed Service
The official client introduced a modified choking algorithm in seed
state, as described in Section 2.3, although it reverted back to the
original in the most recent version. The client’s version notes claim
that the modified algorithm aims to reduce the amount of duplicate
data a seed needs to upload before it has pushed out a full copy of
the content into the torrent. We study this modified algorithm for
the first time and examine this claim.
Figure 7 shows the duration of unchokes, both regular and opti-
mistic, performed by the seed in a representative run of the afore-
mentioned setup. Leechers are unchoked in a uniform manner, re-
7
(a) Measurement results of Legout et al. [71].
 0  10  20  30  40
Uploading peer ID
 0
 5
 10
 15
 20
 25
 30
 35
 40
Do
wn
loa
din
g p
ee
r I
D
 0
 1e+07
 2e+07
 3e+07
 4e+07
 5e+07
 6e+07
(b) Simulation results.
Figure 59: Total amount of data (in bytes) peers uploaded to each other. Note that Subfigure (b) is
a reproduction of Figure 5 of Legout et al. [71] (cf. Subfigure (a)). The data is averaged
over ten runs with different random seeds. Peers 1 to 13 represent the ’slow’ peers (20
KBps upload capacity), peers 14 to 27 the ’medium’ peers (50 KBps upload capacity),
and peers 28 to 40 the ’fast’ p ers (200 KBps upload capacity).
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Figure 2: Clustering index for all peers, averaged over all runs, in the
presence of a well-provisioned seed. Errorbars represent the 10th and
90th percentiles. Peers 1 to 13 have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 14
to 27 have a 50 kB/s upload limit, and peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s
upload limit. The seed (peer 41) is limited to 200 kB/s. Peers show a
strong preference to unchoke others in the same class.
their own class, thereby forming clusters. Further experiments with
upload limits following a uniform distribution also show that peers
have a clear preference for peers with similar upload capacities.
Although from Figure 1 it might seem that slow peers show a
proportionally stronger preference for their own class, this is an ar-
tifact of the experiment. Slow peers take longer to complete their
download (as shown in Figure 3), and so they perform a higher
number of regular unchokes on average than fast peers. Also no-
tice that medium peer 27 interacts frequently with slow peers. This
peer’s download capacity is inherently limited, arguably due to ma-
chine or local network limitations, as seen in Figure 4 that plots
observed peer download speeds over time. As a result, it stays con-
nected to the torrent even after all other peers of its class have com-
pleted their download. During that last period it has to interact with
slow leechers, since those are the only ones left.
Figure 1 also shows that reciprocation is not necessarily mutual.
Slow peers frequently unchoke medium peers, but the favor is not
returned. Indeed, the slow peers unchoked medium peers for a to-
tal of 501,844 seconds, as shown by the relatively dark center-left
partition. However, the medium peers unchoked slow peers for only
273,985 seconds, as shown by the lighter bottom-center. This lack
of reciprocation is due to the fact that slow peers are of little use to
medium ones, since they cannot offer high enough upload rates.
In summary, the choking algorithm facilitates clustering, where
peers mostly interact with others in the same class, with the occa-
sional exception of random optimistic unchokes.
4.1.2 Sharing Incentives
We now examine whether BitTorrent’s choking algorithm provides
effective sharing incentives, in the sense that a peer who contributes
more to the torrent is rewarded by completing its download sooner
than the rest. Figure 3 indeed demonstrates this to be the case. We
plot the cumulative distribution of completion time for the three
classes of leechers in the previous experiment. The vertical line in
the figure represents the optimal completion time, the earliest pos-
sible time that any peer could complete its download. This is the
time the seed finished uploading a complete copy of the content.
On average, this time is around 650 seconds for the experiment.
Fast leechers complete their download soon after the optimal
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of the download l tion time
for the three different classes of leechers, in the presence of a well-
provisioned seed (limited to 200 kB/s), for all runs. The vertical line
represents the earliest possible time that the download could complete.
Fast peers finish much earlier than slow ones.
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Figure 4: Peer download speeds for all 60-second time intervals dur-
ing the download, averaged over all runs. Darker rectangles represent
higher speeds (the unit of the color bar on the right is in kB/s). Peers 1
to 13 have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 14 to 27 have a 50 kB/s upload
limit, while peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s upload limit. The seed (peer
41) is limited to 200 kB/s. Peer 27 achieves lower download rates than
other peers in its class, while peer 8 is the last one to finish.
completion time. Medium and, especially, slow leechers take signif-
icantly longer to finish. Contributing to the torrent enables a leecher
to enter the fast cluster and receive data at higher rates. This in turn
ensures a short download completion time. The choking algorithm
does indeed foster reciprocation by rewarding contributing peers. In
experiments with upload limits following a uniform distribution, the
peer completion time is also uniform: completion time decreases
when a peer’s upload contribution increases. This further indicates
the algorithm’s consistent properties with respect to effective shar-
ing incentives.
Note, however, that this does not imply any notion of data vol-
ume fairness. Fast peers end up uploading significantly more data
than the rest. Figure 5, which plots the actual volume of uploaded
data averaged over all runs, demonstrates that fast peers are the ma-
jor contributors to the torrent. Most of their bandwidth is expended
6
(a) Measurement results of Legout et al. [71].
 0  5  10  15  20  25  30  35  40
Downloading peer ID
 0
 10
 20
 30
 40
 50
 60
Ti
me
*6
0s
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 140
 160
(b) Simulation results.
Figure 60: Downl ading speed of the users over time (gray scaling is KBps). Note that Subfigure
(b) is a reproduction f Figure 4 of Legout et al. [71] (cf. Subfigure (a)). The data is
averaged over ten runs ith differen random seeds. Peers 1 to 13 represent the ’slow’
peers (20 KBps upload capacity), peers 14 to 27 the ’medium’ peers (50 KBps upload
capacity), and peers 28 to 40 the ’fast’ peers (200 KBps upload capacity).
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Figure 2: Clustering index for all peers, averaged over all runs, in the
presence of a well-provisioned seed. Errorbars represent the 10th and
90th percentiles. Peers 1 to 13 have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 14
to 27 have a 50 kB/s upload limit, and peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s
upload limit. The seed (peer 41) is limited to 200 kB/s. Peers show a
strong preference to unchoke others in the same class.
their own class, thereby forming clusters. Further experiments with
upload limits following a uniform distribution also show that peers
have a clear preference for peers with similar upload capacities.
Although from Figure 1 it might seem that slow peers show a
proportionally stronger preference for their own class, this is an ar-
tifact of the experiment. Slow peers take longer to complete their
download (as shown in Figure 3), and so they perform a higher
number of regular unchokes on average than fast peers. Also no-
tice that medium peer 27 interacts frequently with slow peers. This
peer’s download capacity is inherently limited, arguably due to ma-
chine or local network limitations, as seen in Figure 4 that plots
observed peer download speeds over time. As a result, it stays con-
nected to the torrent even after all other peers of its class have com-
pleted their download. During that last period it has to interact with
slow leechers, since those are the only ones left.
Figure 1 also shows that reciprocation is not necessarily mutual.
Slow peers frequently unchoke medium peers, but the favor is not
returned. Indeed, the slow peers unchoked medium peers for a to-
tal of 501,844 seconds, as shown by the relatively dark center-left
partition. However, the medium peers unchoked slow peers for only
273,985 seconds, as shown by the lighter bottom-center. This lack
of reciprocation is due to the fact that slow peers are of little use to
medium ones, since they cannot offer high enough upload rates.
In summary, the choking algorithm facilitates clustering, where
peers mostly interact with others in the same class, with the occa-
sional exception of random optimistic unchokes.
4.1.2 Sharing Incentives
We now examine whether BitTorrent’s choking algorithm provides
effective sharing incentives, in the sense that a peer who contributes
more to the torrent is rewarded by completing its download sooner
than the rest. Figure 3 indeed demonstrates this to be the case. We
plot the cumulative distribution of completion time for the three
classes of leechers in the previous experiment. The vertical line in
the figure represents the optimal completion time, the earliest pos-
sible time that any peer could complete its download. This is the
time the seed finished uploading a complete copy of the content.
On average, this time is around 650 seconds for the experiment.
Fast leechers complete their download soon after the optimal
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Figure 3: Cumulative distribution of the download completion time
for the three different classes of leechers, in the presence of a well-
provisioned seed (limited to 200 kB/s), for all runs. The vertical line
represents the earliest possible time that the download could complete.
Fast peers finish much earlier than slow ones.
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Figure 4: Peer download speeds for all 60-second time intervals dur-
ing the download, averaged over all runs. Darker rectangles represent
higher speeds (the unit of the color bar on the right is in kB/s). Peers 1
to 13 have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 14 to 27 have a 50 kB/s upload
limit, while peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s upload limit. The seed (peer
41) is limited to 200 kB/s. Peer 27 achieves lower download rates than
other peers in its class, while peer 8 is the last one to finish.
completion time. Medium and, especially, slow leechers take signif-
icantly longer to finish. Contributing to the torrent enables a leecher
to enter the fast cluster and receive data at higher rates. This in turn
ensures a short download completion time. The choking algorithm
does indeed foster reciprocation by rewarding contributing peers. In
experiments with upload limits following a uniform distribution, the
peer completion time is also uniform: completion time decreases
when a peer’s upload contribution increases. This further indicates
the algorithm’s consistent properties with respect to effective shar-
ing incentives.
Note, however, that this does not imply any notion of data vol-
ume fairness. Fast peers end up uploading significantly more data
than the rest. Figure 5, which plots the actual volume of uploaded
data averaged over all runs, demonstrates that fast peers are the ma-
jor contributors to the torrent. Most of their bandwidth is expended
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(a) Measurement results of Legout et al. [71].
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(b) Simulation results.
Figure 61: The cumulative distribution function of peer download times. Note that Subfigure (b) is a
reproduction of Figure 3 of Legout et al. [71] (cf. Subfigure (a)). The data is averaged over
ten runs with different random seeds.
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Figure 5: Total number of bytes uploaded by peers to each other, aver-
aged over all runs. Darker squares represent more data (the unit of the
color bar on the right is in bytes). Peers 1 to 13 have a 20 kB/s upload
limit, peers 14 to 27 have a 50 kB/s upload limit, and peers 28 to 40
have a 200 kB/ upload limit. The seed (peer 41) is limited to 200 kB/s.
Fast peers upload much more data than the rest.
on other fast peers, per the clustering principle. Interestingly, the
slow leechers end up downloading more data from the seed. The
seed provides equal service to peers of any class, as we show in
Section 4.1.4, but slow peers have more opportunities than others
to download from the seed, since they take longer to complete.
In summary, BitTorrent provides effective incentives for peers
to contribute, as doing so will reward a leecher with significantly
higher download rates. Recent studies [16, 17, 23] have shown that
limited free-riding is possible in BitTorrent under specific circum-
stances, although such free-riders do not appear to severely impact
the quality of service for compliant peers. However, these studies
do not significantly challenge the effectiveness of sharing incentives
enforced by the c king lgorithm. Although fre -riding is possi-
ble, such peers typically achieve lower download rat s than they
could if they followed the protocol. As a result, if peers wish to ob-
t in the highest possible rates, it is in t ir best interest to conform
to the protocol.
4.1.3 Upl ad Utilization
We now turn our attention to performance by examining whether
the choking algorithm can maintain high utilization of peers’ upload
bandwidth. Figure 6 is a scatterplot of such utilization in the afore-
mentioned setup. A utilization of 1 represents taking full advantage
of the available upload capacity. Average utilization for each of the
thirteen runs is plotted once per minute. The metric is torrent-wide:
for each minute, we sum the upload bandwidth used by the peers
during that minute, and divide by the upload capacity available over
that minute for all peers still connected at the minute’s end. The to-
tal capacity decreas s over time as peers complete th ir downloads
and disconnect. Utilization is low at the begin ing and the nd of
the sessi n, but close to optimal for the majority of the download. It
ris s slightly after approximately 15 inutes, which corresponds to
when fast peers leave the torrent. Perhaps the four-peer limit on par-
allel uploads restricts fast peers’ utilization. In any case, utilization
is good ov rall.
In ummary, the choking algorithm, in cooper tion with other
BitTorrent mechanisms such as rarest-first piece selection, does a
good job of ensuring high utilization of the upload capacity of
leechers during most of the download. Low utilization during the
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Figure 6: Scatterplot of peers’ upload utilization for all 60-second time
intervals during the download, in the prese ce of a well-provisioned
seed (limited to 200 kB/s). Each point represents the average upload
utilization over all peers for a given experiment run. Utilization is kept
high during most of the download session.
startup period may pose a problem for small contents, for which
it could dominate the total download time. We discuss a potential
solution to this in Section 5.2.
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Figure 7: Duration of all unchokes (regular and optimistic) performed
by a well-provisioned seed to each peer. Results for a single representa-
tive run. Peers 1 to 13 have a 20 kB/s upload limit, peers 14 to 27 have
a 50 kB/s upload limit, and peers 28 to 40 have a 200 kB/s upload limit.
The seed (peer 41) provides uniform service to all leechers.
4.1.4 Seed Service
The official client introduced a modified choking algorithm in seed
state, as described in Section 2.3, although it reverted back to the
original in the most recent version. The client’s version n tes claim
that the modified algorithm aims to reduce the amount of duplicate
dat a s ed needs to upload before it has pushed ut a full copy of
the cont nt into the tor e t. We study his modified algorithm for
the first ime and examine this claim.
Figure 7 shows the duration of unchokes, both regular and opti-
mistic, performed by the seed in a representative run of the afore-
mentioned setup. Leechers are unchoked in a uniform manner, re-
7
(a) Measurement results of Legout et al. [71].
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(b) Simulation results.
Figure 62: Seeder unchoke duration to each peer, as obtained from a representative experiment run.
Not that Subfigure (b) is a eproductio of Figure 7 of Legout et al. [71] (cf. Subfigure
(a)). Peers 1 to 13 represent the ’slow’ peers (20 KBps upload capacity), peers 14 to 27 the
’medium’ peers (50 KBps upload capacity), and peers 28 to 40 the ’fast’ peers (200 KBps
upload capacity).
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